I. INTRODUCTION

The Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty at its first meeting in Washington on 17th September, 1949, decided upon the machinery to be set up to operate the Pact. A notable feature of the organisation agreed on is its regional basis for planning defence strategy.

Five regional planning groups were determined and their composition is clearly related both to the geographical situation of their component nations, and to the degree each signatory nation can be expected to contribute from its own military resources to the defence of the region and to the collective defence of the whole North Atlantic Treaty area. The accompanying sketch maps¹ have been prepared to illustrate this important aspect of the organisation and the significant geographical location of Ireland in relation to four of these five regional groups. As the maps indicate, Ireland lies on the boundaries of the four regions in question and has a common land frontier with them. This land frontier - the boundary of Northern Ireland - is in no sense a military boundary, and, even if it were, experts in preparing defence plans cannot limit the operation of the plans to strictly political boundaries. Ireland occupies a position of great strategic importance in relation to each of these groups.

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III. REGIONAL ORGANISATION

Five Regional Planning Groups.

These comprise:-

1. Northern European: Consists of Norway, Denmark and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The position of this country locates it on the land boundary of this group and gives it a common frontier with its area. This group will, presumably, be concerned with Scandinavian defence and with naval defences in the Baltic and North Sea. It is also known that the Norwegian defence authorities are organising a radar screen which, it is of significance to note, faces west as well as east. This screen is an extension to Scandinavia of the Radar network which the Benelux Powers are creating in their area. During the discussions on American Military Aid to Europe, it was stated that Norway and Denmark would, under the proposals, receive coastal defence vessels, with aircraft, in addition to transport and machine-guns.

   At the outset of a war, the plans of this group might not be concerned with Ireland, but that situation would alter with a Russian success on the Continent. Such an event would make bases in Britain insecure and force a search for bases further westward, such as this country could provide. The position of Ireland is, therefore, likely to be considered by this group in their planning.

2. Western European. Embraces the Western Union Powers, i.e., Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The borders of this region touch Ireland and give it a frontier in common. 'The hard core of the ground-power-in-being in Europe' to which General Bradley² (now Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the all-important Military Sub-Committee of the Atlantic Pact) referred recently will fall to be provided by this group. And upon the military strength of this group depends the prospects of Russia being pinned down east of the Rhine.

   The Republic of Ireland, geographically or politically, is an area which those responsible for the planning of the Western European Region will regard as artificially excluded from that region. The Western European Region is bounded on the east by the Rhine, on the south by the Pyrenees, on the north-west by the North Sea, and on the west by Ireland. Even if the whole of Ireland were excluded politically from the region its western boundary can still, for strategic purposes, be stated to be Ireland. No staff planning defence for this region can regard with satisfaction the situation in which the region's land defences end with the militarily artificial boundary of Northern Ireland. The staff responsible will be equally dissatisfied with a position in which the sea and air defences of this region extend around but do not include the relatively undefended area of the Republic of Ireland. The attack against which the Western European Region is planning will, if launched, come from the east. The Region's only hope of holding that attack is ample and timely aid from across the Atlantic. This aid must pass by the coasts of Ireland or through its air space. In other words, the vital lines of communication to Western Europe pass around Ireland and can be interrupted or severed by forces in Ireland. Ireland, therefore, occupies a vital position on the direct lines of communication on which depend the success in war of the Western European Region. Consequently, no staff responsible for the defensive plans of the Western European Region can fail to take note of the position of Ireland, more particularly as they are certain to regard it as relatively defenceless.

   Western Europe is, however, at present militarily unorganised and relatively defenceless against an eastern attack. Atlantic Pact and Western Union plans do not visualise that an effective defensive organisation will be in readiness earlier than 1952. Should war come earlier, Russia can, and probably will, occupy Europe to the oceans. In such eventuality, Great Britain and Ireland would be the only areas of the Western European Region unoccupied, and Ireland would be liable to the same scale of attack as Great Britain. The scale of attack now includes (according to an Australian semi-official view) airborne, or even seaborne invasion, provided the attacker once succeeds in obtaining air superiority. Ireland would, if still undefended, be regarded as a suitable target for attack as the soft spot in the area and also as the vital point from which British communications with America could be disrupted, thereby possibly terminating British resistance. It must be assumed that the military staff of the Western European Region will devote serious thought to the position of Ireland as an area which, even in the most favourable situation, is of importance to the defence scheme of the region and which, in adverse circumstances, can be of the most vital consequence. Under the Military Aid programme, the United States are to supply this region with the following armament:-

   United Kingdom	-	Aircraft only.
   Netherlands	-	Coastal Defence Vessels, Tanks, Trucks, Artillery & Machine-guns.
   Belgium and Luxemburg	-	Coastal Defence Vessels, Tanks, Trucks, Artillery & Machine-guns.
   France	-	Coastal Defence Vessels, 'planes, Tanks, Trucks, Artillery and Machine-guns.

