[matter omitted]
Mr. Seán Lester arrived in New York on the 13th from Montreal where he had spent two days. He had a suite at the Waldorf and I got in touch with him there by phone that day. He and Mrs. Lester took lunch with me on the 14th. After lunch, when Mr. Lester and I were alone, he asked me what I was doing in New York. I said that I was constantly up and down to Washington or New York from Ottawa about one thing or another, wheat, e.g., and so on. I added that as I was to be in New York that week you had asked me to enquire in a personal way about the situation as regards our candidature for membership of the United Nations. Mr. Lester said that you had been making similar enquiries of him through Mr. Cremins before he left Geneva and that he had been expecting a letter from you. I said that, as a matter of fact, you had asked me to get in touch with him if he were in New York and request his good offices. He said he would be glad to enquire how things stood. His own view was that nothing would be done during the present session of the Assembly. But he made it clear that, at that moment, he had no knowledge at all as to the position.

On the 15th November Mr. Lester informed me that he had met 'a New Zealand delegate' the night before (he did not give me the delegate's name) of whom he had casually enquired as to the position regarding our candidature. The New Zealand delegate had said that, in his view, 'any reversal of the Security Council's decision i.e. withdrawal of Russia's veto this session was definitely not to be expected'. 'New Zealand', Mr. Lester added, 'shares Australia's views about our candidature.'

Mr. Lester went to Boston on Saturday the 16th for the week-end. I did not see him again until Monday the 18th. So far as I know he made no enquiries of anyone who could inform him of the position before he went to Boston.

On the 18th November Mr. Lester had, as yet, no news. He pressed me very hard for the reasons for our enquiries, our 'anxiety' was the word he used. 'What's the hurry? You have made your gesture by going up'. To this I replied that I had simply been asked by you, as I was coming to New York to find out as best I could whether anything was likely to happen during the present session of the Assembly. (I did not think it right to go any further).

I heard nothing more from him until the 23rd November when he called me up and asked me to come to see him. I did so. He then informed me that, after conversations with different UNO officials, he was satisfied that there was little likelihood of our election during the present session. The officials (Mr. Lester gave me no names) emphasised that while the Russians were unpredictable they were unlikely to let up in the present general atmosphere. Mr. Nunan cabled you from the Consulate General in that sense later on the same day (23rd November).¹ I told Mr. Lester on this occasion of the results of my own enquiries.

Mr. and Mrs. Lester very kindly gave Mr. and Mrs. Nunan and myself luncheon at the Waldorf during the week. (The Nunans had had the Lesters to lunch before my arrival in New York). The Secretary General,² the Consul General and I talked about partition in the Lesters' suite after lunch. The Secretary General was against any campaign in the United States that would appeal to anti-British elements there. He himself introduced the subject of partition and made the point about a campaign in the United States out of the blue. He spoke with great emphasis. We did not argue the matter.

I had no further conversation with Mr. Lester until the 27th November after receipt of your telegram No. 270 of that date to the Consul General.³ I then told him that the 'Irish Independent' had been advocating a withdrawal of our candidature. (The 'Independent' article was, by the way, noticed in the Montreal 'Standard' of Sunday the 17th November). Mr. Lester thought that our withdrawal would be a great mistake.⁴ He was leaving New York the next night on the 'Queen Elizabeth'. We said goodbye and I casually asked whether, when we met again, I should still have to call him 'Mr. Secretary General'. He then gave me the reply that he would exact my 'full respect until all is over, that is, until the assets are all distributed - about March next'. (My telegram No. 123 of the 29th November).⁵

Mr. Lester's chief informant about the possibilities during the present session of the Assembly was, I think, Mr. Martin Hill, who is one of Mr. Trygve Lie's 'secretaries'.

Mr. E.J. Phelan⁶

[matter omitted]
Mr. Phelan took me over the house and grounds alone.⁷ I asked him what he thought the position with regard to our candidature for the United Nations then was. 'The only view anybody close to the top could give you on that is that nothing can be ruled out. Anything may happen even this session. There is a deep resentment about the exercise of the veto against Ireland deeper than most of the officials know. Never mind what Sean Lester or Martin Hill or any of these people tell you. They don't know. I don't know. The Russians might change overnight, might let up on the veto in our case if e.g. there was a better atmosphere on some unrelated issue. Events aren't logical, developments aren't predictable anymore. Nothing makes sense. Again, the Russians might let up if they reject the proposals for regulating the use of the veto. They might say "Very well, we do not accept these proposals, but we will let the rejected candidates or some of them in￿.'

