My dear Jowitt,
It is with great misgivings that I follow your dictate and drop the 'Lord'; quite apart from your position as Lord Chancellor you are, in my eyes, one of the great judges of our times; as a Counsel this fills me with respectful awe; I am doing so only because failure to comply with your injunction might suggest that I desired to maintain a certain aloofness or 'standoffishness' when the reverse is the position.

In the first place let me thank you sincerely for your very charming letter. It was really nice of you to write so freely and I appreciate very much your understanding of our problems. I shall seek to convey as freely and as unofficially as you so reasonably did, some of the considerations which seem so difficult to understand from the British viewpoint.

Perhaps it would be well if, even at the risk of sounding egotistical, I said something of my own personal approach to Anglo-Irish relationship. I do so for two reasons: in the first place because it will enable me in the process to make clear one of the difficulties which it is difficult to appreciate from 'the other side of the hill' but which, from 'this side of the hill' is very real. In the second place, to dispel, by dealing with it squarely, an impression which exists in England, that we (and myself in particular) are influenced by bitterness and hatreds based upon the past; also that though we are rather 'charming and amusing' we are 'really quite unreasonable'. So please bear patiently with my own personal approach and do not, like so many judges I have known, jump to premature conclusions and say 'this fellow is merely burying himself in the unfortunate past of Anglo-Irish history'.

When I was very young my father was executed for his part in the 1916 Rising. My mother was in jail and on hunger strike several times. I was at school in France, but I arrived here at the age of 14 and I promptly found myself in jail; from that time until 1921 I was in jail or 'on the run' continuously. Then came the Treaty which, irrespective of its merits or demerits, was put up to Ireland by the then British Government under threat of 'immediate and terrible war' if it were not signed and accepted. Civil War followed. I was again in jail and 'on the run' often. Brother was set against brother; families were divided; shootings and executions were the order of the day. The Civil War ended nominally in 1923, but in fact we have had a continuous incipient Civil War ever since until the last general elections.

The two successive Governments (Mr. Cosgrave's and Mr. de Valera's) continually made, I believe, bona fide attempts to end this position; they sought continually to reconcile the traditional ideal of Irish independence, which, since the era of Tone and the United Irishmen in 1798, had become synonymous with Irish Republicanism, with the requirements of British policy in regard to the Crown; a new factor was also introduced into the already complicated scene by the partition of the country and the setting up of a citadel of intolerance in Belfast.

These attempts failed, cycles of violence and repression continued with rhythmic regularity; our statute roll bulges with every conceivable form of coercion Act; internments, Military Courts, executions, suppression of meetings and censorship have been the order of the day for over a quarter of a century, but all to no avail.

The cycles of violence and repression, which continued until the beginning of this year, passed by unnoticed in the British press. In so far as they were noticed at all they were put down to 'those impossible Irish' who murder each other, die of hunger strikes and have Military Courts. I suppose that was inevitable, because Britain had many problems and Irish politics were both incomprehensible and of little interest to the British public.

In Ireland, however, these events wracked the heart of the people. The bitterness they engendered reverberated throughout public life. Every act of violence and every act of repression brought in its trail more bitterness. This condition of affairs was destructive of the fundamental principles of justice and democracy, on the one hand, while it precluded the pursuit of any constructive policy on the other.

The psychological attitude of the mass of the people was an important factor. While they had no sympathy for the acts of violence committed by the I.R.A., they had sympathy with the ideals for which the I.R.A. stood. These were traditional ideals of the Irish people, which were also shared by the successive Governments. You cannot treat young men who are actuated by idealistic motives of patriotism on the basis that they are criminals, without evoking sympathy.

For over ten years I remained on the sideline watching this same conflict going on, coming into contact with it only in my professional capacity. During that period, with the experience I had had, I think that I was able to examine logically and dispassionately, the causes and remedies for this tragic situation, trying, as you so well do, to put myself 'in the other fellow's shoes'. I did so without any sense of bitterness or rancour, but rather with a deep realisation that the British people were completely oblivious of the ills which their policy indirectly wrought in the life of our people and that they themselves would have abhorred these ills just as much as we did, had they been conscious of them.

