I have the honour to refer to my secret report No. 165 of the 14th, 19th, and 24th February¹ on the subject of the Minister's personal letter to Mr. Pearson of the 7th of February (Ireland and the Atlantic Pact).² In the portion of my report under date the 24th February I stated that I would send you a further report today.

Mr. Reid asked me to come to him yesterday afternoon - the Secretary of State being engaged in the House - to see a copy of the reply that the Secretary of State had sent to Mr. MacBride. I said that I had understood from Mr. Pearson that he would let me see the amended draft of his letter before it was despatched. I asked whether it had actually gone. Mr. Reid said that it had. I expressed my surprise as the Secretary of State had been very specific in promising to let me see the revised text. Mr. Pearson had, I said, very graciously asked me to discuss his personal reply to my Minister and I had made some suggestions. I should have been grateful if I had seen the letter before it was sent. Mr. Reid then said that it might not have left the Department yet. He would see. The fact was that it had not gone: and when I went across the street to Mr. Reid's office he had the original dated the 22nd February on the table. It was already signed.

We went through the text together. I noted that Mr. Pearson had adopted the following suggestions made by me on the 18th February: (1) to alter the wording of the expression of his desire to see partition ended; (2) to put in something indicating that when partition came up for discussion by the representatives of the Atlantic Pact countries the Canadian representative would approach the matter sympathetically. I noted also that the letter did not raise the point that we had not made the ending of partition a condition of entering UNO. The reference to Newfoundland was also omitted. There was, however, the appeal to Mr. MacBride to consider Ireland's entry into the Pact as things are with a view to ultimate unity through the Pact. This was new in the letter.

I felt that Mr. Reid's statement to me on the telephone that the letter had gone was a way of saying that the discussion on the text was closed and that they wanted no points raised on the new draft. I, therefore, thought it right to raise none but one. I thanked Mr. Reid for adopting some of the suggestions I had made and said that I felt that Mr. MacBride would greatly appreciate the friendly tone of the letter generally.

Adverting to the new paragraph (the penultimate paragraph) I spoke as follows.

Mr. Pearson, I said, had asked me whether Mr. MacBride would mind something in that sense going in, and I had replied that Mr. MacBride would wish him to be quite frank. But I had submitted generally what the answer would be. 'You may be asking us' I said (to Mr. Reid) 'to split the country from top to bottom. The cost of the peace Pact to us might be a civil war. We would, in that case, be a useless member of the Alliance. What you are asking is politically impossible.'

Mr. Reid said: 'When the representative of a country says that something is politically impossible there is no arguing the matter'. (This was said not in the least unkindly).

'Oh, no,' I said 'you should enquire why a course is politically impossible. The reason why it would be politically impossible for us to join the Pact as things are is this. We could not persuade our people of the moral justice or equity, or even the expediency, of making a defence agreement, of going into a military Alliance for the protection of freedom and the guaranteeing of the territorial integrity of Nations with a Great Power whose armed forces occupy our own territory. That is why the invitation in the letter is to do something no Irish Government would take the responsibility, or could, intelligently, take the risk of doing'.

Mr. Reid put it to me this way: 'We could never enter a military Alliance with the British or the Americans. Public opinion in this country would not stand for it. So strong is that tradition that if Mackenzie King were Prime Minister today we would not be sponsors of the Atlantic Pact. Mr. St. Laurent has the courage to go into it. It is a very courageous course. We could not go into an Alliance with Britain alone or the United States alone; but the Atlantic community is a different position altogether'.

Mr. Reid went on to say that, after March 31st, when Newfoundland would be a Province of Canada and the Pact be in force, American troops might still be in Newfoundland - then Canadian territory.

'But with your consent?'

'We are not so sure', he replied, 'we are not out of that wood yet'.

'But', I said, 'Mr. St. Laurent told the press after his talks in Washington that that matter would be arranged "without embarrassment to anybody". Didn't he say something like that?'

'Oh, well, we are not so sure', Mr. Reid repeated.

(Mr. Reid's idea was to impress upon me that other small Nations besides Ireland have a lot to contend with from their powerful neighbours).

He continued as follows. The Atlantic Pact was going to be a means of taking the bitterness out of the race conflict and so helping to solve the problem of national unity in Canada. The French and the English would be in it, and that would have an immediate reaction on the English-French controversy in Canada. That was their dear hope. It would be a chance to bring the two races together as they had never been since Confederation.

I said that the race problem in Canada had not prevented the country as a whole from fighting and winning two world wars. The national Government ruled Canada from coast to coast. If Ontario was occupied by American troops could any Canadian Government hope to hold the country to an Alliance with the United States even with the other Atlantic Nations as parties? The reaction in Canada to the fact that Britain and France were together in the Pact would be all to the good. But what a chance the occasion of the negotiations for the conclusion of the Pact gave for a new approach to the problem of Irish unity and for an examination of possible ways and means of ending partition so that Ireland could take her place and play her full part? It was the greatest chance since Ireland was dismembered.

'How much' I asked 'do you want us in the Pact? I know you need us: but how much do you want us?'

Mr. Reid indicated that they undoubtedly wanted us in the Pact.

I continued in the following sense. We strengthen the moral front, complete the geographical outline of the Alliance and bring the whole of our island into the strategic plan? Very well. Isn't it worth a great positive effort on the part of all concerned to make it possible for us to come in? That was what we were asking. Surely the country that would take that particular initiative at this crucial moment would be doing a fine thing for the future of us all. How could that be politically difficult? If Mr. Reid, I submitted, said it just was, I would ask why, just as he should ask me why when I stated that a certain course was politically impossible for us.

Mr. Reid then said that for them to take the initiative on the partition issue now would put an end to their hopes of concluding the Pact by the end of March.

I suggested that the partition discussion would not prevent the Parties presently in negotiation on the Pact from concluding it by the end of March. We could adhere, or otherwise become a Party, later on when our problem was out of the way.

'Sweden will be out, Italy may be out - we are going to give Italy no quid pro quo for joining - and you will probably be out'. Mr. Reid made this observation, I imagine, to show me that the absence of these three countries from the original or charter membership would be a weakness in the Alliance.

I insisted that Ireland was not asking for a quid pro quo, although bargaining should not be out of the question in so grave a matter. We were asking that those who invite us to take a certain course help us to remove an obstacle that makes our acceptance of the invitation impossible.

Mr. Reid asked me whether I thought the second last paragraph of Mr. Pearson's letter would have the effect of putting the Government more against coming in than they are now. He said they would want to avoid that.

I said that the paragraph was, of course, impliedly, a criticism of Irish national policy, but that I was sure Mr. MacBride would not feel that Mr. Pearson was telling us what to do. I added that I thought Mr. MacBride might wish to reply to that particular paragraph.

Mr. Reid said that he was sure that Mr. Pearson would be very glad to receive a reply if Mr. MacBride desired to send one.

I asked him to have in mind that what was being asked of us was something which I believed the Canadian people would not entertain if their country was dismembered like ours.

Mr. Reid said, quite solemnly, that he honestly did not think the Canadian people would be disposed to accept our view that we should stand out of the Pact on the partition issue.

I said that some would not, but that the growing number of Canadians who understood the Irish situation would not misunderstand our attitude to the Pact.