8. France, Europe and the world now seem to be thrown back to a state of affairs such as that which immediately followed the last war. Once again the victorious States of Europe (whoever they will be) must endeavour to found their peace on a strong machine involving the use of organised force against 'aggression' from the defeated States, rather than seek salvation in normal friendly relations between all States showing a common culture and economy. In other words, the occasion never seemed brighter than now for a strong League of Nations run by a few all-powerful Big Powers and never gloomier for a 'federation' settlement based on mutual forgiveness, repentance and Christian charity. Disarmament, except of the vanquished, seems farther away than ever, and the practical safety and independence of the peaceable small State appears likely to be diminished more than ever in future, notwithstanding a more than ever voluble lip-service to the alleged 'sovereign equality' of all nations whether great or small. This is certainly a pessimistic picture for a small Christian State to look upon. All that can be said in its favour is that, if the New Order succeeds in maintaining peace for a century at the expense of some Christian and national ideals, it will certainly have achieved the unexpected and will also have benefited some of mankind at least. Without a prolonged peace, the Christian ideals of Faith, Hope and Charity and the national ideals of Liberty, Equality and Self Determination are bound to finally degenerate into obsolete terms. Unfortunately, however, no small nation, or any other nation for that matter, is at all convinced that any set of victorious belligerents in this war will be capable of assuring peace in the world for even one single generation. It is not because the 'peace-machinery' is lacking. We still have the League and the Hague Court and plans such as that of Dumbarton Oaks promise a still more effective machine. The big doubt which now fills the minds of all thinking men is not concerned with the ability of any victor to keep down any vanquished State nor his ability to keep the small States from fighting small wars. The big doubt hinges entirely on the ability of the victorious Powers to preserve peace between themselves and so avert the substitution of 'regional' for 'national' wars in our own time.