Despite the tension in the rest of Europe during the last couple of days, things seem to be comparatively calm here - on the surface at least. Outside of the two notes in the 'Informazione Diplomatica' and the open letter to Runciman¹ - that appeared in the 'Popolo d'Italia' - all of which are said to come from the Duce's own hand - Italian newspapers look objectively at the international situation. Naturally they publish large accounts of diplomatic activities in London, Paris and elsewhere, but they do not act as if the country was on the brink of war.

Many diplomats here interpreted the second note as a definite moral commitment from Italy to support the Fuehrer and the first clear indication that Italy would back German demands in Czechoslovakia. My friend, the American Ambassador², holds, however, that in case of war, the Duce would stand out unless force of circumstances should drag him in and public opinion, whatever it may be worth, is definitely against further military adventures.

In diplomatic circles here the Duce's solution of the Czechoslovak problem as outlined in the letter to Runciman is regarded as thoroughly sound: that is a plebiscite in the frontier districts and a kind of cantonal system in the more inland parts where foreign elements are in large numbers. If Beneš³ does not accept a solution of this nature the danger of war will, like the sword of Damocles, continue to hang over his head even if temporarily averted now.

Chamberlain's visit to the Fuehrer is regarded as a master stroke of diplomacy, and if, as is likely, the outcome will be a roundtable conference of Britain, Germany, Italy and France, the results may be far-reaching and provide for the settlement of other matters that now darken the international horizon.

The United States Ambassador told me on Monday that he was sailing yesterday for America as he did not think there was any danger of war. By Wednesday things, however, had got so bad that he was obliged to postpone his departure.