When Monsieur Schuman, French Foreign Minister, called on the President on the 22nd instant, he stated in the course of a general conversation that he was very satisfied on the whole with the way things had gone at the talks in London during the preceding ten days. The way he put it is that the results were on the average satisfactory. In his view this is the best that could be expected given the necessity to get agreement between twelve different powers. He seemed to be particularly happy about the reactions to his own proposal for the pooling of the French and German coal and steel industries. He regards the reaction among the French people generally as reasonably good and consequently feels reassured as to the backing in the country for what he described as an especially delicate initiative. He declared that it would have been inconceivable five years ago that such an offer on the part of France would encounter such a favourable reception in France. He seemed particularly gratified at the way in which the annual convention of his party (MRP), which was held at Nantes from the 18th to the 21st May, had reacted to the proposal. He stated that no dissenting voice had been heard and interpreted this as symptomatic of the average French reaction.

Monsieur Schuman's optimism about the reaction here to his proposal would appear to be rather too unqualified. Monsieur Francisque Gay,¹ former Ambassador in Canada, Vice President of MRP and an old friend of the President, as well as a good friend of Ireland many years ago, called on the President on the 23rd instant and had much of interest to say in regard to this question. He explained that he had just come from a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, where certain criticisms of the proposal had been voiced. He went on to say that, although he is one of Monsieur Schuman's most intimate friends, he personally has serious doubts about the feasibility and long-term wisdom of the project. The most serious anxiety under this head is, he stated, felt precisely by those who are closest to M. Schuman's way of thinking. He declared that many of the delegates to the MRP Convention at Nantes are rather uneasy about the project and its implementation, and that he personally had arranged matters in such a way that a motion approving the project should not be discussed - this to prevent criticism being voiced publicly by M. Schuman's own supporters. The motion itself, which was approved unanimously, was, he stated, very carefully drafted and, in its very punctuation, hints at the differences of opinion which exist in the MRP Party. He explained that his own anxiety and that of those who share his views, comes from the fact that they fear that the project may become a Franco-German 'tête à tête'. Should this happen, then the execution of the project would raise difficulties of a major character. He and his friends doubt whether Benelux and Italy alone would offer sufficient counter-balance to Germany. Britain's position is at present uncertain apart altogether from the practical difficulties of fitting her planned economy into the framework envisaged by the Schuman project. Among the problems which the implementation of the project will raise are the differences in salary scales and Social Service charges prevailing in France and in Germany (where they are lower), the fact that the Germans work longer hours and dispose of richer deposits which can be more cheaply exploited, these various factors resulting in the German product being available at lower prices than those at which the French product can be marketed. If, on the other hand, the ownership of the German steel industry should return to its former 'Nazi' proprietors, M. Francisque Gay would see in this the seeds of future trouble. A most important point in his eyes is that of the nature of the Higher Authority, how it is to be made a genuine spokesman of governments and independent of private interests, and how its decisions are to be given effect. His principal preoccupation, however, is that mentioned at the outset, viz. that this project may become simply a Franco-German tête-à-tête in which, one inferred he fears that Germany would become ultimately the dominating partner.

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When the Schuman project was announced, a certain degree of surprise was expressed in the Press at the suddenness with which and the circumstances in which Monsieur Schuman made it public. As regards the circumstances surrounding his announcement Monsieur Schuman is, as you know, rather quiet in manner and in his general behaviour. It appears, however, that the Press Conference at which the announcement was made, was surrounded with all the appurtenances likely to ensure the maximum publicity and that Monsieur Schuman spoke in a manner designed to achieve that result. It was alleged at the time that he made his announcement in this particular way and on the particular date involved so as to avoid the risk of having the proposal buried in committees and emerging in an emasculated form; in other words, he was anxious to strike public opinion and secure for his proposal everywhere the advantages coming from the sudden publication of what is obviously a rather sensational initiative. Apart from the desire to strike public opinion by announcing the scheme without a prior public warning, many people here believe that the reason why Monsieur Schuman failed to advise other governments thereof beforehand is that he feared that if he were to do so some of them, and particularly Britain, would have endeavoured to prevent publicity being given to the project until they had had time to study it. It was foreseen that the British Government would not be enthusiastic for a number of reasons, including their reluctance to participate therein and their lack of desire to see France taking the centre of the stage by a concrete step in co-operation. I am informed by my Turkish colleague that he gathered from the British Ambassador that the latter had heard nothing whatever about it beforehand. This, if true, is the more interesting in that when I paid my courtesy call on him Sir Oliver Harvey² told me that the British and French Governments were now accustomed to consult each other on all kinds of questions of mutual interest. Monsieur Menemenjoglu saw in the failure of the French to advise the British beforehand a retort for the failure of Britain to give the French prior warning of the devaluation of sterling last September and in particular of the degree of devaluation unilaterally determined. I should say, however, that the Italian Ambassador³ (who enjoys here a reputation for being well informed and level-headed), rather discounted the suggestion that the British were taken completely by surprise. According to him talks between French and German coal, and more particularly steel, interests, have been going on for some time past and he considers it unlikely that the British Ambassador should not have been au courant. The fact that such talks have been taking place was confirmed to me by M. de La Tournelle, Political Director General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It would seem, however, that at least the form and extent of the announcement made by M. Schuman at the Press Conference on the 9th May were a surprise to the British. I might add that the Canadian Ambassador when I saw him on the 11th May, without purporting to express an opinion on the merits of the Schuman proposal in detail, said that he regarded it as a most courageous gesture on the part of the French and one which superficially seemed to him to be capable of bringing about a definite improvement in the future relations between France and Germany and hence of great importance for the Western World.

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