Volume 7 1941~1945


Doc No.
Date
Subject

No. 152  NAI DFA Secretary's Files A34

Memorandum from Joseph P. Walshe to Eamon de Valera
'The Case of Hermann Görtz'
(Most Secret) (Copy No. 2)

DUBLIN, 4 December 1941

The German Minister came to see me by appointment, made at his request, at 12.30 today. He said he had come about the item of news which had appeared in this morning's paper concerning Görtz.1 He only wished to say that he was very sorry that there had been publicity. He felt that it would give those who were opposed to Irish neutrality a good basis for making further attempts to weaken it. Things, he said, had been going on quite well, and he thought he had succeeded, as far as Germany was concerned, in maintaining an attitude favourable to our neutrality, which he had always admitted to be a primary German interest in this part of the world. He regretted that all the details of the Held affair2 had been resurrected and a new atmosphere of suspicion created. He hoped very much that there would not be further publicity. His own position would, of course, be made much more delicate, and the difficulties of his life here considerably increased. He did not believe there was any diplomatic post in the world so difficult as his and so much an object of intrigue by Germany's enemies, whether Anglo-Irish or English. The latter, he thought, had something new to add to their dossier which was being prepared for the day when they would think it opportune to ask for his dismissal.

I told the German Minister that he had only his Government to blame for any new difficulties that might be created. I had frequently mentioned to him the serious deterioration in our relations which had been caused by the Held affair, and we had the right to expect that he himself would have taken action to put an end immediately to the activities of the agent who was then landed here. Whether he had done so or not, the activities had not ceased. I was not aware of the details, but I knew that the Government took a serious view of their subversive character. Having carefully considered the matter, they had decided that publicity was necessary in the interests of the security of the country, and they were in a much better position than either he or his Government were to take a comprehensive view of the situation and to come to a decision accordingly. Moreover, he should remember that a great deal of the propaganda against our neutrality in Britain and the United States dated from the time of the Held incident, and was determined largely by the fact that the parachutist in the case was presumably still at large. Publicity, we hoped, was part of the liquidation of that disagreeable affair.

The German Minister at this point interrupted to assure me in the strongest terms that it was entirely opposed to his Government's policy to interfere in any way in our internal affairs or to encourage any action against our Government, and he felt sure – although he knew nothing about Görtz or his activities – there was no intention also in this case of tampering with Irish interests.

I replied that my Government was naturally in a better position to judge whether these activities were detrimental to the interests of Ireland. It was quite possible that both his Government and Görtz were drawing a line through Irish politics which did not correspond with the reality, and, whilst tampering with things which appeared to relate to the other side of the border they might be profoundly affecting the interests of the country as a whole.

As to his view that the publication of the arrest of Görtz would cause new suspicion between us, I agreed, but he must remember that our Government – like the Governments of all neutral countries at the present moment – were rightly suspicious of all the great belligerents. They knew perfectly well that at any moment it might suit one or the other to interfere in our internal affairs, and we were not naïve enough to allow ourselves to be unduly shocked if our suspicions were occasionally realised. Each country had to use the means best adapted to its security. We considered publicity one of our best defences.

The German Minister was so troubled by my reply that I thought it better to suggest that he should have a chat with you about the whole matter. But, if he did decide to do so, he should be able to give a guarantee direct from his Government that we had seen the last of German agents and their activities in this country. He said he would think of my advice in the matter of the inter- view with you. If you wanted to see him, he was naturally ready to come at any time.

I left it an open question, as it might be well to postpone seeing him until we have all the facts of the Görtz case. Perhaps also Dr. Hempel might try to get some guarantee from his Government without further pressure. Unless we receive a promise in this sense, it will be next to impossible to maintain normal relations with the Legation.

While not at any time revealing to the Minister that I knew the details about

Görtz's activities, except that they were subversive, I did not conceal from him that we took a very serious view of the situation. At the same time, I did not hint in the remotest way at the possibility of a break in our diplomatic relations.

[initialled] J. P. W.

1 Hermann Görtz (1890-1947), Abwehr agent sent to Ireland in May 1940 to establish links with the IRA in preparation for a possible German invasion of Britain. He was arrested in November 1941.

2 See No. 165. Stephen Held delivered 'Plan Kathleen', a scheme for a German landing in Northern Ireland, to Germany. Held sheltered Görtz in his house in Dublin until Gardaí raided it in late May 1940.