It is possible that the question of our membership of UNO may be referred to in the course of your talks with Mr. Herbert Morrison. We know from Maffey that the British were rather hoping that the United Nations Organisation would provide a framework within which certain questions between this country and Britain would be more easily discussed and settled than if we were to remain outside the Organisation.

We do not want, of course, to evince any undue chagrin at the failure of our application. At the same time, the danger of being left indefinitely outside the Organisation is one which we would naturally seek to counter so far as possible. Unless we are prepared to seek diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia - a course which public opinion here would probably reprobate, particularly in present circumstances - our best chance of getting into UNO now seems to rest in our being able to persuade the British and the Americans to link the question of our admission with the question of the admission of the five 'ex-enemy' States with which peace treaties are now being negotiated in Paris. A logical connection between the two sets of candidatures is established by the terms of the Potsdam Declaration itself.

The Potsdam Declaration stated that the British, American and Russian Governments had instructed the Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Romania. It went on to say that:-

'The conclusion of peace treaties with recognised democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations.'

Having thus dealt with the cases of the five 'ex-enemy' States - Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Romania - the Potsdam Declaration went on to say:-

'As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organisation, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
"1. Membership of the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out those obligations. 2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effective by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.'

This section in the Potsdam Declaration was followed by an express statement to the effect that the terms of the statement did not apply to Spain.

It will be noted that in dealing with the former neutral States, the Potsdam Declaration expressly confirmed the willingness of the three Powers to support their candidature provided that they fulfilled the qualifications set out in Article 4 of the Charter. In voting against the Irish and Portuguese applications, Soviet Russia clearly broke the undertaking into which she entered at Potsdam. Now, the question which presents itself - and which, it is submitted, it is in our interest to propound to the minds of the British and American Governments is: whether in view of Russia's breach of her Potsdam undertaking in regard to this country and Portugal, they intend, without getting a firm undertaking from Russia that she is prepared to change this attitude, to support for membership of UNO the five 'ex-enemy' States referred to in the Potsdam Declaration, four of which - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland - are likely to be consistent supporters of Russia within the Organisation? If they do, and if former 'enemy' States find it easier to get into UNO than countries like ourselves and Portugal, not only the prestige of UNO, which undoubtedly suffered by the rejection of the Irish and Portuguese candidatures, but the prestige of Britain and America and Western Europe as a whole, will suffer a further and very damaging blow.

This argument seems to be the strongest card in our hand at the moment in connection with our relationship to UNO. No doubt, it is already present to the minds of other Governments. But it is worth emphasizing it at the moment because the clauses of the draft treaties specifically providing for the entry of the five 'ex-enemy' States into UNO are apt to come up for discussion at Paris any day now.