I have the honour to report as follows:-

I called upon the Secretary of State for External Affairs on Friday the 11th February at 2.30 p.m. by appointment. I handed him two copies of your Aide Mémoire¹ in reply to the United States Aide Mémoire on Ireland and the Atlantic Pact and informed him that your Aide Mémoire had, I understood, been delivered to the Secretary of State in Washington on the 9th February.

I also handed Mr. Pearson the Minister's letter addressed to him.²

Prime Minister St. Laurent was leaving for Washington later that evening and I asked Mr. Pearson to give him a copy of our Aide Mémoire so that he would be informed of our position. Mr. Pearson said he would gladly do so but that he did not think the question of Ireland and the Pact was on the agenda for Mr. St. Laurent's talks with President Truman. Nevertheless he would give him the Aide.

He opened Mr. MacBride's letter and looked over it. He did not read it through. He said he would like to study it and the Aide before we discussed the matter generally. He thought the best thing would be for him to do so at once so that he could have a word with Mr. St. Laurent before he left for Washington. (The House was meeting at 3 p.m.). He said that he had wanted to have a long talk with me about the Pact and that he should have asked me to come to him before then. But he was glad Mr. MacBride had taken the initiative and the documents would enable us to talk in a more concrete way. He would call me early in the week, after Mr. St. Laurent's return, and we could discuss the matter in the light of the Minister's letter etc.

I said that that would be best. I added that the Pact proposal enabled us all to look at the question of Irish unity in a new light and against a new background. The Pact proposal was the most concrete expression up to date of the solidarity of the Atlantic community. Ireland belonged by history, outlook, geography, etc., to the Atlantic community. She was kept out of the United Nations by Russia because of her historic place as a Nation of the Christian western world. Whatever obstacles stood in the way of Ireland's participation as a Nation in the Atlantic Pact should be removed. There was no possible chance of our undertaking the obligations of the Pact as an undivided Nation. We simply could not carry them out. Our people would not follow any Irish Government into an Alliance that would, so long as the country was partitioned, involve us in civil war. There was nothing but goodwill in Ireland for the success of the Pact proposal. The appeal of its moral integrity would be irresistible granted the removal of the crime on the doorstep.

Our Minister felt, I continued, that the whole problem could be approached afresh now on the international plane in the very practical context of the defence of the Nations of the free world. It would be an easier approach than the British had ever had available to them and there was plenty of goodwill now amongst the British people generally. We were all being brought together by the menace of a common danger. The unity of the West would be strengthened more than anyone could now say if, as a first achievement of the coalition, it secured the full restoration of the Irish Nation, the removal of the last obstacle to close Anglo-Irish co-operation, and the consequent heartwhole participation of a United Ireland in the obligations of the Atlantic Pact.

I referred to the Six Counties election. I said that I knew that there would be no delusion in the mind of the Secretary of State as to the meaning of the result. There had been no change in the character of the Government of the Six Counties for twenty-eight years. There never could be any change so long as the constitutional and electoral framework of the Six Counties remained as it is. The arrangement was working out as it was devised to work out. A minority was placed in control of the largest possible area they could permanently control. Each election in the Six Counties was merely a new illustration of the fraud perpetrated and the freak created by the Partition Act of 1920. The election just concluded was brought on at this particular time in order to stampede opinions outside Ireland against any movement towards a new approach to the problem of unity such as we are now seeking. The problem was always in our view an international problem. The correctness of that view is now plain. Manifestly, this particular problem has become an important concern of the sponsors of the Atlantic Pact. And there is a growing confidence in Ireland in the prospect of a workmanlike attack upon this by no means ineluctable difficulty.

Mr. Pearson listened very sympathetically to what I had to say. He did not seem to need any enlightenment on the position in the Six Counties. He expressed his thanks to me for putting our views before him and said that he would have all I said in mind. He said he would see Mr. St. Laurent before he left Ottawa but repeated that I must not expect anything from the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. There was a full agenda already. He would call me early in the week. It was then past three o'clock.

Mr. Pearson did not call me until Friday morning the 18th February. His Secretary called the office that morning and arranged for me to come to him at 12.30 p.m. I did so and remained until 1.20 p.m.

Mr. Pearson had with him Mr. Escott Reid,³ the Acting Under Secretary of State.

He had the draft of a letter on the table before him. He took up the draft at once, and, stating that it was a letter which he proposed to send to Mr. MacBride, proceeded to read it for me. He asked me whether I had seen the Minister's letter to him. I said that Mr. MacBride had sent me a copy. He then said that he would let me have a copy of the reply.

At the beginning of the draft Mr. Pearson expressed his thanks for the confidence which Mr. MacBride had reposed in him by sending him a personal letter and for the frankness of the Minister's observations therein.

