With reference to the international situation, I have to state that I had a further brief conversation with Mr. Soubbotitch, Permanent Delegate of Yugoslavia, at a farewell dinner offered to him last night by his colleagues.

M. Soubbotitch stated that he had as yet no details of the conversations which had taken place at Venice and Berlin between Yugoslavia and Italy. He would learn these only when he returned to Belgrade in a day or so. He could say however that Yugoslavia was satisfied with the results, and confident that Yugoslavian interests in Albania would be safeguarded. I reminded him of his hopes that an agreement regarding fortifications would be reached. He did not know if any such specific agreement had matured but, as he understood the matter, this would be included in the general agreement regarding the safeguarding of interests. He could say also that neither Germany or Italy had invited Yugoslavia to adhere to the axe or to join the anti-commintern pact. Yugoslavia's policy was explained as one of neutrality. There was no intention, either, on the part of Yugoslavia to leave the League.

As regards the Croatian question, M. Soubbotitch mentioned that an agreement had been reached, but at the last moment a hitch occurred which would require new negotiations. The difficulty related to a portion of Bosnia, occupied by Croats, which the Croatian leaders required to be included in the 'autonomous' area.

I think that the general impression here following Hitler's speech remains that the speech left the general situation practically as it was, with, however, a concentration of the danger in regard to Danzig. On the question of Danzig, I find Polish circles peculiarly confident. The Poles seem to think that the best solution would be the allotment of East Prussia to Poland instead of the allotment of Danzig and a portion of the corridor to Germany! The Polish Consul-General here states that Poland is willing to discuss any changes which would preserve Polish political and economic rights in Danzig, but that the Polish Government hardly dare give way on any point at the present moment, owing to the state of opinion in the country.

I had a word with the Italian Consul-General also last week. He seemed to be somewhat anxious about the situation, but he thought that war could be avoided 'if Germany did not attack Poland on the question of Danzig'. He seemed to realise that that would mean war. It is the generally expressed opinion here that a German provoked war for Danzig would be anything but popular amongst the masses in Italy. There is also a story which is being whispered about that Balbo², Grandi, and Badoglio³ had recently addressed a letter to Mussolini pointing out the dangers to Italy of the present Italian foreign policy, and it is also stated that Balbo had made a protest at a meeting of the Fascist Grand Conseil. It is impossible to weigh up what importance if any is to be attached to these stories.

I raised the question in a recent minute as to how I should dispose of code books, etc. if a situation ever arose under which there might be danger that these books, etc. would pass out of my personal control. Mr. Andrews (South Africa) told me a few days ago that he had received confidential instructions to be acted upon in certain eventualities. He did not mention what the instructions were, but he said that he was to destroy codes and cyphers, and to find if possible a neutral legation which would be prepared to safeguard his office files, records, etc. So far as Geneva is concerned, he does not seem to think that the latter is a practical one. Probably he has received a copy of a circular addressed to Legations in other countries which would only have a limited application here. It seems probable that all the Delegations, neutral and others, except those accredited also to the Swiss Government, would leave Geneva in the event of a general war, even if Switzerland were not involved. Of course, Ireland's policy is to remain neutral, in any conflict, but it might happen that events might at some time render it impossible for me to guarantee the safety of the codes, etc. and that was why I asked for instructions in order to be ready for any eventuality