The news of the Communist break through in Northern Korea struck British public opinion with the force of a hurricane. It was ill-prepared for the blow. General MacArthur's bombastic utterances, the news of the launching of a United Nations offensive, and the publicity given to the theory that the Chinese Communists captured in Northern Korea were merely volunteers, had lulled people in this country into the comforting feeling that, in spite of local difficulties, everything in Korea was going well. The realisation that Communist China had decided to take a major hand and that the United Nations armies were in imminent danger, was more than a shock. It threw not only public opinion, but the official and political world, into a state of complete bewilderment.

The Debate in the House of Commons on Wednesday did nothing to relieve the general feeling of bewildered gloom. Nothing served to underline the mental 'desarroi' more than the Foreign Secretary's statement, at the conclusion of his opening speech, that he was keeping 'an open mind'. As one Member remarked in the course of the Debate, Mr. Bevin's inferiority complex in dealing with the United States, and his isolation complex in dealing with Europe, is ordinarily equalled only by his superiority complex in dealing with the House of Commons. As another Member said in conversation with me, Mr. Bevin's statement that he had 'an open mind' made people feel, more than anything else had done, that things were bad indeed. When the House adjourned on Wednesday evening, nobody seemed any wiser for the afternoon's Debate. Nobody seemed to have any idea what should, or could, be done in face of the disaster threatening in Northern Korea.

The Cabinet met the following morning. Following up a vague suggestion made by Mr. Eden in his speech the previous day, the desirability of sending a British Minister to Washington or Lake Success was discussed. The idea was already being canvassed widely in the Press and it is noteworthy that the name generally mentioned was that of Mr. Hector McNeil. Indeed, it is remarkable how little reference was made, in all the discussion of this proposal, to the possibility of the Foreign Secretary going himself. Mr. Bevin, who has already lost much prestige outside his own Party, seems now to be losing much of his authority within it. The upshot of the discussion at Thursday morning's Cabinet meeting was that it was desirable in principle that a senior British Minister should go to Washington for discussions with President Truman and that, if anyone went, it should be the Prime Minister himself. The Foreign Office was instructed to put this to Washington at once (I am recounting the course of events rather categorically, but my information comes from a really first hand source). The Debate resumed on Thursday afternoon with Mr. Churchill's pronouncement. The universal opinion in the Corridors was that Mr. Woodrow Wyatt's description of it as 'one of the greatest speeches of Mr. Churchill's career' was simply ludicrous. As even Nelson Broadbent, Diplomatic Correspondent of the 'Daily Mail' put it to me, the first two-thirds of the speech were merely ancient history and the final third of it contained nothing new. It was while Mr. Churchill was speaking, however, that a Foreign Office official passed to Mr. Ernest Davies, who was on the Front Bench with Mr. Bevin, the first news flash of President Truman's press conference in Washington. Mr. Davies passed the text at once to Mr. Bevin who said: 'This helps - this gives us our chance'. Mr. Bevin was not far off the mark. The fact of the Truman interview, when it became known throughout the Corridors, was dramatic. Bewilderment and gloom were turned into anger and alarm. Sidney Silverman immediately began to circulate a letter of protest to the Prime Minister which quickly collected one hundred signatures. The Press Gallery was unanimous in condemning the folly of President Truman's statements. Government, Conservatives, and Left Wing Labour, were united in the same feeling. What caused this concentration of opinion was not merely President Truman's incautious remarks about the possible use of the atomic bomb, but the over-elaborate defence which he gave to General MacArthur at a time when opinion in the House of Commons was crystallising in the view that the essence of the problem, and the cause of the disaster, was the fact that MacArthur had been allowed to pursue his own sweet way, resenting and ignoring political guidance.

The British reaction to President Truman's statement was immediate. Messages flew between London and Washington and between the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill. Another meeting of the Cabinet was called for 6.45 p.m. at which the lines of the statement to be made by the Prime Minister at the conclusion of the Debate were determined. It is difficult to believe that these were not made known to the Opposition beforehand because the excellent speech made by the last speaker on the Conservative side, Mr. R.A. Butler - who was loudly cheered by the Government Benches - set the scene for Mr. Attlee's concluding speech admirably.

Mr. Attlee's speech really contained only two points of substance - the statement of the British Government's view that the use of the atomic bomb should be a matter for decision by all the Governments whose troops were fighting in Korea and, secondly, that he, himself, intended to visit Washington. Slender as these two points were, they did much to relieve the uncertainty and mental confusion of the preceding two days. The Labour Government was delighted with the result of the Debate. Not only was the degree of unanimity shown in the Debate most comforting and helpful, serving as it would to strengthen Mr. Attlee's hand in his discussions with President Truman, but the British Government had, they felt, succeeded, almost by accident, in capturing the initiative so far as the whole of Western Europe was concerned. In conversation last night, Mr. Ernest Davies evinced very considerable satisfaction on this latter score. He mentioned the fact that the French Premier was coming to London today for conversation with Mr. Attlee as proof that when he went to Washington, Mr. Attlee would really be the spokesman, not merely of Great Britain, but of Western European opinion as a whole. Mr. Davies made no reply when I asked whether Mr. Attlee would not find it rather difficult to reconcile the role of spokesman for Western Europe with that of spokesman for the British Commonwealth, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

The general lines of British policy in regard to the present Korean crisis have become much clearer within the last few days. I will deal with them in a report within a day or so. In the meantime I understand that Mr. Attlee's talks in Washington will cover a very wide field indeed and some indication of, their nature is given by the fact that, as Mr. Davies informed me last night, the only officials of the Foreign Office who will accompany the Prime Minister are Mr. R.H. Scott, Head of the Far Eastern Division, and Sir Roger Makins whose inclusion, Mr. Davies told me, was due to the fact that he was the principal Economic expert of the Foreign Office.