The draft then went on to say that the Governments of the Atlantic Pact countries had been trying to avoid controversial issues which might stand in the way of their full co-operation on the major purpose of the Alliance. It instanced in that connection the case of the United States bases in Newfoundland. (Newfoundland will become the tenth Province of Canada soon). There was a good deal about this. The effect of it was that Canadian-United States relations on the Pact were not to be upset by any arrangement about the bases not wholly satisfactory to the Canadian Government in view of Newfoundland's entry into the Confederation.

Then there was a paragraph (presumably a paragraph as I did not see the text) the net effect of which was that the Canadian Government were unable to take the initiative in raising the question of the partition of Ireland with the Governments of the other Atlantic Pact countries. The letter added that Mr. Pearson would like to see the question of partition settled to the satisfaction of the people in the North as well as those in the South of Ireland.

At the end the letter made a courteous reference to Mr. MacBride's invitation to Mr. Pearson to visit Dublin.

The Secretary of State said that he was sure the draft was the reply which Mr. MacBride would expect. He asked me to understand clearly that the sense of the letter was that the Canadian Government could not move in the matter of Partition.

I referred to the part of the letter in which Mr. Pearson expressed his desire to see partition ended. I said that I knew how much my Minister would appreciate that. I added that the form, however, in which Mr. Pearson's desire was expressed might be construed as a re-statement of British policy on the partition issue. I said that the sentence seemed to imply that the removal of partition was exclusively a North and South affair. The British, I said, had always sought to avoid their own responsibility in the matter by saying that the ending of partition was a matter for agreement between North and South; that they could not do anything to right the situation until the Irish agreed amongst themselves, and so on. I asked Mr. Pearson whether he could not recast the sentence to make it clear that he would like to see a settlement 'satisfactory to the majority of the Irish people'. That, I said, would be an assertion of the democratic doctrine applicable to the case. He said he would do so; he asked me would it be alright to say to the satisfaction of 'the Irish people as a whole'. I said something like that would do, but that I personally liked the word 'majority'.

I then thought I could venture a little further. I said outright that the reference to the Newfoundland bases seemed somewhat strained, if not irrelevant. Mr. Pearson looked at Mr. Reid (who I imagine drafted the letter) for guidance. Mr. Reid said nothing on the point. The Secretary of State then said he thought they might look at the Newfoundland reference again. (This to Mr. Reid).

On the question of the main sense of Mr. Pearson's proposed reply to the Minister's letter I spoke in the following sense.

The Pact would be the most concrete expression yet formulated of a regional policy of peace through strength within the Charter. Ireland is an Atlantic Nation. She has as vital an interest in the security of the Atlantic world as any of the other Nations of the West. In proportion to her size Ireland has made possibly a larger contribution to the creation and maintenance of Western civilization than any Western European country except perhaps France or Italy. She had a lively sense of her responsibility for the safety of her own child. Every one of the Pact countries was a democratic community. Ireland was the only country of all those concerned whose people were not allowed to rule in their own land. No Nation has more distinct geographical boundaries. The partition of her territory is a cruel injustice to the Irish people, a brutal international crime.

Mr. Pearson interjected that he agreed that the partition of Ireland should be ended. He said that the division of so small a country was unnatural and ridiculous.

I said that for twenty five years not a voice had been raised in any British Commonwealth country advocating the abolition of the border. We had been regarded as the defendants in the case. But we had always said that a time would come when the security of our neighbours would be endangered by the unnatural state of affairs in Ireland which the division of the country had brought about. Partition had been holding back the natural development of the country for half our lifetime, and postponing our heartwhole participation in international affairs.

We had used every effort to bring the British to see things as they actually are. We fully appreciate their difficulties. But there is no doubt whatever as to what ought to be done. Partition was not an Irish problem. It had always been an Anglo-Irish problem. Now it was an international problem in the wider sense still. And we were now looking to the Atlantic Pact countries to examine the problem anew in the light of the historic proposal to unite all the Nations of the North Atlantic in defence of freedom and peace. We took the view that every obstacle in the way of co-operation amongst the Pact countries should be removed. You could not remove the obstacle of the partition of Ireland by postponing it. We should not be forced into the position of seeming to isolate ourselves from the Atlantic community. We do not want to isolate ourselves. But, on the other hand, if we go into the Alliance while still a partitioned country we would be in the paradoxical and ironical position of courting civil war as a consequence of our entry into a Pact for world peace. We were, therefore, looking with more confidence than ever to the prospect of an international solution of the problem of Irish national unity.

Mr. Pearson said, not very kindly, that there were 'worse crimes than the partition of Ireland'. If there was another war there might be no Ireland left at the end of it.

