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I had a brief conversation regarding UNO at dinner, one evening, when at Geneva recently, with Professor Sir Charles Webster, Special Adviser to the British Minister of State (Mr. Noel Baker) who was a delegate to the Assembly. We talked of the Charter, with which he had much to do at San Francisco, and he said one or two things which may be of interest, one being that, in his opinion, it would be a long time before any neutral was admitted to UNO, and another that he thought that neutrality would not be recognised by the Security Council if war again broke out. He made it clear that difficulties regarding the admission of neutrals would not come from Great Britain - it was Russia which he had in mind, and this notwithstanding the Potsdam communiqué. 'We want the neutrals in', he said.
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It may be worth while to consider, in connection with the question of the entry of neutrals, what the reaction might be, towards neutrals' applications for membership, of a Great Power (or a satellite) which might fear, at some time, armed resistance to its policy, i.e. if its policy tended towards aggression. Would such a Power stand to gain or to lose by the admission of neutral States? I imagine it would stand to lose, and that, therefore, there would be an incentive on the part of such a State not to support applications for membership, because it is unlikely that any of the neutral States would lean on the side of an aggressor. As before suggested, the attitude of States which regained their liberty of action through the operation of the right of veto might easily be governed by their geographical position. If they were too close to an aggressive Great Power, they might simply revert to a strictly neutral position, if that could be maintained, and defend that position if it could not. The fate of the Swedish application, if made, will be something of a pointer for other neutrals in a similar position.
As regards the second statement made by Sir Charles Webster, he went on to say that the renunciation by Britain of an attack on Ireland when Britain was in grave danger during the war, was one of the greatest renunciations in history. I could easily have suggested that having aggressed us for at least 25 generations, we were entitled to a little rest, but I refrained, and merely replied that the attitude adopted by Great Britain was fully appreciated in Ireland, and indeed it had been expressed by Mr. de Valera. He wondered whether it was really appreciated, and was disposed to think it was not. History alone would show, he said. He seemed to believe, in fact, that the effect would be 'wholly bad', though he did not develop this. I asked would not the Allies have lost their whole moral position if Ireland had been attacked, and he readily agreed, at the same time repeating however his statement regarding the renunciation. I referred to the difficulties which partition must always cause until a solution was found, and he said that the majority in the Six Counties were tough and they would certainly resist if interfered with. As regards his statement that neutrality would not in future be recognised, I asked how could the violation of a neutral State be justified, and he replied that it could be justified for one cause only, the 'maintenance of peace and security'. I said that there could not be question of the maintenance of peace as the assumption was that war had broken out. He mentioned, or seemed to mention, Art. 51 of the Charter as an article which would authorise a violation of neutrality, but, having referred to this article afterwards, I do not see how it could be so stretched, if that was in fact his meaning. He insisted that such action could be justified for one cause only - the maintenance of peace and security. He said further that Ireland had through her failure to assist the Allies when America entered the war lost forever the sympathy of the USA. He was in America at the time, he went on, and he knew. I said that there had been a lot of propaganda to that effect at the time, but that my information was to the effect that subsequently there had been a reaction. The conversation was necessarily casual and disjointed. Sir Charles was very friendly, but I would say that it is definitely his opinion that neutrals will have difficulty with Russia in regard to applications for admission to UNO, and that neutrality will have a hard life in war No. 3, if such should happen.
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As regards crimes of war, which subject will probably eventually be developed by UNO, I am not sure that long-drawn-out trials are the best means for dealing out justice in cases of unprovoked aggression and of the other crimes which follow such aggression. I should imagine that more nett charges and more speedy methods would have greater efficacity, both in regard to the punishment of criminals of war and to making would-be aggressors think twice in the future before letting loose the furies. One difficulty as regards the punishment of criminals of war, especially for small States which may suffer aggression from Great Powers, is that justice can normally only be administered by the winners.
