Ambassador
I have to report that I had an interview this morning with the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Francis P. Matthews.¹ It may be well to explain how the interview arose.

I have had the pleasure of meeting the Secretary a number of times since he came to Washington and have always found him extremely friendly and interested in our problems. You may remember that he was one of the speakers at the dinner for the former Minister, Mr. Seán Nunan, before his departure from Washington. He attended that dinner on my invitation. Recently he was a guest at the Press Club luncheon at which you spoke, again on my suggestion. I had a talk with him on that occasion and mentioned to him the speech delivered by Brigadier O'Gowan² at the Overseas Writers' Club here regarding Ireland and the Atlantic Pact. He had not seen the speech though I had had a copy sent to him at the Navy Department, and he asked me to send a copy to him at his home address at the Mayflower. When I met him at your house for dinner a couple of weeks ago he said he would like to have a chat with me, and this week I called him and invited him to luncheon. He was unable to come and asked me if I would come over to the Pentagon at 9 a.m. and talk with him in his office, which, naturally, I was happy to do.

I arrived at the Pentagon at 8.40 a.m. The Secretary arrived at 8.50 a.m. A couple of minutes after his arrival I was ushered in to see him. He was most friendly, and after the usual preliminary remarks I explained to him that I had had unofficial approaches made to me within the past few weeks in regard to the possibility of the Taoiseach accepting an invitation from the President to visit the United States in his official capacity. I indicated to him that I had been given to believe that these approaches had been inspired by the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Louis Johnston,³ one of the parties who saw me being Mr. Jim Markham,⁴ former Alien Property Custodian, and also associated with Mr. Johnston in his law practice. I further said to Mr. Matthews that our people at home would naturally be interested in such an invitation but that it would be desirable that Mr. Seán MacBride our Minister should be included in such an invitation if it were issued, at the same time mentioning briefly the political background in Ireland.

I then went on to refer to Mr. MacBride's interview in Paris on June 6th given to the United Press, in which he had stated the desirability of the United States providing arms for Ireland to defend herself in the event of invasion, and I gave briefly the substance of the Minister's statement. I also said that the question had been placed before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House considering the Military Aid Programme, by Congressman Harry J. Davenport⁵ of Pennsylvania who took a considerable interest in Irish matters, and summarised for the Secretary the statement submitted by the Congressman.

I then read an extract from the President's message to the Congress entitled 'Recommendation that the United States continue to Provide Military Aid to Other Free Nations', in which he said: 'The security of the United States and the free world may demand prompt emergency assistance on the part of the United States to other imperilled nations whose continued integrity is of vital importance ... I therefore recommend to the Congress that limited provision be made for authority to cope with such emergencies. It will not be necessary to provide additional funds for this purpose. Such emergencies will be sufficiently provided for if a small portion of the funds made available for military assistance may be shifted to meet such situations as they arise'.

In my personal opinion, I continued, that statement by the President would, if given legislative force, enable the United States to accept the suggestion put forward by Mr. MacBride in his press interview provided that the Department of Defence, of which he the Secretary was one of the principal policy makers, made suitable recommendation.

It therefore had occurred to me that if there was anything in the suggestion that the Taoiseach be invited to visit the President the occasion might well be utilised for an agreement in principle on the possibility of supplying the means of defense to Ireland, or, at least, the question might be explored. I had, therefore, taken the liberty of approaching him for his advice in connection with the matter and hoped that he would give consideration to the subject, and, if he thought well of it, advance the matter in the appropriate quarter. I emphasised that this talk was of a personal nature and said that I had confidence that he would not consider me presumptuous in seeking for a discussion of the matter with him.

The Secretary listened patiently to all I had to say and did not interrupt me until I had finished. I think I must have talked for at least fifteen minutes. He gave me the utmost attention - in fact his attitude was rather judicial. When I had finished he began to question me. He asked first about the approaches made to me in regard to the visit. He said he knew Jim Markham and also he knew of Charles Brady who first came to see me on the matter.

He then asked had there been any reaction to Mr. MacBride's interview. I said not as far as I knew, except that Mr. Averell Harriman had been asked a question about it when he was giving evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee on this question of Military Aid and that Mr. Harriman had said in reply that if Mr. MacBride wished to obtain military aid he should join the Atlantic Pact. I further said that Mr. Harriman had now been appointed Foreign Affairs Coordinator by the President and if that was his attitude, as revealed by his answer to the question, then we would have little hope of obtaining aid except in the way he suggested, and explained once more our difficulties in regard to entering that covenant.

Mr. Matthews said that he was fully aware of our difficulties in regard to the Pact and that no one was more sympathetic in our case than he personally. But however sympathetic he may be, he was a public servant here to carry out the policy of the United States, and we must not forget that the cornerstone of American policy was to foster and retain friendship with England, and how would she regard the giving of arms to Ireland? Would England not fear that such arms would be utilised for the purpose of attempting to obtain the return of the North and, indeed, was there any guarantee that this would not be so? He further said that the present British Government was committed to the retention of the North, and if such an effort as he mentioned were made by us it might merely mean that the entire armed force of Britain would be directed against us and that a second occupation of the entire country by Great Britain would come into being. He indicated also that the U.S. Government would not take up our case with the present British Government because they felt that that Government was too deeply committed to retaining the North. He also implied that the U.S. Government were not too sure that the Labour Government might not stay⁶ closer to Russia if they were not kept 'sweet' by the U.S. If, said he, a Conservative Government were in power in Great Britain it might be a different story for they would then have more reliance on the stability of the Government and in its philosophy than they have in the present Socialist administration.

