Dear Conor,¹
This is by way of being a summing up of the general situation in regard to the approaches for a resolution. Joe Shields told me today that Tom Buckley had a letter dated June 30 from John W. McCormack,² Majority Leader, in which McCormack said that he and Mike Mansfield, who is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, would do everything in their power to ensure that a resolution satisfactory to us would be reported on to the Committee. The date of McCormack's letter is significant. It was after the Korean business started and yet it appears not to have weakened his expressed determination to produce an appropriate resolution.

I myself had a talk with Mike Mansfield on Monday last. Mike, while not as optimistic as previously concerning the possibility of an appropriate resolution coming out, still said that he saw no reason - once the Military Aid programme was out of the way - to suppose that our resolution would not be acted on by the Committee. However, he did also say that the atmosphere is not as receptive for it as before the Korean question became acute, and there is no need for me to labour this point with you. You will readily understand that if this war in the Far East becomes at all serious and American lives are sacrificed, they will have extremely small sympathy for us, first because of our neutrality in the last war and secondly because of our attitude towards the Atlantic Pact. No doubt you have seen the cables sent making suggestions as to how this feeling might be counteracted.³

It may interest you to know that I had luncheon recently with Matthew J. Connelly, the President's Appointments Secretary and one of his closest intimates. We lunched at the Carlton and after lunch Matt took me to the White House where I made a tour of the White House offices, met a number of the staff, and finally was brought in to meet the President. My conversation with the President, as you will understand, did not refer to the subject of Partition. It was very brief and very friendly. I have met him a couple of times before and he was good enough to remember me. While there I also met Bill Boyle,⁴ the Chairman of the Democratic Party, and a couple of other people whose names are not now important.

During the course of our lunch Matt told me that he had had a call from James Michael Curley,⁵ the former Mayor of Boston, asking him to arrange with the President to receive Curley and a delegation to heads of various Irish Societies in the United States. Curley told Matt to tell the President that the Partition question could easily be an issue in the next election, and that he thought it would mean two million votes for the Party if they incorporated in the platform a plank recommending the abolition of Partition. Matt told me quite frankly that after consideration he sent a telegram to Curley saying that the President's time was fully occupied and that there was no hope of making an appointment as requested by Curley. The reason he sent this telegram was that while he said it is true that the Partition issue might mean 2,000,000 votes cast for the Party it might also mean the loss of 6,000,000 and this the Party cannot afford. In other words the whole outlook in the matter even at this level is one of political expediency. I suggested to Matt that he was exaggerating and that there would be no loss. But he is too old a politician and too versed in the ways of the United States electorate to accept my view point.

I asked Matt was the President actually interested in our position. He said in all frankness that while the President was aware of the position, was fond of the Irish and was always willing to do anything that would not embarrass him, the Partition question to him was not a vital issue, and it is most unlikely that he will take any steps which would endanger the close-knit friendship with Britain. Matt said that the friendship with Britain was absolutely the cornerstone of the administration policy in the foreign field, and they were always afraid of needing them, the British, too much for fear they might move further left.

In addition to this, Connelly pointed out to me that in making the suggestion that the President receive a delegation from Irish Societies, Curley was in all probability playing his own hand and that his suggestion was, he felt sure, knowing Curley's cynical opportunism, merely a card to be played in getting himself elected once more as Mayor of Boston. My own feeling is that we should not be too worried about whether he is re-elected Mayor of Boston or not, and I was wondering if it would not be a good idea to urge Curley to return to the charge once this Korean situation has settled itself. That will, however, take months.

I am in close touch with Mike Mansfield and know the present position in regard to the Resolution pretty well. The galley proofs of the evidence given at the Hearing have not yet been returned to the printer but will in all probability be back before the end of the present week, and the hearings will be printed and available for the Committee before the end of next week. When they can give consideration to it is another matter. The Military Aid Programme is going to take up their time fairly completely for the next couple of weeks. I have been considering whether it would not be a good idea to have a barrage of letters and telegrams sent to the various members of the Committee, but Mike Mansfield thinks it would probably antagonize them rather than do any good. He thought that possibly an approach to members of the Committee by members of Congress would be more effective, especially if they came from the same State. I think I shall attempt it in a quiet way and will let you know the result.