   Even before the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the Benelux Group were devoting attention to the ground, air, and radar aspects of the anti-aircraft defence of this Region. They were likely to have noted the blank spot in the area caused by Ireland, which, they are well aware, has, for all practical purposes, no anti-aircraft defences.

3. Southern European
   The Southern European Group is composed of France, Italy and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Again, Ireland's geographical location gives her a common frontier with this Regional area. At first hand, this Region might be considered as having no interest for Ireland, but, when the problem is examined, the position is found to be quite different.

   The Mediterranean area and the shipping route to Africa and the East are second in importance only to the route across the Atlantic. Italy will only stay in the Atlantic Pact if she has a guarantee of aid in war. Aid must come from Britain or America and proceed through the Straits of Gibraltar. Map No. 7³ shows that all shipping traffic from Great Britain for the Mediterranean, and, in fact, for Africa and the whole East, comes from either the English or Bristol Channel and proceeds through the passage bounded on the north by the South Irish coast and on the south by the Brittany Peninsula in France. This line of communication is, therefore, flanked on one side by, and can be interrupted from, Ireland. Ireland has, accordingly, not merely a theoretical land frontier with the Southern European Region but occupies a position from which its essential sea communications can be interrupted and the coherence of the Region as a defensive area ended. The British Authorities may have become accustomed, if not reconciled, to this situation, but the more logically-minded and essentially selfish French are certain to direct attention to the fact that Cobh and Berehaven are as essential to the protection of this line as Brest and St. Nazaire. For these reasons, the position of Ireland is certain to be considered by the planning staff of the Southern European Region.

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V. AMERICAN STRATEGY AND IRELAND

Independent of the fact that Ireland occupies a position of vital importance in relation to at least three of the Atlantic Pact Planning Groups, the principles of American (including Canadian) strategy as developed since the close of World War II., and, in particular, since the intensification of the East-West crisis are certain to have direct military effects on Ireland.

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Even after accepting that attack from the East can be held beyond the Rhine, it would be unwise to assume also that Ireland will not be seriously and directly affected by American (and Atlantic Pact) strategy during a war waged under those more favourable circumstances.

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If the question of Ireland entered the minds of Generals Bradley or Collins⁴they at least assumed a fully effective defence organisation in the area which is the back-door of the Western Europe Area, so all-important in their strategy and which is also the European landfall of General Bradley's 'sea-lanes' and of General Collins' 'vast movements of men and supplies.'

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VI. IRISH POLICY, DEFENCES, and the ATLANTIC PACT

So far the attitude of American and Atlantic Pact planners to Ireland as a geographical area has been discussed. While geography will be the predominant consideration affecting their attitude to Ireland, they will have to consider two other factors, namely, Irish policy to the Pact, and the existing state of Irish Defences.

At present, only three countries in Western Europe are not members of the Pact. They are, Ireland and Sweden (which were invited to join), and Spain (which was refused as a member.) While all three are of great importance in Western Europe, Ireland geographically occupies a most central position and is of vital import in relation to Pact strategy. Ireland has refused to consider association with the Pact while Partition continues. Sweden, the only other country which refused the invitation, has direct geographical contact with Russia. Because of this, some members of the Pact felt she had a special case for refusing. Sweden, however, is devoting a very big proportion of her national economy to defence. No western nation on the Continent is relatively better prepared for war. Her defence effort is proportionately many times greater than the Irish defence effort and is directed to protection against attack from Russia. Sweden, therefore, though not a member of the Pact, is contributing practically as great an effort to defence against Russia as if she were. It cannot, therefore, be urged against her that she is herself defensively weak, and, more important, it cannot be suggested that her lack of defences constitutes not only a weakness to herself but to the whole Pact Defence Organisation.

