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Volume 8 1945~1948

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Date
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No. 336 NAI DFA Secretary's Files A34

Memorandum by Frederick H. Boland on the planned repatriation of Herman Goertz to Germany
(Secret)

Dublin, 16 May 1947

  1. At the suggestion of Herr Hempel, and on the Minister's instructions, I saw Goertz at Hempel's house yesterday evening. Hempel was present during the conversation.
  2. After some preliminary conversation on other matters, I told Goertz that my purpose in seeing him was to tell him quite frankly the conditions on which he was being repatriated to Germany. It was clear from his letter to the Taoiseach that he had fears and anxieties which were quite groundless. My purpose was to try to relieve his mind and to spare him unnecessary mental strain.
  3. I told Goertz about the assurances which had been sought and received. He would not be required to go to the Russian zone against his will. There was no danger to his life or personal liberty. After his arrival in Germany, he might be detained for a short period - not more than three months, I thought - for 'screening'; otherwise there was no question of his being tried or imprisoned, unless, of course, he was guilty of ordinary common-law crimes. Goertz said he wouldn't mind even six months' detention if he were free after that. The limitation about common-law crimes was quite natural and he had nothing to fear from it. I said that, as regards his fears arising from his part in the suppression of the Spartacist riots, the point had been mentioned to the Allied representatives, and General Clay, the Commander of the United States Zone, was being specially informed of it and asked to take the necessary protective measures. If there were any place in Germany rather than another to which he would prefer to go, that could probably be arranged. He had nothing to fear from the de-Nazification Courts. As I understood it, he had never been a member of the Nazi Party. As regards the libel in the 'Daily Mail', the allegation that he had been engaged in a Nazi conspiracy since his release last Autumn was, of course, rubbish. An early opportunity would be taken to deny it. I suggested to Goertz that, in view of all this, the apprehensions expressed in his letter to the Taoiseach were groundless.
  4. Goertz thanked me. He said he accepted the fact that the assurances had been given, but he was sceptical as to whether they would amount to much when he got to Germany. He spoke on his past - his working in training the Secret German Air Force while ostensibly practising as a lawyer, and his part in the suppression of the Communist riots after the 1914-18 war. Speaking with considerable heat and emphasis, he said that the Germans in authority in Germany at present were the scum of the country and that the main object of the Allies would be to crush out of existence people like himself who had worked for the greatness of Germany. He said that, though he had never been a member of the Nazi party, the unit of the Reichswehr to which he belonged had been attached to the Waffen SS, and both the SS and the Imperial Command, of which he was an officer, had been declared criminal organisations. His brother, who was not a Nazi at all, had been sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He questioned whether the assurances given would be much value in such an environment. I said that the assurances had been given in the light of all the factors he had mentioned, and the Government, who had the responsibility of judging the question, were quite satisfied that they would be honoured. If there had been any doubt in their minds, his deportation would not have been decided upon. What interest would the British and American authorities have in giving assurances, only to leave themselves open to a charge of breach of faith by failing to see that proper effect was given to them? Similar assurances had been given when the military internees returned to Germany, and they had been carried out. Goertz said he had been concerned with activities between his arrival and arrest here which were not known to the Allies and would, therefore, not be covered by the assurances. They involved sabotage and had to do with ships. I said I thought the Allies knew all about his activities here - more, possibly, than we did. That was a fair assumption from Colonel Lahousen's evidence at Nuremburg.
  5. Goertz said that, if all this was so, why were the Allies so interested in his extradition. He said he used the term advisedly. I asked him what made him think there was anything special about his case. Deportation Orders had been made against all the former German agents, and what I had said about assurances applied to the others as well as to him. The suggestion behind his use of the word 'extradition' was quite wrong. The Government's attitude had been determined as long ago as the Summer of 1945 when the Allied Control Council called for the return of German officials and agents to Germany. Other neutral countries complied with this decision; alone of the neutral countries, Ireland did not. Our Government's attitude was that they were not prepared to require the German officials to leave, because their conduct here was always correct. As regards German agents, however, who came here illegally during the war in violation of our neutrality and of the Government's pledge about the use of our territory, it was never the intention to allow them to make their permanent homes in this country, but it was decided to allow them to stay here until their detention had ended and until the passions of the immediate post-war period had subsided and satisfactory assurances