'These are slim prospects' I said. Mr. Phelan agreed but repeated: 'Nothing can be ruled out, anything may happen, that's how I put it. This, remember, is not a question of procedure. And it is not treated as one of principle. It is a question of what the Russians will do today, or tomorrow, or, say, next Wednesday. Your own guess based on the day to day reports in the 'New York Times' is as good as mine or anyone's. I don't think the Russians know what they will do next week or before the session ends.'

[matter omitted]

My own enquiries

I had breakfast at the same table as Mr. C. Bruggmann, Swiss Minister at Washington, on the morning of the 13th November. The room was crowded and one found a place where one could. I had met Mr. Bruggmann at Philadelphia in 1944. During breakfast he spoke quite freely about the Swiss Government's attitude to UNO. He said that they had a delegation of observers at the present Assembly session (five was the number he mentioned so far as I can remember). They were enquiring into the question as to how many and which of the UNO bodies Switzerland could join without becoming members of UNO. Switzerland would not abandon neutrality. He asked me whether Ireland would abandon neutrality. I said we had applied for membership in the usual terms. Mr. Bruggmann had no idea as to what would happen during the present session in so far as the rejected candidates were concerned.⁸

[matter omitted]

On the 14th November also I met Mr. Cockram of the Dominions Office who was working between Lake Success and the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Waldorf. He asked me to dine with him at the Essex House Hotel (where the British Delegation were staying), the next evening. I said 'Why not dine with me?' He said that that would be better still as he would be at their offices in the Waldorf on the evening of the 15th. He said, however, that he would like me to meet Mr. Arthur Bottomley the Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions. I said 'Bring him along if he is free'. The next morning Mr. Cockram rang to ask whether he might bring along Mr. Boyd Shannon as well. I asked Mr. Nunan to join us as I felt unequal to three Dominions Office guests - alone. At dinner we spoke about things in general, the Chicago Air Conference of 1944 which Mr. Shannon and I attended; the 'revolt' in the British Labour Party, which Mr. Bottomley said meant nothing; and so on. Mr. Bottomley asked whether we were glad or sorry not to be in the United Nations.⁹ I said that our view was that the organization should be universal. I referred to Mr. de Valera's speech on Russia's candidature for membership of the League of Nations in 1934 - its fairness, its frankness and sound internationalism.¹⁰ Mr. Bottomley had not heard of it. He was impressed by the irony of Russia's attitude to Ireland in 1946. 'But', he said, 'you know why Russia is against you? Because you are a Catholic nation'. I replied that that reason, if it stood alone, would have decided Russia to rule out a number of countries. There were other considerations. It was a pity, I said, that there had been any attempt at horse trading as a method of election of new members. That had left a definitely bad impression on the public mind everywhere. Mr. Bottomley smiled and said nothing.

This was a pleasant evening. Our guests did not remain late as they had a meeting at 9.30 p.m. We dined at 7 p.m.

I went to Lake Success on Saturday the 16th November. Mr. St. Laurent was to address the Political Committee on the veto that morning. When I arrived, Mr. Wellington Koo was speaking on proposals to reform the procedure and practice in the use of the veto. He was followed by others including M. Parodi who had a comprehensive scheme. Mr. St. Laurent did not speak at the morning meeting. Looking around the long oval table, most of the faces were unfamiliar to me. M. Brière was with M. Parodi (M. Hervé Alphand was not. He attends the Economic etc. Committee). I knew most of the members of the British and the New Zealand delegations, attending the Committee, some of the South African and Australian, and all of the Canadian.