The reasons why Spain is not a member of the Pact are well known and she has indicated in general her willingness to co-operate in the Pact. Spain is also devoting a very great proportion of the national effort to defence measures, and her only difficulty is lack of modern armaments and industrial resources. In fact, the American military as opposed to political experts are most anxious to get Spain into the Pact Organisation. This is because they believe the large Spanish Army, if aided with modern armaments, may contribute as much, if not more, to the defence of Europe than the French Army. Principally for this reason there is an increasing desire to include Spain in the Pact. She may, therefore, join the Pact in the future. If not, it cannot be urged against her that politically and militarily she is not contributing at least her share to the defence of Western Europe. In particular, it cannot be suggested that her lack of defences is in any way constituting a weakness to the Pact Defence Organisation.

Sweden and Spain must, therefore, be regarded as contributing at least their quota to the defence of Western Europe. Spain is in general willing to join the Pact, and Sweden is regarded, at least in some quarters, as having good reasons for not formally joining the Pact. Ireland is, therefore, in a very exceptional position and, if policy with regard to Spain changes - as there are indications it may - will find herself the only country in Western Europe not geographically in contact with Russia (like Sweden), which is not a member of the Pact Organisation. The Pact is essentially a military and defence organisation. It has already been made clear that the Regional Groups, in their planning, must consider the position of Ireland in relation to those plans. The Groups may, in fact, almost certainly will, decide that naval and air bases in Ireland are essential during an East-West conflict. They will certainly agree like the Australian publication already quoted (which certainly reflects British views) that denial to an enemy of bases in Ireland is of prime importance. They will also agree that, in the words of Baldwin, 'the isles' (which include Ireland) 'are far less secure than ever before in history.' Ireland, therefore, is now a vulnerable area liable, like the United Kingdom, to seaborne or airborne invasion should the enemy possess air superiority.

The planning staffs of the Regions interested in Ireland are quite well acquainted with the present strength and nature of Irish defences. It will be quite apparent to them that Ireland does not possess the coastal, harbour, air, radar and general local defences which the Western nations, such as Belgium, Holland and Denmark are providing for the local defence of their national territories. These local defence measures are, of course, proceeding simultaneously with the creation of Infantry Divisions and other troops and air squadrons which they will contribute to the overall West European armies for defence against attack anywhere. The planning staffs will have no hesitation in deciding that Irish defences are inadequate to meet an attack on Ireland in the strength and under the circumstances visualised. Following from this, they must also conclude that Irish Defences are a danger to the Atlantic Pact Defence System because of their inadequacy.

Any effort to discuss this question from the Irish viewpoint would involve a discussion of the whole problem of Irish Defence Policy and the plans and programme necessary to implement such a policy. This is because the relation of Irish defence to the Atlantic Pact Defence Organisation now involves all the external factors affecting Irish defence. It may, however, be accepted that two courses are open to the Atlantic Pact Powers in relation to Ireland: they can decide to make representations to Ireland as to the inadequacy of her defences and as to the danger to Western European Defences in war that would follow from this inadequacy; they can also decide not to make representations but to provide in their plans for the establishment by their forces of defences in Ireland on the outbreak of war. These defences might be established in co-operation with or independent of the Irish authorities. It can be urged that, as there is at least a possibility that the Atlantic Pact Powers may desire bases in Ireland, it would be an economy of effort also to allow them to undertake the local defence of Ireland. There is, however, a great difference between the giving of naval or air bases or other facilities for the conduct of the offensive side of a war involving submarine and air activities at sea, and the handing over of local defence and security measures to an external Power. In the case of bases or limited facilities, the external Power, provided the local defences and security were adequate, would have little or no occasion for interference in the general life of the nation. If, however, an external power even under friendly conditions has to undertake local defence and general security measures, a position is reached in practice in which the country is not merely granting bases or facilities, but is to a greater or less extent militarily occupied. This is because the provision of local defence and security measures in war will result in contact and interference with the civil population and also in interference with transport, communications, supplies and the general economy of the nation. Depending on the degree to which these powers of interference are exercised by an external power, a nation is to the same degree militarily occupied. It can be suggested that Ireland escaped those dangers in the last war and will, therefore, escape them again. America, however, only came into World War II two years after it started and was not in a position to influence its conduct in Europe for another year. She then, however, displayed - even in the case of Ireland - a greater inclination than Great Britain to disregard the rights of small nations when their interests clashed with her military needs. She took the initiative with regard to Axis representatives in Ireland⁵ and had decided that, in certain circumstances, a naval base in the Shannon would be necessary for the Allies. Baldwin states that bases are a strategic necessity to the super States; General Collins hopes for friendly shores, and only Secretary of the Army Gray⁶ promises they will be set up 'with the consent of the nations involved.' If, however, Ireland is described to the American public as a 'base of strategic necessity' or, much worse, as a weakness to Atlantic defences, when that public are in a state of crusading zeal in a war against Communism, they will certainly pay more attention to the question of 'strategic necessity' than to 'the consent of the nations involved.' It would be unwise to base Irish Defence Policy on any other assumption.

