With further reference to the general international situation, I have to state, for the information of the Minister, that, from conversations with my colleagues here, it is clear that the general impression amongst them is one of the greatest relief that Great Britain has broken away from tradition by giving, with France, the guarantee to Poland which the British Prime Minister announced yesterday. Official circles in Berne also, M. Holsti2 informs me, feel now more happy than for a long time at the determination of Britain and France to come to the help of Switzerland in case of a German attack on this country, even though, in case a general war actually broke out from any other cause, this country would of course be immediately in danger. The Swiss feel that the menace of German aggression for the sole reason of acquiring territory which is alleged to be inhabited by 'Germans' is for the present removed.
As regards the Balkans, it is clear here that Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey which have been alarmed at the German action in Czechoslovakia view with relief the new attitude of Britain and France towards Poland, but they will expect some definite guarantees in their own cases if they are to resist militarily a German thrust South-eastwards. My Balkan colleagues here with whom I discussed the matter considered that a simple joint declaration for consultation would be of little use. They look for definite engagements for military assistance, or there is a danger, as they say, that such small states may be forced to come to an understanding with the Reich. Even in Bulgaria, I am informed, public opinion is very much against Germany, not because the Bulgarians love the Czechs, or for that matter any members of the late Little Entente, but because they fear for their own independence. Seventy-five per cent of Bulgarian trade is now with the Reich (50% Germany, and 25% with Czechoslovakia).
A question which is much discussed here today is whether the guarantee announced by Mr. Chamberlain regarding matters involving the independence and vital interest of Poland, would cover the case, for example, in which Danzig might decide to join up with the Reich. There is however clearly a loophole left for negotiations between Poland and Germany in regard to problems such as those of Danzig and the Corridor, although it seems to be left to Poland to decide when her 'vital interest' would necessitate armed resistance. There is no doubt that Poland attaches the greatest importance to her interests in Danzig and to a clear and unmenaced outlet to the sea, and the fact that her port of Gdynia is situated to the west of the Free City does not render easy any waiving of her rights, or any accommodation in regard to a west to east passage for Germany to Danzig and East Prussia. In view however of the fact that there is a majority of Germans in Danzig (though the majority in the corridor is Polish) it is difficult to see how peace can be maintained unless there is some serious attempt at settlement of the Danzig problem. Poland will no doubt make serious efforts to avoid a military clash, in consultation with her new allies. Naturally, Great Britain and France would not be seriously perturbed regarding Danzig or the corridor were it not for the possible effect on the general situation and balance.
I had also a talk last night with my Danish colleague. Denmark remains very much disturbed at the prospects, although the more definite stand now being taken by the Western Powers bring relief even there. He states however that in case of an attack by Germany, Denmark can do nothing, and he does not expect guarantees or help from any quarter, unless perhaps in the case of a general war. The Danes seem to fear that Germany may seize their country for the food produced there - just as the Swedes fear a German attack for the purpose of securing control of the vast Swedish resources of raw materials of military value. In 1914-18, when the Germans forbade the Danes to export food to Great Britain, the Danes were able to point out that there would be no cattle available for Germany if the British stopped the importation by Denmark of oil cake for feeding. In the same way, when the Allies tried to prevent the exportation from Denmark of food and cattle to Germany, the Danes pointed out that, in case of refusal to export, the Germans might attack them, and then there would be nothing to send to Great Britain. Accordingly, an arrangement was agreed to that Denmark could supply a greater proportion of foodstuffs to the Allies, and the rest to the Germans. My colleague doubts if any such arrangement would be possible in case of another war. He is pessimistic regarding the position of his country, although he shares the present degree of optimism which the firmer attitude of Britain and France has brought about.
I mentioned in a previous report that M. de Velics (Hungary) had told me on the 17th March that Hungary had no intention of leaving the League.
M. Borberg (Denmark) states that he has it on high authority that the Prime Minister of Hungary3 stated recently that Hungary was finding it increasingly difficult to remain in the League owing to her German affiliations. The guarantee to Poland may however have the effect of stiffening her attitude, and preventing any hasty action.
I mentioned to you at Zurich my conversation recently with the German Consul-General in which I mentioned to him in friendly fashion the dangers of the existing situation and the alarm which everywhere existed amongst the small States on the Continent following the events in Czechoslovakia. He pooh-poohed any idea of the danger of a European war, and said that he thought that I exaggerated, and that all the 'fuss' was being caused by Britain and France owing to the internal situation in those countries. I said that I greatly doubted that the matter was so simple as that and I referred to the disaster that European war would be for all countries - everybody would be down, but somebody would be under. He emphasised that there was no danger whatever that Germany would make war on anyone, and he expressed his optimism regarding the ultimate outcome of the situation. He knows that the Irish Delegation had always expressed themselves in favour at Geneva of a fair settlement by peaceful means for Germany and for the other 'vanquished States'.
As regards Italy, for some reason or another, the position in the Mediterranean is regarded here now as not being immediately dangerous. Vague stories are going the rounds about growing dissatisfaction in Italy with the policy of the axe, and with Mussolini, and it is said that amongst the ordinary population there is general abhorrence at any idea of war with Great Britain.
On the whole, I would say that the general situation is regarded here today as having improved, although of course all the main problems remain unsettled. I should add however that on Thursday Mr. Jacklin, the Treasurer of the League told me that he found international financial circles pessimistic, and he said that in London the view which formerly was 'war possible, but appeasement probable' was now reversed 'appeasement possible and war probable'.