Mr. St. Laurent saw me from his place and very kindly made his way to me at the end of the meeting. 'I heard in New York that you were to speak today, Sir', I said 'and came to hear you'. 'That was nice of you', he replied, 'if you have any ideas for my speech' he said 'now is the time. I am to speak after lunch'. 'I could offer some mild suggestions on the subject of the veto', I said. The Minister laughed and said: 'I think I know what they would be. You know, of course, that there is some prospect of your being elected this session. Russia is holding out, so far, in order to create the precedent that an applicant can be turned down by the veto'. At this stage Mr. Escott Reed joined us. He is the chief adviser of the Canadian Minister of External Affairs at the Assembly. He had heard Mr. St. Laurent's last remark to me. 'Minister' he said, 'about Ireland's election, I should tell you that we have just been approached to agree to postpone the elections in order to let the Council simmer down after the onslaught in the Committee on the veto. There has been a canvass going on in the hall all the morning to get agreement on postponement'. Mr. St. Laurent was a little taken aback by Mr. Reed's remarks. He looked at me, just shook his head, and closed up.¹¹

I had a few minutes conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan.¹² I took occasion to thank him for his remarks about Ireland at the Security Council. He said that unfortunately they hadn't carried the day. I asked him how the matter now stood. He said that they were no further. He felt that the matter would not be concluded during the present session. 'I think its off for the time being' he said. We had some further conversation about the fine arrangements, acoustics, interpretation etc. at Lake Success, and that was all. The head of the British Foreign Office seemed as young as he was twenty years ago.

Mr. Gousev passed down the hall but I did not endeavour to meet him. He was, as you recall, the first Russian Ambassador in Ottawa. In appearance he is a different man from the rough and unkempt Bolshevik of his first diplomatic assignment. He is spruce and almost elegant. One learns that he is, if possible, less communicative than ever.

I had a few moments conversation of no consequence with Professor Morgenstierne of Norway.

Sir Carl Berendsen who leads the New Zealand delegation said he was delighted to see me at Lake Success. 'I knew they couldn't keep you out' he said. Mr. Paul Martin joined us and said he was wondering how I had got in!

I had lunch at the cafeteria used by the public. Mr. Paul Hasluck of Australia whom I met there for the first time sat beside me. Many delegates, etc., go there as it is less crowded than the delegation dining room. There also I met Sir Hartley Shawcross¹³ and we spoke for a while about the Nuremberg trials and the prospects of a codification of international criminal law.

Mr. Paul Hasluck was the most intelligent and helpful representative of all.¹⁴ (In appearance he bears a close resemblance to Governor Dewey).¹⁵ During lunch he introduced the subject of Ireland's election. He said that Australia wanted to see Ireland in the UN organization as soon as possible and as soon as we desired. 'Do you want to get in soon?' he asked. I said that we had applied in the hope of being elected. Our people believed that the organization should be made to work as well as possible as it was apparently the only international organization that all the Great Powers could at present agree upon. It should be made universal as soon as possible. 'Could we talk about this again?' he asked. (Luncheon is hardly eaten at Lake Success. It is snatched). I said I would be very glad indeed to do so, and that I would look him up early the following week. I had business in New York for a few days. (My telegram from the Consulate General, 17th November).¹⁶

I¹⁷ called by appointment on Mr. Hasluck at the Australian Mission to UNO offices in the Empire State Building at 4 p.m. on the 20th November. Telegram 306 of the 20th November conveys the result of our talk.¹⁸ It was Mr. Hasluck who informed me that the inclination of American officials - he said he could not say it was American policy - was to seek postponement. They felt, he said, that so long as the British held out against Albania, Russia would hold out against Ireland. Mr. Hasluck invited my personal view as to the effect on public opinion in Ireland of a second rejection now. I gave him my view that a second rejection now would be bad and would set public opinion in Ireland in a wrong direction. I said I would consider this aspect of the matter and inform him later on of my considered view. (I did so after receipt of your telegram No. 270 to the Consul General).¹⁹ Mr. Hasluck said that if the matter was clearly coming to a vote in the Council, and there was no prospect of our success, the Australian representative would at the appropriate time propose an adjournment if we desired to avoid another rejection now. (I informed him after receipt of your telegram No. 270 that a postponement would be desirable in the circumstances outlined).

I could not exaggerate to you the friendliness and frankness of Mr. Paul Hasluck whom I had never met before my visit to Lake Success on the 16th November.²⁰ Before I took leave of him on the 20th November he said: 'I will get in touch with you the moment there is any sign of any new development.' There was none before the 28th November. On my return to Ottawa I wrote Mr. Hasluck a personal note of thanks for his kindness to me while I was in New York.

