1. In the Memorandum on 'Fundamental Factors Affecting Irish Defence' which was prepared by the General Staff in 1936 attention was directed to the question of espionage and subversive activities in conjunction with external powers or organisations as one of the principal matters likely to influence Irish defence in the event of war.
2. In 1938 G.2 Branch, Department of Defence, organised a section to deal with problems of defence security intelligence, following on representations made by the Department of External Affairs. The immediate cause of the action of the latter Department would appear to have been that representations had been received from the British authorities that the espionage activities of Germany extended to Ireland and that these activities affected British, United States and French defence interests. The Department of Defence was selected to organise and direct this section because –
   1. similar functions in almost all other States are performed by a special section of the Department corresponding to this country's Department of Defence;
   2. certain contacts with such sections were involved and could most appropriately be made by a section of the Department of Defence here;
   3. the Department of Defence had already studied this problem and directed attention to its importance.
3. An important measure taken by G.2 Branch in the organisation of a Defence Security Intelligence Service was the establishment of a new section in the Post Office Investigation Branch for the supervision of suspect correspondence. When an external Government directed attention to the problem of foreign espionage in Ireland the Government in question recommended the establishment of a Postal Supervision Section as one of the first essential measures for the detection of such activities. As a result of arrangements made, the Officer in charge of this special section of the Post Office Investigation Branch was sent to London with a view to obtaining first-hand knowledge of the operation of such a section. This action was taken after An Taoiseach had approved of the proposal and it had been agreed by the Minister for Justice that he would issue to the C.S.O. G.2 Branch warrants for postal supervision when the necessary case had been made in each instance.
4. At the commencement of the Emergency the question was again raised as to who would be responsible for duties in relation to a number of questions affecting the security of the State, especially in its external aspect. An Taoiseach, at a conference attended by representatives of the Departments of Defence, Justice and External Affairs, decided that G.2 Branch, Department of Defence, should be responsible.
5. The special circumstances during the Emergency such as the existence of censorship and emergency legislation overcame legal and other difficulties affecting the work of the Defence Security Intelligence Section which have now arisen again. One very important facility granted for a period before and also during the entire Emergency was the issue of warrants by the Minister for Justice direct to the C.S.O. G.2 Branch for the necessary supervision of postal, including telephone, communications in certain cases. The Minister for Justice wishes now to revert, in connection with the issue of warrants, to what is described as the pre-war arrangements, i.e. that such warrants would be issued only on the certificate of the Commissioner, Garda Síochána, that the warrants are necessary for the prevention or detection of crime.

The proposals of the Minister for Justice would so materially affect the functioning of Defence Security Intelligence that it has become necessary to examine again in some detail the problem of postal, including telephone, supervision.

The minute of the Minister for Justice proposes a reversion to what is described as pre-war conditions. G.2 Branch had in fact been made responsible for Defence Security Intelligence a year before the war and it had taken six months to overcome a variety of difficulties before the work of postal supervision was got into systematic operation. The present proposal of the Minister for Justice, therefore, actually involves reversion to the position that existed before any Department was made responsible for Defence Security Intelligence.

International conditions at present are, however, far from normal. They are on the contrary such as to give very strong grounds for believing that the Government would hardly consider it desirable that any measures which were essential for the security of the State in the year before the Emergency should not now be continued.

The proposal of the Minister for Justice that the supervision of postal communications should be directed solely to the prevention or detection of crime would render this supervision to a large degree useless for the purpose of Defence Security Intelligence as many of the activities with which Defence Security Intelligence is concerned are not in themselves criminal. This point is elaborated in correspondence with Mr. P. P. O'Donoghue, Legal Assistant to the Attorney General, which is attached as an Appendix to this Memorandum.¹

It will be noted that many of the activities referred to in the correspondence with Mr. O'Donoghue affect the interests of friendly foreign States.

As shown by the experience of this country prior to and during the Emergency one of the problems confronting the State is the necessity of being in a position to prove that the activities in Ireland of certain foreign States, their nationals here, and their Irish friends, are not harmful to other States. The only way in which this can be satisfactorily achieved is for the Defence Security Intelligence Section in this country to keep itself fully informed of all such activities.

The experience of G.2 Branch in the last seven years shows that many of the incidents and problems that worry foreign States in relation to Ireland come to their notice through matter directed by post to and from Ireland. If the Defence Security Intelligence Section here is to continue to keep itself informed of these matters, at least equally as well as the authorities of the foreign States concerned, postal supervision in selected cases is clearly essential.

