Dear Mr. Pearson,
By the time you receive this letter you will probably have received our reply to the Aide Mémoire, delivered by the United States Government, in relation to the proposed Atlantic Pact. I am writing this personal letter to you as I want to explain our attitude a little more fully and also because I feel that you might be in a position to assist in ending a deadlock which is detrimental, not merely to us, but to Britain and, to a certain degree, to the success of the Atlantic Pact.

Our Aide Mémoire of the 8th February¹ sets out the main considerations relating to the problem of Partition and I need not, therefore, repeat these to you. It is by no means an easy problem from the point of view of Britain, because of its internal political implications in the field of English politics. However, I believe that inwardly the members of the British Government - or most of them - would wish to see Partition ended, but feel that it is a dangerous political problem for the Labour Party. They want to avoid Conservative criticism; though, indeed, I think they are inclined to exaggerate, in their own minds, the extent of the opposition they would meet from the Conservative Party. I believe any British Government would be glad to see the problem solved; unfortunately, however, any effort made to solve it is liable to be made an issue in British party politics - and accordingly there is a tendency to shelve the question.

The realisation that a united and friendly Ireland on Britain's western shores is far more important than any outworn mental attitude towards Ireland, is beginning to gain ground within the ranks of thinking people in all parties in Britain. The experience of two wars and of centuries of struggle must lead reasonable people of all shades of opinion to realise, instead of the mailed fist, the wise and statesmanlike policy lies in securing the friendship and goodwill of the Irish people. Quite apart from Ireland's strategic position and from the fact that Ireland is an essential part of Britain's larder and, therefore, of vital importance in wartime, the goodwill and friendship of the Irish race, scattered throughout the American Continent, in Australia and elsewhere, is of some importance.

As I explained in Paris, there were two last points of friction remaining to bedevil Anglo-Irish relationship. With the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act, we have been able to remove one of these points of friction. We believe that this was a constructive step for the betterment of the relationship between the two islands. There remains now but one point of friction, namely, the Partition of the country. Because of the political difficulties confronting the British Government and because of the somewhat 'non-transacting attitude' of our friends of the C.R.O., I felt that no useful purpose would be served by pressing the Partition issue during the discussions which we had at Chequers and Paris. Now that the Republic of Ireland Act has been enacted, without undue fuss or commotion, save for such adverse publicity for which our friends of the C.R.O. were clumsily responsible, I think that it is gradually beginning to dawn on responsible opinion in Britain that this was, in effect, a constructive step. If it were not for the psychological attitude, so prevalent among British public men, that regards Ireland as part of Britain's possessions and the Irish people as 'rather charming, but quite impossible', the remaining problem - Partition - would have been solved long ago.

The Irish Government's Aide Mémoire in relation to the Atlantic Pact is not a tactical move. It is a genuine effort to explain the difficulties in the hope that they may be faced and solved. No Irish Government could enter into a Military Alliance with Britain while Partition lasts. If it did, it would inevitably find itself faced with a civil conflict within its own area of jurisdiction. Obviously in time of war or crisis, it would have to devote all its energies and resources to fighting its own people, instead of the common enemy, thereby nullifying the very purpose of the Alliance. Of this, there is no doubt. Furthermore, the continuance of Partition and all the means used to maintain it, constitute a constant indictment of the very principles of democracy for which we are all struggling.

A real opportunity now offers to end this centuries-old conflict between Britain and Ireland and to break the deadlock on Partition. For the first time, Britain and Ireland share a common cause. All the irritants and causes of conflict, with the exception of Partition, have been removed. There is a genuine feeling of admiration and friendship for the British people, which is only marred by what we consider to be a completely indefensible and undemocratic anomaly.

The creation of the Atlantic Pact is a matter of importance. The United States Government has been charged with the task of approaching us in relation to it on behalf of the six other countries. We are willing and anxious to join it, if the one obstacle in the way can be removed. This situation enables an approach to the problem which has not hitherto been possible. If the Atlantic Pact is the necessity which I believe it is, then it seems to me that every effort should be made to remove the obstacles that stand in the way. This should enable a new approach to the difficulties which, I think, preclude the British Government from seeking a solution; in other words, it affords a new opportunity of breaking the deadlock which has hitherto existed.

As already indicated, I believe that members of the British Government, and, indeed, many of the public men in Britain, inwardly desire to see this position ended. But, for internal political reasons, they are inclined to shelve the question so as not to get their fingers burnt and because they do not consider it an urgent problem. The proposed Atlantic Pact, in my view, provides a new background against which the problem could be discussed and straightened out without placing the British Government in a political difficulty. While the British Statesmen would not admit this, I think that in the long run, they would be grateful for any step that ended this deadlock without causing them political difficulties.

Of the convening nations, it occurred to me that Canada would be the one that could most appropriately take the initiative in this matter, because of Canada's close relationship with both Britain and Ireland. British Statesmen would I think, take proposals of this nature from Canada more readily than they would from any other participating country. British public opinion would feel that it is only right and proper that this approach should come from Canada. In the context of the proposed Atlantic Pact and of the invitation to Ireland to join it, I do not see how the British Government could refuse to discuss the matter. Partition is clearly an international problem, just as much as Palestine and Indonesia are international problems. It is an international problem that stands clearly in the way of the co-operation that should exist in the Atlantic. It is, therefore, but natural that it should be examined by the convening countries and that every effort should be made to remove it.

I am afraid this letter is somewhat long and possibly repetitious, but I felt that I should write freely and frankly to you. Above all, I want to make it clear that our reply is not a tactical one. It is a genuine effort to remove an obstacle in the way of a closer understanding we are keen to bring about. It is not much use having international contacts and holding international conferences unless we can freely discuss the difficulties and the realities without shirking them because they are troublesome.

One of the factors which causes us grave anxiety is the fear that the problem may become an explosive one. It has already exploded several times since Partition was created in 1920. At the moment it shows all the signs of being in ferment again. That is one of the reasons why I believe there is such an impelling obligation on all of us to press on with constructive action before a more difficult situation arises.

I was so sorry that you were not able to visit us on your way back from UNO. Please remember that whenever you can manage to get free for a few days we shall always be glad to welcome you here.