I said that our people had no delusions about the horrors of a successful Soviet onslaught on Western Europe. That was why they wanted to stand as a United Nation with the other free Nations of Europe. We wanted to play our full part.

Mr. Reid said that the Italians were asking for the return of their colonies as a condition of joining the Pact. If the Canadian Government took up the Irish case the Italians would seize on it as a precedent.

I said that the parallel would be closer if it was a case of the Italians asking for the reintegration of their historic national territory i.e. the return of some occupied province on the Italian peninsula, or a case of France asking for the return of Alsace Lorraine, as a condition precedent to entering the Pact. Pact or no Pact, the unity of Ireland will be the main politics of any Irishman worthy of the name until unity is achieved.

'Your fine speech in the House this week, Sir', I said to the Secretary of State, 'in which you emphasised the damage being done by Mr. Drew⁴ and others by setting up enmity between the Federal Government and the Provinces of Canada was a plea for the unity of Ireland'.

Mr. Pearson smiled his acknowledgment of the reference to his second major speech in the House of Commons.

'I have been wondering', he went on, 'whether you would not be getting nearer to unity in Ireland by going into the Pact as you are'.

The reply to that, I said, which every Irishman will give at once is that we were offered Home Rule in return for participation in the war of 1914, and we had to fight a war of independence when the war of 1914 was over.

Mr. Pearson said that we had travelled a long way since 1914. Ireland had been in international affairs since 1921 and had played a great part - an effective part - even as a partitioned Nation. Mr. MacBride was making hosts of friends for Ireland now by his presence and his diplomacy at international conferences. Could we not go on like that? Ireland had not made the ending of partition a condition of her coming into UNO. She had attached no such condition to her application for membership. He said he thought he would put that point into the letter.

I said: 'I can give you the answer now. First, 1914: secondly, the Charter is not a defence alliance, the Atlantic Pact is: and a partitioned Ireland might be unable to carry out the obligations of a defence Pact.'

Mr. Pearson said that, nevertheless, any State going into UNO was facing up inevitably to something like the Pact which is 'reasonably' square with the Charter. He said he thought he would put in a sentence or two on the point about our application for membership of UNO without conditions. He asked me whether I thought Mr. MacBride would mind if he did that.

I replied that I knew the Minister would wish Mr. Pearson to be quite frank. Mr. MacBride would fully understand the sincerity and friendliness of anything Mr. Pearson would write. But the reply was not in doubt.

(Note: If the reference Mr. Pearson suggested goes into the letter it will, at least, give the Minister an opportunity for a full reply. A letter containing a mere refusal to take the initiative on partition might not give such an opportunity).

Mr. Pearson said that his hope was for a peaceful solution of the Irish problem. There were only two ways of settling the problem, peacefully, or by force. These people in the North, he said, would fight against re-union. He wanted a peaceful solution. Mr. MacBride himself had hinted in his letter at the possibility of the use of force by the South. Mr. Pearson said: 'You people have made up your minds to settle the question anyhow.'

I said: 'No one wants a peaceful solution more than Mr. MacBride. Every patriotic Irishman hopes and prays for that. Mr. MacBride's reference in his letter was to the inherently explosive character of a situation of the kind to which our people were subjected. That was what he meant'. No one, I added, who has not seen his country torn asunder knows how it wrings the heart of a people. A new generation is growing up in Ireland. We have to bear that in mind.

The Secretary of State turned away from that aspect of the subject quickly and asked me to make it clear to the Minister that the question of Irish unity would inevitably be coming up at the meetings of the representatives of the Atlantic Pact countries. 'You and I', he said, 'will be having more talks about it'. Our Aide Mémoire was a reply to the United States approach to us. That approach was at the instance of the Atlantic Pact countries. The United States Government would bring up our reply and discussions would follow. The matter would therefore be raised one way or another.

I asked Mr. Pearson whether he could put something into his letter to the effect that when the matter does come up on the basis of our Aide Mémoire the Canadian representative would ask that the question be re-examined au fond as one of concern to the Atlantic Pact countries. He did not promise to do this. He nodded, and I interpreted the nod to mean that he would consider whether he would put in something to that effect. He did not appear at all happy about this suggestion.

He said that he would recast the letter and talk to me again before he sent it. He would be away for a day or two. He would have a new draft by Monday or Tuesday and would call me as soon as he could.

Mr. Escott Reid asked me to call to the Department today to see the new draft of Mr. Pearson's letter to Mr. MacBride. It is a great improvement on the first draft. It will be despatched by air bag to Mr. Johnson tomorrow.

I shall send you a full report tomorrow by airmail of my conversation with Mr. Reid.⁵