In proposing that the use of postal warrants should be related solely to the prevention or detection of crime, the Minister for Justice also proposed that warrants should be issued only on the certificate of the Commissioner, Garda Síochána, that they are necessary for these purposes. Since the use of the warrants for the purpose of Defence Security Intelligence cannot, for the reasons already stated, be limited in this manner, it is assumed that, if it is agreed that postal and telephone supervision in selected cases may be resumed, G.2 Branch will submit its applications for the issue of warrants direct to the Minister for Justice as heretofore. It may be mentioned that this arrangement was reached originally because of the fact that matters of a very delicate nature were not infrequently involved which made it highly undesirable that there should be any avoidable duplication of records. In fact in some cases this aspect of the matter was considered so important that the cases for warrants were communicated verbally to the Minister for Justice.

The Government, and in particular the Minister for Justice, are entitled to ask what particular problem, apart from the general run of matters requiring investigation, G.2 Branch regards as meriting attention at the present time.The following is an indication of the view of G.2 Branch on this point:

Russian and Communist Problem.

There is a group of activities which, in the light of experience, may be described as being in ways similar to German propaganda and other activities here before the Emergency, namely, those of the Russian-influenced and externally subsidised and directed Communist Party of Ireland. This Party, though small in numbers, is highly organised and has efficient and not over-scrupulous methods of operating which enable it to wield an influence out of all proportion to its membership.

There is a long history of Russian propaganda and even of interference in subversive activities in this country and one known case of the attempted use of the I.R.A. for espionage against Great Britain. While there is no positive evidence that the activities of the Communist Party of Ireland are controlled from Russia, it is at least beyond doubt that the Party bases its general policy on that of Russia. This point is illustrated by the Party's attitude during the war.

Before Russia's entry into the war, the Party supported this country'sneutrality; attacked all the belligerents as capitalistic States and advocated the withdrawal of the Six Counties from the war. When Russia became involved in hostilities, the Party's attitude changed: support of neutrality gave way to advocacy of a policy of combating Fascism and, at the time of the American Note, the Party issued a Manifesto opposing this country's policy of neutrality and advocating the expulsion of the German and Japanese diplomatic representatives.

The Communist Party here receives a regular subsidy from, or through, America and also receives funds from Great Britain and from Northern Ireland. It periodically receives directions from the Communist Party of Great Britain in regard to its activities, either directly or though the Belfast group.

The Communist Party of Ireland then is a unit of an international organisation; is subsidised and directed from outside the State and bases its general policy on that of a foreign State. This aspect of the Communist problem makes it fundamentally different from that of such organisations as the I.R.A. which, even when they collaborated with the agents of a foreign State, did so as an indirect means to their particular ends.

The existence in this country of such an organisation, the first allegiance of which is to an international organisation or to a foreign State, provides an organised group, many members of which would undoubtedly, on request or direction, engage in espionage, propaganda or other activities of the type described in the Appendix to this Memorandum.

German Activities.

G.2 Branch has been recently provided from an external source with correspondence relating to the activities during the war of Frank Ryan and also to recent activities of Helmut Clissmann. Both these individuals were directing brains in German subversive activities relative to Ireland. It is considered desirable that correspondence which might throw light on their present or past activities should still be supervised.

British Activities.

The arrangements for the recruiting of the many thousands of Irishmen who have been joining the British forces annually were made, in the main, by means of postal correspondence with an office in Belfast. It was possible through periodic postal supervision to check the nature and extent of these activities. It is suggested that in the national and particularly defence interests this check should be resumed.

After postal supervision had been in operation for some time it was agreed that circumstances also called for supervision of telephone conversations in certain cases. The considerations already outlined in relation to postal supervision apply generally also to telephone supervision and it has been the experience of G.2 Branch that telephone supervision has, in a number of instances, been the most valuable part of the Defence Security Intelligence machine operated by the Branch.

In view of the considerations set out in the preceding paragraphs, it is suggested that the issue of warrants for postal and telephone supervision for the purposes of Defence Security Intelligence should not be limited in the manner proposed by the Minister for Justice but that the procedure in this connection which was arranged in the year before the Emergency should be retained.

It is fully appreciated that ample grounds for the issue of a warrant must be furnished to the Minister for Justice in each case and that great discretion must be exercised in this matter of postal and telephone supervision so that any publicity regarding it may be avoided and, a more fundamental point, so that there may be no undue interference with the rights of the individual or of organisations.