Dear John,
Before George Garrett's last visit to the U.S., I had a number of informal conversations with him concerning the possibility of obtaining military equipment and training facilities from the U.S. for our army. As you know, we have been dependent practically entirely on Britain for military equipment and, to a certain extent, for training. This is most unsatisfactory for a number of reasons which are obvious. Recently supplies have been curtailed very radically. Whether this is due to a desire to impose pressure upon us or to a genuine shortage of materials in Britain is uncertain.

Apart from these considerations, there are two other considerations which make it desirable from our point of view that we should not be dependent entirely on Britain for either supplies or training. The reasons are:-

• The policy of the British Government in relation to Russia and the satellite Communist states is anything but clear. As you know, the British Government have made several very big trade deals with them; it seems clear that if they are not supplying military equipment to the Communist states they are at least supplying strategic material. The recognition of the Chinese Communist Government and the supply of equipment to the Chinese Communist Government through Hong Kong while the French are fighting for their lives to maintain Indo-China, is another factor which has to be borne in mind.

  There is a very strong left wing in the Labour Party in Britain - much stronger, I believe than appears on the surface; it is silent and quiescent because Labour is in power and because they rely on American financial assistance.

  The economic position of Britain is rather chaotic. Her political future is uncertain; if the Conservatives gain power, it is certain that the left wing of the trade union movement, released from the present restraint, will engage in a fierce struggle against the Conservative Government. This will show itself by demands for increased wages and strikes. The impact of devaluation prices is now becoming apparent.

  In these circumstances, it is very hard to forecast Britain's future, or what her attitude would be in the event of a sudden war. She might participate in it, or she might reach a compromise with Russia. To be solely dependent upon Britain for supplies and training in these circumstances would be highly undesirable.

• Should war break out (which God forbid) and should Britain participate on the side of the U.S., it appears reasonably probable that Britain would be one of the first and main targets for atomic aerial bombing. This would occur even before Russia had overrun the Continent; the extent of the resistance which Russia would encounter on the Continent is very problematical.

  With modern aerial developments and modern bombing technique, it appears likely that even a short, concentrated attack on a relatively small country such as Britain would cripple her production potential, or at least damage it sufficiently to preclude us from receiving the equipment and ammunition necessary for our own defence. We are not in a position to obtain from Britain sufficient war material for stock-piling purposes, and therefore would, if the worst came to the worst, be left in time of crisis bereft of the armament and ammunition necessary for our defences.

  Even should Britain be prepared to make available to us now, adequate equipment, we would, in the light of the events just described, be left without the ammunition, spare parts and replacements necessary to utilise the armament in our possession.

These thumb-nail sketches of possible developments, however gloomy, are possibilities which we must envisage in looking ahead. I think myself that war is unlikely and that if it does take place, it is virtually the end of our civilisation, certainly as far as Europe is concerned. However, so many different factors are involved, that it is necessary that we should think as objectively as possible on all such possibilities.

Whatever the attitude of the Government then in power may be as to our participation in a war, it is, I think, quite certain that Ireland would resist any attempted invasion to the last man. This, I think, is more than could be said for most other countries in Europe and, having regard to this fact, I feel that the U.S. has a direct interest in making available to us defensive armament and training facilities. Of course we would not be in a position to pay for these.

Since George Garrett's return from Washington, I have had a number of further informal discussions with him during which I explained the foregoing. He asked me whether we would envisage a three-cornered military pact between the U.S.A., Canada and Ireland. I told him that this could not be considered, and that any military pact that savoured of a backdoor entrance to the Atlantic Pact should be counted out. Any agreement with Canada would be regarded politically here as being virtually an agreement with Britain. He mentioned the possibility of an agreement between the U.S. and Ireland for military purposes. I explained to him that this too would, under present circumstances, savour of a backdoor entry into the Atlantic Pact and would raise many difficult political issues. That insofar as the U.S. was concerned, it would be unwise to raise any questions of this nature that might become controversial issues in the field of our internal politics; that in any event, there should be no difficulty as far as the U.S. is concerned in helping Ireland to protect and defend herself in the event of a war; that, of all the European countries Ireland is far more likely to resist with determination an attack and would certainly not side against the U.S.

Generally speaking on these issues, I have found the U.S. Ambassador understanding and friendly. I think he saw and accepted the force of the arguments which I put forward. No doubt he has relayed the substance of them to the State Department, but so far he has not received a decisive reply.

When in Washington he discussed this position with Mr. Acheson, subsequently with Mr. Johnson and finally he saw General Bradley. Bradley was interested and undertook to have the matter examined. I gather that he has been pressing for a reply since his return, but has not yet received one. It is unlikely however, that an immediate reply will be received. In all probability the State Department will put out some feelers to the British and the British will oppose any proposal of this nature. They always resent the development of closer relations between the U.S. and Ireland and would like to continue to avail of our dependence on their armament, for pressure purposes.

As I thought it possible that the British might suggest that we were anxious to obtain armaments for the purpose of taking over the six counties, I emphasised to the U.S. Ambassador that the type of armament we would require mostly would be armament of a defensive nature, which would enable us to repel an airborne attack and to maintain lines of communication with the U.S. I felt it necessary to emphasise this aspect, to meet in advance the argument which the British would be likely to use.

To summarise, the points to bear in mind are:-

• There can be no advance commitment as to peace and war. This is a matter for the Government and the Dáil, in the light of existing circumstances.
• Ireland would certainly resist, fiercely, any attempted invasion.
• We require defensive armament and training facilities to repel a possible airborne invasion, also radio, radar and other means of communication and detection.
• For the reasons already enumerated, we feel it would be strategically unwise that our defences should be dependent upon British sources of supplies, even if the British were willing to make these available to us.
• We cannot pay for such equipment and training facilities.

While you should not make any direct approach on this question at the moment, it might be well to make our point of view clear on these questions, if opportunity offers. I should be glad if you would let me know of any indications that you may receive from discussions with anyone closely connected with the administration in these matters.

I enclose herewith, for your information, copy of a confidential minute of conversations I had recently with the British Representative here.¹ You will see from this that relations are anything but satisfactory; though I doubt that the views of the British Representative reflect the more responsible views of the British Government; they probably do, however, reflect the views of the Commonwealth Relations Office, which is, as always, antagonistic.

Australia, who had been prepared to exchange Ambassadors with us, has jibbed at the last moment. I think this is probably as a result of pressure from London.

You could show this letter and the enclosure to McCann and Brennan and to such other members of the staff as you may desire.

I hope you like your new post and are getting acclimatized to the Washington weather. I am sure you have been very busy and that it will take you some time to settle in. The job of meeting and getting to know everybody is, in itself, a tremendous task, so that I am sure you are having a very busy time. Please remember me to all the boys.