Mr Gray's Memorandum¹: Notes Thereon

1. The use of the expression 'diverging sympathies' in the introductory note is likely to give rise to a misunderstanding.
2. The reference to Ireland of the American President in his recent speech was clearly intended as an appeal to our people to go into the war on the side of the British, and it should be regarded as a much graver international offence than our telling the American people that we were seriously in need of defensive weapons. (Beginning of page 3).
3. It is impossible to imagine that there should be impatience with discussions of the Irish question, seeing that at the present moment in America it is regarded as almost a crime to put American interests before European interests. Some of the American papers (e.g., the 'Boston Post' and the 'Boston Globe') complain that America was being forced by propaganda to put British interests before American. (End of page 3).
4. Mr. Gray's assertion that American influence could not be expected to support any Irish demand which could be construed as inimical to the success of the Allies seems to assume that the Allies are fighting for something else besides small nations and international justice, which, after all, could be the only secure basis for the sacrifices which the American people are about to be asked to make.
5. Mr. Gray said that, if it could be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the survival of Britain and of Ireland depended on the use of our ports, America would not criticise their seizure by Great Britain. It would be a pity to let him away with the hypothesis that there might be such an essential inter-relation. It has been very frequently said in Britain that what the British wanted was more destroyers, and Colonel Knox said a few days ago that America could not give Britain more destroyers without seriously affecting the efficiency of the Fleet. So it would appear that America is not ready to sacrifice even a part of her Fleet efficiency for what she asks us to make incalculable sacrifices.² Moreover, everybody knows that destroyers on the high seas are far less vulnerable targets than port installations. Neither can it ever be said that the eight or ten hours difference in distance to the scene of operations of the U-boats would be sufficient to constitute a decisive factor. And, if it is a decisive factor, then it is only one of several. With the adequate help of the American Fleet, Britain might be able to take back the Western French ports. Or, again, if the Americans would hand over to Great Britain the effective control of a large number of their aeroplane and munitions factories, they would provide England with something which is a more obviously decisive factor than would be the shelter of a few Irish ports. One of the things which is maintaining the anti-Irish campaign in America is the easy assumption that the possession of a few Irish ports would in itself win the war for the British. The sacrifices which are still open to America to make before she reaches the magnitude of those involved for us in the handing over of the ports are enormous, and we are getting tired of America's vicarious heroism at our expense. Mr. Stimson spoke on 16th January about a possible invasion of America from the air, and the need of being ready for it. If one member of the American Cabinet is so terrified of Germany as to believe that she can carry out an invasion at 3,000 miles distance the Cabinet as a whole will understand our hesitation in opening ourselves to bombardment by the same Fleet since we are only a few hundred miles from its bases. It is hard to bring home to the American mind the kind of silly demand they are making on us, but let us suppose that America was definitely decided not to go into the war and England had acquired Japan as an ally, would America hand over to Japan the ports of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore in order to make sure that the Germans would be beaten in the Atlantic. If and when the Germans had wiped out these ports from the air, the Americans would begin to taste, relatively speaking, what our losses would be within twenty-four hours.
6. There is not any doubt that, if the neutral countries now occupied by Germany had allied themselves with Germany's enemy, their case for freedom in a European system would not be recognised by Germany after the war, and it is doubtful if it would be taken up by the other countries of the world in face of a victorious Germany. Even if our people did not want to be neutral, it would be the duty of any Irish Government to avoid going into the war until it had absolute certainty that Great Britain was going to win. If Great Britain lost the war and Ireland had joined her side, while England, as a great country, would remain at least relatively free, Ireland in those circumstances would certainly be held by Germany. And, again, the world would say 'The devil mend her, why did she join with the British'. Our only chance of survival and of having a case before Germany and the world for keeping our freedom in the event of a German victory is to stay out of the war. Mr. Gray knows perfectly well that, if he or the members of his Government were in charge of Ireland's destiny at this precise moment in history, they would be absolutely obliged to follow the policy of neutrality, at least until that moment when a defeat of Germany became a certainty.
7. Mr. Gray unfortunately does not accept the normal situation that an Irish statesman or an ordinary Irish citizen can be simply pro-Irish: he must be anti-British or pro-German. As Prof. O'Rahilly³ says in this week's 'Standard', in reply to Bernard Shaw,⁴ 'there are too many people who regard Irishmen in general as a sort of inferior brand of Englishman, but Englishman all the same'.