It is at all times difficult to form a general view of the future of the international situation, which obviously depends not on the events taking place in one country or the attitude adopted by one government, but on the mutual interaction of events and policies in a number of different countries. In other states, so far as I am aware without exception, it is the aim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure that its Ministers abroad shall be as well informed as possible; and for this purpose they are furnished at frequent intervals with the reports sent to their government from Legations in other countries. They are thus enabled to form an objective opinion of current events by comparing the reports so furnished them with the impressions which they receive in the country of their accreditation and by checking their impressions in the light of material thus made available to them. In the absence of such information their impressions must of necessity be incomplete; and it is only by virtue of a highly developed critical sense and a determination not to be unduly influenced by environment that I am able to attain that objectivity of which your minutes of 6th May 1937, 119/1,² and 23rd September 1937, 105/45³, you so rightly indicate the value.

Since the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag on 30th January the general opinion (in which I join) is that there is little danger of a war being brought about through Germany's action. His statement, 'I believe in a long peace', is further confirmed by the fact that the claim of the return of the German colonies, which he placed in the forefront of his demands, does not assume the form of an ultimatum, and obviously contemplated negotiations rather than a coup de main, as evidenced by the chain of argument on which it is based. Of course this does not exclude the possibility of a crisis on the colonial question in the future if England and France insist on the retention of 'mandated' territory on the same grounds which were advanced in 1919; but at the moment Germany obviously hopes to reach a settlement on a more or less friendly basis.

The only other suggestion of danger lies in the words referring to Germany's friendship with Italy, - 'a war started without reason from whatever motive against the Italy of to-day will summon Germany to the side of her friend' (the expression vom Zaun gebrochen cannot be literally translated, but undoubtedly implies an element of unreasonableness or wantonness). Here the actual words are in my opinion very far from promising help to Italy in every war in which the latter might choose to engage and have so been generally understood: moreover Germans, even in official positions, declare openly that they have not the slightest intention of entering a war in order to recover Tunis or Corsica for Italy. Even the juxtaposition in the speech of Germany's services to Italy in the Abyssinian War and Italy's return of Germany's friendship in 1938 would appear to be intended to imply that neither now owes anything to the other. National Socialism, like Fascism, is essentially national and depends on race, and it would be a contradiction in terms for it to fight in order to convert other states to the doctrines of German nationalism, which according to those very doctrines they are incapable of appreciating. On the other hand, liberalism like communism is in its essence international, and, as has become increasingly evident in the last years, is intolerant of systems of government which do not pay at least lip-service to 'democratic' theories. This attitude does not appear to constitute a threat to the peace of the world.

Of course it would be ridiculous to suggest that the average Englishman or Frenchman desired a war for the purpose of establishing a democratic Government in Germany against the will of the German people. The panic in London in September 1938 and the hysterical relief at the Munich agreement far outweigh the warlike sentiments now being uttered in England in the comfortable knowledge that they will have no practical effect.

At the same time it should not be forgotten that in England and France, and even more in the United States of America, there exists a class of persons, many in influential positions, who desire war for an ideological pretext: German opinion divides them into persons with a commercial or financial interest in war, persons desiring a war for imperialistic reasons, persons desirous of avenging the special treatment of Jews in Germany, and persons who wish to see the triumph of Communism. The majority of the various categories referred to would in all probability not themselves take any share in the actual fighting.

As an example of the various motives mentioned above the German press adduces President Roosevelt and his advisers. It is pointed out that his friends Morgenthau⁴ and Baruch⁵ are both directly or indirectly connected with the munitions industry, that Jews hold many of the prominent positions in America today and that the Government and its advisers are without exception members or partisans of the Jewish race, that various ministers in America have done much to encourage Communism, and that President Roosevelt was, apart from the Communist President Azaña, the only head of a nominally Christian state who sent a telegram of congratulations to Stalin on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevist Government.

It is also pointed out (in the French press as well as in the German) that on numerous occasions the same elements have done their utmost to bring about international crisis by the spreading of false rumours (landing of Germans in Morocco, fortification of positions overlooking Gibraltar, despatch of Italian regiments to Spain, etc., etc. (see my minute of 2nd June 1938, 43/33))⁶, by the garbling and mistranslation of speeches on the radio (omission of the moderate portions of Hitler's speeches in September in England and France, omission of the conciliatory portions of Chamberlain's speeches at the same time in France and in the German translation given by the B.B.C.), by the deliberate attempt to provoke a war psychosis (Roosevelt's suggestion that Germany, Italy or Japan were likely to attempt the invasion of America).

All these matters do not mean the immediate outbreak of war, but they undoubtedly maintain a state of international tension, as they are intended to do, and prevent the world from attaining a durable peace. Moreover, if the saner counsels of Chamberlain and Daladier were to be overruled, and a more or less official boycott of the authoritarian states were to be adopted, together with a blank refusal to discuss the return of the German colonies, it is not impossible that a war might result, in which Germany and Italy might be the nominal aggressors but the persons really responsible would be those who in the name of democracy denied them the means to live. This is in my opinion undoubtedly a danger, and would become a grave one if governments presided over by, say, Messrs. Blum and Eden were to come into power in France and England.

To sum up as shortly as possible: Germany, as stated by the Chancellor in his recent speech, is devoid of many raw materials and food stuffs. To obtain these, either (1) she must have colonies, or (2) she must import - which implies corresponding exportation. If she is refused colonies and deprived of the power of exporting, she cannot live; and obviously the danger of war would be a very imminent one. If on the other hand the question of colonies and raw materials is regulated in accordance with the principle of justice, I can see no reason why the world should be in any imminent danger of war.