At this stage you probably wonder what all this has to do with Anglo-Irish relationship. On analysis it has a great deal to do with it, in fact. The protagonists, as well as the whole people, shared the same ideal of an independent and united Ireland. The two successive Governments pursued a policy of seeking to reconcile that ideal with the requirements of British policy, but they none the less shared the same ideal. Accordingly, they were placed in the position of having to fight against a section of their own people for the sake of maintaining tenuous links with the Crown which, for obvious reasons, made no historical appeal to any section of the people. So it came that with every act of violence and every act of repression these links came to be blamed, if not openly, at least inwardly. The I.R.A. and the more extreme elements blamed Britain openly. The Government of the day could not do so openly, but at heart cursed the requirements of Anglo-Irish relationship that brought about these results. The people were sullen and also blamed those links in varying degrees.

Because of these factors the successive Irish Governments could not afford to be friendly or to behave normally with the British Government lest they be accused of acting on behalf of Britain against the ideals of the Irish people. They had to wear a protective armour of stand-offishness and had to be furtive in their dealings with the British Government.

This situation, which is a situation which has, in fact existed from 1921 to 1948, could only be destructive of Anglo-Irish relationship. It resulted in Britain's being blamed by all sections for all the ills that befell us as a result of the situation. The British people, on the other hand, and the British Governments, too, remained oblivious of this. They seldom analysed why there was a strain in relationship; they just put it down to Irish oddity or to rancour based on past history.

My view has been that, for three reasons, this situation must be ended:
Firstly we are not justified in maintaining incipient civil war conditions which result in the destruction of the ordinary rules of democracy, law and justice, merely in order to maintain a tenuous link with the Crown which expresses neither reality nor the desire of the people. There could be no normal Government or political development so long as successive Irish Governments are placed in the position of having to resort to internments, Military Courts, executions and Public Safety Acts in order to govern. The violent or sullen opposition to those links with the Crown, which bring in their trail oppressive measures, are a challenge to the rule of law and undermine Governmental authority.

Secondly, as pointed out, Britain, in the final analysis, rightly or wrongly, gets the blame from both sides for the sequence of events that result. Normal relationship is, then, made difficult. These links, therefore, instead of being of any assistance in the development of Anglo-Irish relationship, merely serve as irritants.

Thirdly, by preventing a more normal relationship with Britain, they react unfavourably in relation to Partition.

There is another factor in relation to this problem and in relation to Partition which, I think has been completely overlooked 'on the other side of the hill'. You refer to the dangers of Communism and a need for co-operation in these dangerous times. I fully agree. Luckily, we have no Communist party here; luckily, so far, the Cominform has overlooked the potentialities of the Irish situation; luckily, so far, their activities have been directed by British Communists who, like so many of your compatriots, did not even begin to understand the 'Irish question'. But, should an Irish Communist party arise, or, indeed, any other party, however extreme, and campaign on the basis of ending Partition and establishing a 32-County Republic, they would gain considerable strength; not because there is any sympathy with Communism, but because they would be appealing to the traditional national sentiment of the people. These are all factors which the present Government, or indeed, any other Government in Ireland, cannot ignore.

On this side it is very hard to find any reason to favour the retention of the anomalous position created by the External Relations Act. From the British point of view, it is equally hard to find any reason for its retention; it serves no useful purpose and, indeed, as I said in a recent interview which I gave to the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, it is hardly flattering to the British Crown. (I enclose herewith a copy of this interview, in case you did not see it; it sets out broadly the policy which, I think, should be followed).

The relationship that counts is the factual relationship coupled with the ties of blood, culture and friendship that exist and it would normally develop to a greater extent, once the causes of friction are removed.