of their safety could be secured. It was on the basis of that policy, which we had frankly stated to the Allied authorities at the time, that the Government had refused the Allied Control Council's demand in 1945. It was that policy which was now being carried out. Now that the war in Europe was over nearly two years and satisfactory assurances had been received, it was felt the time had come for the German agents to return to their own country. Goertz asked might he take it from this that he was not being deported in consequence of pressure by the Allies. I said he could. He had seen during his time here how the Irish Government reacted to external pressure. (Goertz readily assented to this.) Pressure would not induce the Government to change its own policy or act contrary to what it considered right and proper - quite the contrary. If it were otherwise, he would have been sent back in 1945 when the repatriation of German agents was formally demanded by the Allied Control Council. He and the other agents were being deported in accordance with the policy, adopted two years ago, which I had described to him.
  6. Goertz said that, when he was released from detention in September, Mr. Costigan had told him that he was free to stay here. What had happened in the meantime to alter the position? I said that that point had been dealt with on the affidavits at the recent proceedings. There had obviously been a misunderstanding. He had taken Mr. Costigan's words as going further than they went. There was a transfer of responsibility at the time from the Department of Defence, who had been responsible for their custody, to the Department of Justice, which set them at liberty because the Emergency Powers Orders had expired; but the suggestion that there had been any change of policy as regards the ultimate repatriation of the German agents was not correct.
  7. Goertz said that, if the agents were being merely deported and not extradited, why was it necessary to treat them as criminals? Why were his colleagues subjected to the humiliation of appearing manacled in the presence of the Allied Air Attachés? I said that Herr Hempel had already told me about this allegation that the men were manacled, and the Department of Justice had specially investigated it. There was not one word of truth in the allegation. I wondered from whom he had heard it? He said he had seen the men himself from his cell, walking beside detectives with their left shoulders lowered. Herr Hempel asked him had he seen the chains or manacles. He said he had not, but, having been in a convict prison, he knew what men looked like when manacled. I said he was mistaken. There was not the slightest foundation for the suggestion. It was simply fantastic. I said that the British and American Air Attachés should not have been there at all when the four men left on the 15th April. We had told the British and the American representatives so.
  8. Goertz went on to speak, with considerable heat, about the manner of his arrest in early April. He said he was not allowed to clean his boots, a detective officer had ordered the landlady, who brought his breakfast on a tray, to 'get out', and offensive remarks were made to him. The attitude of the detectives who arrested him was a great contrast to that of Detective Inspector Wymes, who arrested him in 1941. He said that he had called on Wymes after his release to thank him for his courtesy. Speaking with emphasis, Goertz said he objected to being treated as a criminal. I said he was not regarded as a criminal and he was not being deported as such. I knew nothing of the details of his arrest, but, if the things he complained of had occurred, he might be quite sure they were not done in consequence of any orders given. Nothing was further from the intention of the authorities than to cause himself or his colleagues unnecessary humiliation.
  9. Goertz also spoke about his detention in Mountjoy. He said he knew he was in the condemned cell merely for his comfort - it was larger and had a fire. Nor had he any complaints against the Governor or the staff. But the obvious precautions against suicide - the leaving on of the light at night, the frequent inspections, and the removal of his knife and fork after meals - constituted an interference by the authorities, which he strongly resented. Whether he took his life or not was his own business.
  10. The conversation concluded with Goertz thanking me for the information I had given him but saying that, even still, he did not wish to return to Germany. He spoke about getting away to Spain or the Argentine. I said that, even if this were practicable - which I thought it wasn't - it would involve the risk of his returning to Germany without the cover of the assurance which we had obtained. In any case, it was hardly a permanent solution. Hempel expressed a similar view. I concluded by saying that my purpose in seeing him was to endeavour to remove from his mind the fears and anxieties about what would happen to him on his return to Germany which we knew to be groundless. I hoped I had succeeded in that. For the rest, Germany would have to get back on to her feet and the task would tax all the energies of the German people. I thought he was wrong in feeling that there was no place for people like him in Germany or that he had no longer any avenue of useful work and activity in his own country.
  11. Throughout the conversation, Goertz was calm and courteous, except when he spoke of the intention of the Allies to crush the best elements in Germany, of the circumstances of his arrest, and of the precautions taken in Mountjoy. On these three matters he spoke heatedly, but immediately afterwards apologised for doing so.
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