With reference to previous minutes regarding the general situation, I have to state for the information of the Minister that while opinion here remains calm, there is no doubt that the situation is regarded today as being much more tense than during the past few days. The opinion is in fact freely expressed that war may break out now at any moment. This is more true for international circles than for Swiss circles - with the exception of course of official circles - which seem unwilling to believe that a way out of war will not be found. In the international circles, hope has almost reached vanishing point. I myself consider the situation as being extremely grave, the chief danger being that the position at Danzig may precipitate events in the pursuit of the Nazi-programme.

The emergency measures are in evidence here. Public buildings, railways, bridges, etc. are guarded by military. Columns of soldiers in full kit march undemonstrably through the town on the way to their stations. Certain essential foods and food products, such as sugar, rice, oatmeal, salt, etc. are temporarily off the market, and people are using the reserve stocks which, a few months ago, they were directed by the authorities to lay in. And today, for the first time for years, re-appeared five-franc notes instead of the ordinary silver five-franc pieces. All these measures bring home to the population the seriousness of the situation, but nevertheless some hope persists.

The international circles are for the most part simply waiting on events. The possibility of a settlement arising from the Hitler-Chamberlain communications is regarded now as slender in view of British-French commitments and of the unlikelihood of any appreciable climb down on the part of the dictator. There is also the feeling that more than the Danzig question is in play; that in fact the whole issue between the two sides is knit even though this may not appear explicitly in the correspondence. Some hope had been placed on Italy, but little reliance is now placed in that quarter. There is however the further offer from King Leopold and the Queen of the Netherlands which could still be seized upon as a way out and there remains of course the suggestion of a conference of five or six Powers. Events may however be precipitated if German restraint is not exercised in Danzig and the Corridor.

There is speculation here as to whether Italy would, at first at any rate, remain neutral, with the consent of Germany, if hostilities broke out, and whether such an attitude on the part of Italy would not practically render impossible the bringing of help to Poland. It is alleged by some that armed neutrality on the part of Italy might not be acceptable to Britain and France. The Bulgarian Minister tells me that it is the policy of his country to remain neutral, and he expresses the opinion also that Roumania would like to take up a similar position. It is stated that Roumania is one of the countries which is most disturbed by the German-Soviet pact, on account of the Bessarabian question which is still open between that country and Russia.

In certain Soviet circles here efforts are being made to explain the pact with Germany as a deliberate wedge driven by the Soviets into the anticomintern pact, and therefore as a weakening of the totalitarian States. It is undoubtedly that, but it also seems to give Germany carte-blanche to act against Poland. The possible reactions of the pact are much discussed. It is stated that benefits to Germany in the shape of supplies could hardly be effective before six months, as communications would have to be organised.

Moreover, the position of Italy would be worsened through increased naval pressure in the Mediterranean if owing to Japanese irritation at the pact tension lessened for a time between Japan and Britain.

I presume that whether this present crisis is resolved peacefully or not, you will send me immediately instructions on the various points raised in my minutes of April and May last (e.g. disposal, if there was any danger of their getting out of my control, of confidential reports, and of code and cypher: also as regards funds for the Office, and, if it happened that the Office and flat had to be vacated, how furniture etc. should be disposed of).¹

I mentioned in a previous minute that it is not now the intention of the Secretariat to take the initiative in moving from Switzerland in the event of war in Europe. It is stated here that the Swiss Government are fairly well satisfied that they would as in the last war succeed in maintaining their neutrality if war unhappily broke out between surrounding countries.