Mr. Matthews went on to emphasize in very straightforward language the necessity for the U.S. maintaining the good relationship with Great Britain which existed, and the importance that nothing should be done to injure such relationship. He said he was now speaking to me as the devil's advocate, that he was a lawyer for thirty five years and that he always thought out first the points against his case in weighing up his chances of success in Court. He assured me that he was most completely sold on our point of view and then proceeded to ask me detailed questions.

First he asked about the use of the arms. I reiterated what I had said that they would be for defense, that the present Government were committed to the pursuance of a peaceful policy for regaining the North, that they, too, were fully aware of the danger which an attempt at armed force would have, that even if there was a change of Government the present opposition headed by Mr. de Valera was the most likely successor and that Mr. de Valera had made it clear many times that he was not in favor of the use of force even to obtain our rights. To this Mr. Matthews said that Mr. de Valera had made the same statement to him when he visited Ireland and he accepted that as accurate, but, he asked, was that enough to reassure the British. To this I said that our Army would have control of the arms, that today there was no extremist body in Irish politics, and that if something could be worked out it might be possible to arrange for some sort of American Military Mission to be stationed in Ireland to supervise the use of the arms.

The Secretary said to this that the posting of such a mission might cause political difficulties in Ireland, to which I replied that though I was going far beyond my scope I thought it might be possible to have the commission posted as a training unit to instruct our Army people in the use of the arms. It would then serve two purposes, only one of which need be announced.

The Secretary then said he would give earnest consideration to what I had said. I would realise, of course, that the great stumbling block was Partition - the British were afraid of what steps we might take and the State Department insisted that nothing be done on the U.S. side which would cause a breach between Britain and themselves. He felt personally that there had been too much talk of Partition, too many professional Irishmen - as he styled them - in this country were seeking notoriety by bombast utterances, and that more might be done behind the scenes. He saw, in God's good time the ending of Partition by peaceful means possibly not in this generation, his and mine, but by a process of evolution in the next generation.

He regretted that he had not had this interview with me at the beginning of the week for on Thursday he had had the President to himself for three hours at Quantico the Marine Base, and they had talked of every subject under the sun. He would surely have discussed this matter with him had he had the information which I had given him. I shared Mr. Matthews' regret.

However, he said, he thought that something to our satisfaction was possible to arrange. It would have to be handled with the greatest care and secrecy. Nothing should be allowed to leak out, and he suggested that for the present it might be the part of wisdom to avoid any further public references to the armed aid question while he would see what could be done.

He proposed specifically to talk the whole question over with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnston, on his return from Japan which will be next month. He thought he would take him on his yacht down the river where they would be quite alone and discuss the subject in absolute secrecy. In the meantime he warned me of the necessity of the utmost care in regard to the possibility of leakage. If a whisper got out he thought there would be no possibility of making any arrangement for the opposition would then be warned. He gave, as a case in point, the desire of the President as told by the President to appoint an Ambassador to the Vatican but the report had got out before he could put his desire into practice and consequently the Protestant groups had been able to publicise the issue and make it politically impossible for the President to carry out his intention.

As regards the visit, he suggested that if Mr. Costello and Mr. MacBride came they should make it a solely protocol visit rather than let it develop into a tour of the country. I pointed out that there would be a difficulty in this as so many groups throughout the country would wish to hear them. He offered the suggestion that any public utterances they found it necessary to make might perhaps be of a most general nature, emphasizing the friendship between the U.S. and Ireland, etc. I gathered from this that Mr. Matthews thought that during the course of the visit anything said which might irritate the State Department or the British might militate against the success of the mission.

He further added that the visit might be undertaken without any advance talks as to what might be discussed, but that the opportunity would occur for discussion in private of the matters in which we are interested. He suggested that the subjects we had discussed this morning be now left dormant until he had had his talk with Mr. Johnston on his return from Japan. I said that I would convey his recommendations.

Before concluding the interview which lasted approximately three quarters of an hour the Secretary wished to be remembered to the Ambassador and expressed his pleasure at meeting him at dinner at the Ambassador's house. He also asked for the former Minister, Mr. Nunan, said they had been friends for many years and added what he has said before that given the chance he would 'give his right arm to be Ambassador to Ireland'.

I asked permission to present my son Peter who was in the anteroom to the Secretary. Peter had driven me to the Pentagon. He was most kindly to Peter as indeed he was to me. I thanked him most heartily for his graciousness, and told him in reply to his question as to why I had approached him in particular that it was because he had the reputation of being a person of the highest integrity, that he enjoyed the confidence of the President and that he was also in the confidence of the Secretary of Defense whose voice in the matter was of great importance, and, finally, that he had been so friendly to me since his arrival in Washington that I felt at ease with him. He seemed pleased by what I said. I mentioned incidentally to the Secretary that I would be having Mr. Matthew Connelly, the President's Secretary, to luncheon on Thursday and asked him if he thought I should broach the matters I had discussed with him to Mr. Connelly. After a very deliberate pause for thought, Mr. Matthews replied that he thought it would be better not, that though he was friendly with Matt Connelly and knew the President thought highly of him too, nevertheless this was a question for the highest policy level which Matt was after all not on, though so close to President Truman.

In conclusion I may say that I am satisfied that Mr. Matthews is genuinely in sympathy with our cause though his thinking may not coincide with ours on all the points at issue.