My telegram of this morning² will have informed you that looking at matters from here there was, at that time, no change in the situation which is still tense. For purposes of record, I should like to explain that official opinion here seems to regard the situation as tense so long as the conversations going on do not lead to a development which will mean finally either war or solid prospects of peace. What I have been able to gather from official circles, journalists and French newspapers would lend itself to the interpretation that France is resolved on this occasion to put an end to what is regarded as the more or less perpetual threat of German foreign policy. There is undoubtedly a feeling that Germany has been bluffing and that a sufficiently firm attitude on the part of France and her allies will lead to her modifying her demands.

It is even possible that the suggestions in some of the press to-day that the crisis is still acute are as a result of this belief, as, to convey the impression that France regards the crisis as acute, where German circles might expect a reaction of détente, would only serve to emphasise the firm attitude which France is observing. In the normal way, one would have expected a feeling of détente to prevail here to-day and it is quite probable that at bottom official circles do regard the situation as somewhat brighter. However, the manner in which M. Daladier chose to summarise the written reply he received from Herr Hitler on Sunday (i.e. by simply stating that 'Chancellor Hitler declared that he could not accept the proposal that M. Daladier had suggested') would seem to be symptomatic of the determination of the French Government to accept nothing less than a modification of the German attitude towards her problem with Poland (i.e. unconditional return without discussion of Danzig and the corridor as set out in Herr Hitler's reply). This determination may, of course, be based on a false appreciation of the factors of the problem and, in particular, it might be contended, of the prospects for France and her allies of a victory in the event of war. I think, however, that it must be taken to exist and it would be a mistake to assume that because a feeling of optimism prevails as a result of, or would seem to follow from, any particular development the possibility of war in the immediate future is diminished. The fact, for instance, of the continuation of preliminary 'conversations' and the apparent optimism to-day of some of the German press as to a pacific solution, which may be a consequence of that fact, have not led the Quai d'Orsay to alter its general verdict of the situation, viz, that it is still serious. I have the impression that France will have no hesitation in going to war if she considers that any apparent change in the policy of Germany is not likely to be permanent; and it is doubtful at this stage to what extent Great Britain, even if she should favour a compromise which would go further than the French are prepared to go, could influence this attitude of France.

There is a certain amount of attention being devoted to the attitude of various countries obviously with an eye to the way in which the attitude of such countries may influence the lines of German policy in conversations for peace or may effect Germany's chances in the event of war. I gather that the position in Japan and in Italy in particular preoccupies the Quai d'Orsay. The general public undoubtedly entertains considerable hopes that Japan will at least be neutral in the event of war and the impression is also general that Spain for the same reason as Japan (The German-Soviet pact) is lost to Germany.