1. I have gone into the above question pretty thoroughly since you suggested we ought hold out against the American Minister to the extent of asserting our absolute right to secure ourselves for German debts of all kinds by means of the German assets of all kinds which we hold or may gain possession of before the war ends.¹

On the whole, I think we can make a plausible case, although not, perhaps, one which will stand too much dissecting by an international lawyer.

Insofar as any claim we make to own a prior mortgage on German property within the jurisdiction, is likely to conflict with the 'right of conquest' which the United Nations are hoping to exercise, we shall have to walk warily. Our counter claim is not, as far as I can ascertain, backed by any good solid precedent and we must, therefore, be prepared either (1) to break new legal ground (and risk a rebuff) or (2) to found our case on the general practice of certain countries after the last war without trying to argue that our position is all-square with theirs. Preferring as I do, the latter alternative, I feel we should not commit ourselves too much in writing, but rely largely on such specious arguments as you can impress verbally on the American Minister when he calls for his reply.

[matter omitted]

4. If we are to interpret the American Minister 's Memorandum literally it would seem that his Government is not interested at the moment in any German property of a 'non-internable' (i.e. of a non-military or non-naval) character. It is true that the unqualified expression 'aircraft' is used, but that – on the basis of ejusdem generis – would appear to mean 'military aircraft' in the context of the memorandum. Yet, I suppose, it would be foolish to hope that the United Nations propose to allow us to hold on to German merchant ships and any German civil aircraft which may enter our waters or territory, without making some attempt to have us surrender them into the victor 's hands or at least to have us 'restore' them to a Germany powerless to defend its property from the victors.

However, since the present Memorandum is so limited in scope, we need only reply to the comparatively simple issues which it raises and await further developments.

[matter omitted]

6. Summarising the 'precedents' it is clear they do not really fit our own situation. But the American Minister should readily understand, seeing how drastically neutral States have dealt with German property in the past without so much justification as we possess (the bomb damage and the Irish ships lost during this war), that the Government feel they have a pre-eminent lien² on any German property which may be, or happen to come under Irish control. Whoever wins the war – thus becoming entitled to German property interned here – the Government's right to detain German matériel pending full satisfaction of Germany's war-debts to Ireland ought to be internationally cognizable. An assurance from the American Government that they appreciated that position ought surely not be too much for this friendly Government to expect of them.

In point of fact, the money-value of German war-material interned here at the moment is utterly negligible in comparison with the considerable amounts due to Ireland by Germany as a result of occurrences during the last five years.