My dear Joe,
Mr. Mackenzie King's views (conveyed in my telegram No. 27 of the 28th February)¹ on the American Note of the 21st February, and possible further action against us, were so soon falsified by Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons that I think it right to confirm the sense of my telegram in this way. I delayed sending it until Monday the 28th February, the morning after my conversation with the Prime Minister, so that I could have its terms approved by Mr. Robertson. This was my own suggestion to the Prime Minister in order to avoid any misinterpretation of his mind to you. Mr. Robertson approved the terms of the telegram as being a correct statement of Mr. King's views. I did not give him a copy.

If, of course, the British take no further action against us in the way of 'sanctions', then Mr. King's views will not have been completely falsified. He was, however, quite definite as reported in my Secret Report of the 3rd March² that no matter what reply we made to the American Note we would hear no more about it, but that our non-compliance with the request would be taken into account when the war was over. That, however, he said, was an aspect of the matter which, doubtless, we had fully weighed.

With regard to the question as to how much the Prime Minister knew beforehand about the American approach I now have the impression – rightly or wrongly – that he probably knew, in a general way, that something was to be done about the German legation and the Japanese consulate in Dublin. Very likely the British mentioned it in a 'casual' way sometime previously, and, having got no adverse reaction at the Canadian end, the way was clear for a formal American approach by whomsoever i.e. whether the British Government, or the American military authorities, the initiative was to be taken. This is merely my own speculation on an aspect of the matter the facts of which must be fully within your knowledge.

[matter omitted]