VII. PARTITION AND THE ATLANTIC PACT

Throughout this paper where the expression 'Ireland' has been used it refers to the area at present administered by the Government of the Republic. As geographical factors and national policy on Partition must largely influence Ireland's position in relation to the Atlantic Pact, it is desirable also to mention the following military considerations arising from the existence of Partition. All the considerations mentioned as applying to the present jurisdictional area of the Republic of Ireland in connection with the Pact would apply with equal force to a Republic of Ireland which included the whole geographical area of Ireland. From the viewpoint of the framers of the Pact they would apply with much more force to the whole of Ireland if she were not in the Pact Organisation. This is because during the last two wars the British and Americans had Irish bases and did not suffer from the disadvantage of being without facilities here during a war on commerce in the Atlantic. Although the area available for bases during the last war was limited and a cause of dissatisfaction, it is certain that it would have been more difficult if not impossible to maintain Irish Neutrality were it not for British occupation of the Six Counties. British fears as to the capacity of Irish Forces to defend Ireland were also naturally lessened because they held, at all material times, important forces in Northern Ireland. They were ready, because of their adequately organised and defended bridge-head in Northern Ireland, to take early measures to prevent the remainder of the country being occupied by their enemies. A State which had attained full sovereign independence over the whole territory of Ireland, whether in or out of the Pact, would be expected to create a defence organisation capable of taking all measures of national defence and security immediately on the outbreak of war. It could only expect outside aid in defence when a general attack had developed or seemed likely to develop against its territory. Ireland in such circumstances would be compelled, like Denmark, Norway, Portugal or Switzerland, to devote a greater proportion of the national effort to national defence. The Irish Defence Organisation is at present not ready to provide the local defence and security necessary for the present area of the Republic on the outbreak of a war. It follows that it is much less ready to provide on the outbreak of hostilities for the far greater defence which would be expected of a nation controlling the whole area of Ireland so vital to the defence of Western Europe.

At present, America, Canada, Britain, France and some other countries are concerned in the external sphere almost entirely with the problem of containing Russia. The Atlantic Pact is the military organisation for this purpose. Their attitude on other problems will be considerably influenced by the importance they attach to the Pact. Attention has already been directed to the adverse effect of Partition on Ireland's capacity to defend herself and also to the fact that a discontented Ireland is not an aid to security in the Atlantic.

Now that specific and extensive measures are being taken to organise the defences of Western Europe and the North Atlantic, some attention may be directed to the inadequacy of Irish defences even for the protection of the present area of the Republic. It may be suggested that a State which has made or is making a limited defence effort in connection with its present area would not be capable of taking over the more extensive and more important defences of the whole of Ireland on the outbreak of war, if Partition were ended. This argument may tend to counterbalance the one that Ireland cannot effectively defend herself while Partition lasts. It may also help the pro-partition argument that Northern Ireland is essential to British and American defence. It certainly will appeal to the many people in America and elsewhere who are concerned at present with little else except the Russian problem.

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APPENDIX IV

AMERICAN INTEREST IN IRISH AIRPORTS

Information is available that the staffs of the American Air Companies employed at Shannon Airport assume that the United States Air Forces would take over and use the airport in the event of war. Gossip of this kind increased during the discussions in Dublin recently with the American Air Companies as to the future use of the airport. It is also of interest to note that the usually reliable 'New York Times' published a note, admittedly inaccurate, duringthe discussions stating that strategic considerations were entering into them. This note went on to state that, if Collinstown were developed in addition to Rineanna, there would be two airports in Ireland from which the largest American aircraft could operate 'in reprisal bombing against the Soviet Union.' While inaccurate, the note indicates the lines on which certain Americans are thinking as to the position of Ireland in the event of war.

Another possible example of this interest is the fact that the American Defence Authorities originally contemplated accrediting only an Air Attaché to the essentially Land Irish Defence Forces.

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