You expressed the view in your letter that the repeal of the External Relations Act in some way will serve to make the ending of Partition more difficult. Frankly, I do not think so, and this view is confirmed by some of my Protestant friends from the North. No doubt, the 'Burghers' of Belfast will blow a lot of hot air in the hope of creating as much mischief as possible between Dublin and London; they have always done so, and will, no doubt, continue. I trust they will get no encouragement for this in London. They have always persisted in referring to this part of the country as Mr. de Valera's Republic; they will no doubt continue to refer to it as Mr. Costello's Republic.

For more than a quarter of a century, links with the Crown have been maintained on the basis that they would speed the ending of Partition. So far, we have seen no evidence that they served this purpose; they have merely served to maintain the country in a constant state of incipient revolt.

The pretence of attachment to the Crown or to the Commonwealth is, I think, little more than a veil used to cloak the intolerant and undemocratic rule of the Belfast dictatorship. A cursory comparison of the figures of those who fought against Germany in the last war from the 26 Counties and the 6 Counties, furnishes some evidence of their 'loyalty'.

There will, no doubt, be a tendency to exaggerate the effect of the repeal of the External Relations Act, mainly due either to ignorance of its effect or to malicious propaganda by the 'Burghers' of Belfast. The Act merely deals with the accredition of diplomatic representatives by and to the King.

In practice it has already fallen into desuetude; it does not deal with Ireland's position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. The constitutional position as regards Ireland's membership of the Commonwealth is that we ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth with the repeal, in 1937, of the earlier Constitution, Article 1 of which provides:

'The Irish Free State is a co-equal member of the Community of Nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations'.

That Article was repealed in 1937 and replaced by our present Constitution which provides that we are a Sovereign, Independent and Democratic State, instead. Accordingly, as a matter of constitutional law, our membership of the Commonwealth was terminated formally more than ten years ago. I mention this because of the Tory tendency to magnify the effect of the repeal of the External Relations Act.

I am terribly glad and happy that you share our views in relation to the necessity for ending Partition. I do think its continuance is a constant indictment of the elementary right to national self-determination and of the principles of democratic rule. To a certain extent, I think that it has damaged Britain's position in the world as well as in Ireland.

I cannot altogether agree that it is a matter that concerns only the North and the South of Ireland. Partition was effected and continues to operate by virtue of an Act of the British Parliament, passed in 1920, for which no single Irish representative voted; British customs operate the Border; British troops occupy the territory; U.K. finances are inextricably mixed with the Belfast Government; there has never been any clear cut indication given by the British Government that it desires to see Partition ended. In these circumstances, whatever may be the innermost desire of the members of the Government, it is difficult to convince the people on this side that Britain is not involved. They have no way of reading into the minds of your Statesmen.

I do accept that the members of the present British Government desire, in an academic fashion, to see it solved, but they have done nothing, that I know of, to translate that desire into action; they have not even indicated publicly that they consider the reunification of Ireland to be a desirable objective. Such a statement would, I believe, be constructive and of material assistance.

I am afraid I have inflicted upon you an extremely long letter. I felt from your letter, however, that you were genuinely interested and that, therefore, you would forgive me for being so long-winded and repetitious. It was only by writing quite freely and unofficially that I could fully explain to you our viewpoint. However, long-winded [though] this letter may be, I sought to eliminate from it many of the more obvious considerations with which I have dealt in public speeches. Rather I have sought to deal with some of the less obvious elements of the situation which I have deliberately refrained from discussing in public, lest it might have been construed as an attempt to exacerbate the situation.

I shall keep on working for the development of friendlier relationship, hoping for co-operation from the other side. I feel that we have already made some considerable progress and that, since the change of Government, there has been a distinct improvement in our mutual relationship. Before, it would have been quite impossible for half the British Cabinet to visit Ireland, at least without very extraordinary police protective measures. Most of the Ministers who came had no police protection at all, and the one or two who had, merely had it pro forma. This may seem of very little importance, but it is, nevertheless, a very real test of the improvement in our relationship.

On reading over this letter, I find that it may sound critical or argumentative. It is not intended to be so, it is really a very earnest effort to convey my considered view of the way in which to ensure closer friendship.