[matter omitted]

On Monday night the 25th November I took a walk up and down Park Avenue in the coal-strike brownout with Mr. Stańczyk who is a member of the Polish Delegation.²¹ He had been leader of the Polish Delegation to the IL Conference in Philadelphia in 1944 and it was to him I had conveyed your message to support Poland for membership of the Governing Body of the ILO, if a vote was cast on that issue. (He was then, I think, Minister for Social Affairs. He was a leader of the Social Democrat party, most of whom are now Communist). We talked about the similarity of the Irish and Polish struggles for freedom and unity; about the Polish treasures 'lost' in Canada; and, inevitably, of the United Nations. 'The United Nations' Mr. Stanczyk said 'why do we call it so? There is no United Nations: no broad basic policy of the peace organization agreed on by all. The Great Powers are at war in the United Nations. Who can say what the result will be? A continuance of the war going on here in the Waldorf Astoria in another way; or peace?' We did not speak of Poland. Of Ireland Mr. Stanczyk said 'Ireland must join the United Nations, but who knows when, next year perhaps'. I said that our Government and people were grateful to Dr. Lange²² for his speech on our candidature. 'But that was the voice of Poland' Mr. Stanczyk remarked with a stab of propaganda. 'Will you please' I said 'convey to Dr. Lange our sincere thanks?' Mr. Stanczyk took me by the arm and replied 'I most certainly shall, my friend'.

Mr.²³ Stanczyk's son, a tall gangling youth with glasses, in his teens, maybe twenties, - Mr. Stanczyk himself is short and stockily built - had joined us during our walk and at one stage remarked 'Ireland is the talk of Lake Success. You should get Ireland in, father'. 'Your distinguished father would want us in at once' I observed 'Russia is the trouble'. Stanczyk senior squeezed my arm, and at once relaxed the pressure as if he was going too far. He said nothing. I asked 'Why should Russia oppose us?' Mayor O'Dwyer's brownout seemed to become a blackout. We spoke of other things, the glory and horror of New York in her wealth and luxury, the future of America in world affairs, her doubtful destiny as the custodian of the European heritage, and so on. But we spoke no more of Ireland and the United Nations.

On the 26th November Mr. Harry Andrews and Mr. Steyn (Legal Adviser South African Department of External Affairs) had tea with me in Peacock Alley at the Waldorf. Mr. Andrews was keen to know about the form of Ambassador Walshe's Letter of Credence and the signature and counter-signature.²⁴ I told him and explained the position under the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act, 1936. My guests did not conceal their pleasure when I told them that that was the position still. Mr. Andrews said that he had thought that all that was changed. They warmed to me and Mr. Andrews then told me that Field Marshal Smuts had come to New York with a speech for the Assembly containing a strong reference to the vetoing of Ireland's election. One of the phrases was 'What can any country have against Ireland?' The Field Marshal was very keen on keeping the reference in but after long discussions they had decided to leave out references to any particular country.

As regards the prospects of our election this session neither Mr. Andrews nor Mr. Steyn had any views. 'The fact is', Mr. Andrews said, 'that no one is thinking very much about the defeated candidates. The Committees are full of controversies. We ourselves have our hands full with the Indian problem and South West Africa. How do you think we are doing?'

I said that Prime Minister Smuts was not getting a good press. 'A good press?' exclaimed Mr. Steyn 'how could he? We have a bad case'. We all laughed.

'Anyway' Mr. Andrews added 'we are not really consulting the United Nations on this. We are just telling them'.

On²⁵ taking leave Mr. Steyn, who is a young man, said: 'I am a Dutch South African. I have been brought up on Mr. de Valera. We all admire him in South Africa. I have a point to make to you. The British Commonwealth can be made whatever the French in Canada, the Dutch in South Africa, and the Irish all over but especially in Ireland, want it to be. That's a point, isn't it?'

I said I had never heard a better from Van de Heever.²⁶

Conclusion

That was all I could do. It was difficult to do more without giving the impression that I had a special mission in New York. If I had stayed until the end (one met the same people frequently in elevators etc.) it would also have appeared that I was there for a purpose. All I saw and heard merely confirmed the first impression gathered that nothing would happen during the present session. Yet people would go on adding that anything could happen. And in fact there was the case of the problem of Trieste of which some sort of solution came suddenly, indeed overnight, following sharp controversy and disagree-ment for weeks before.

I have inadvertently omitted any reference above to my conversation with Dr. Wilgress²⁷ and Mrs. Pandit.²⁸ But they were reported in the telegram of the 17th November.²⁹