The German Chancellor's speech of 28th April has no doubt been fully reproduced in the Dublin press, and it would be unnecessary to give any analysis of its contents. The general opinion here (not only in German circles but among the neutral members of the Diplomatic Corps) is that the Chancellor has been very successful in exposing the amateurishness of President Roosevelt's diplomatic offensive. His reference to Ireland and Palestine in particular were received with considerable amusement.

The general effect of the speech seems to be on the whole regarded as conciliatory. The denunciation of the Naval Agreement with England and the German-Polish Pact had been regarded as highly probable, if not inevitable: the fact that in each case the Chancellor has declared himself ready to enter into new negotiations prevents such a step from being regarded as purely aggressive, while putting the onus of continued friendly relations on the other party. It is in my opinion evidence of the desire not to embitter the international situation that no reference was made to the introduction of compulsory service in England, and that in particular there was no allusion to the entirely inadequate nature of the measure or the obvious reluctance of the population of England to submit itself to military training.

The references in the speech to Ireland have no doubt been reproduced in the Irish newspapers. I think it however well to give the translations.

In speaking of the German solution of the Czechoslovak problem, the Führer goes on to say:

'No more than English measures, let us say in Ireland, whether they are good or bad, are subject to German control or criticism, is this the case with these old German principalities.'

And later, in answering President Roosevelt's request that Germany should pledge itself not to attack Ireland, he adds:

'I have just read a speech of the Irish Prime Minister De Valera, in which - strange as it may seem - unlike Mr. Roosevelt he does not accuse Germany of oppressing Ireland, but makes the charge against England that Ireland has to suffer under her continuous aggression. However great Roosevelt's comprehension of the needs and difficulties of other states, it must still be assumed that the Irish President knows the dangers which threaten his country better than the President of the American Union.'

It will be seen from these extracts that the German attitude towards Ireland is exactly the same as it was before 1914, - that just as Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 was, and Bohemia in 1939 is no concern of England's, so Germany is not prepared to interest herself practically in Ireland, as being in the English sphere of influence. The efforts of Sir Roger Casement²,Joseph Plunkett³ and others to induce Germany to declare the freedom of Ireland as one of her war aims were not successful, mainly because the German Government feared that the opposing powers would draw an analogy between Ireland and Alsace-Lorraine. The same analogy would now exist, whether it be a correct one or not, between Ireland and Bohemia, and of course no German Government would (except possibly in a war) make a direct claim for the liberty and independence of Ireland.

On the other hand, Ireland is at present the object of great sympathy in Germany, - partly from sentimental reasons, partly as being a useful method of propaganda against England. I have not the slightest doubt that, if Ireland wished to increase its trade with Germany, it could do so very largely, - on even better conditions than the present Agreement. I have also little doubt that the officials in charge of the German press would welcome any assistance given then by the Irish Government in regard to propaganda on the general questions of Ireland's position, including the Partition question. Of course any such campaign would be inaugurated by the Press Department of the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Propaganda, - with which, as you indicate in your minutes of 30th June 1937 (114/13) and 21st March 1938, and telegram of 9th July 1939, it is not desired that I should enter into relations⁴. If at any time the Minister should wish me to approach the officials in question, I shall of course be delighted to do so.