Dear Minister,

You know that there are only three Ministers available to meet as an Executive; the President, Defence, and Agriculture. These three have considered the question in its naked form: whether this Government could make an agreement binding itself to abstain from an appeal to the Court in any circumstances. They are all equally positive that such an agreement would be a political error of the first magnitude. Diarmuid O'Hegarty is equally strong in the same sense - and they all have the definite feeling that even the immediate abolition of the Privy Council would not offer an adequate substitute for political purposes. They consider it almost as important - but not quite - to prevent the British going through with their purpose of omitting 'member' and inserting 'international'.

In view of your telegram of 7th September saying it was impossible to explain the situation by wire,¹ the President feels that he will not be in a position to make a positive suggestion until the full situation becomes clear on John Hearne's return. However, he urges you to press Canada and South Africa to take a longer view of the agreement and to examine it as a renunciation of sovereignty which, perhaps, they have no right to make. The President would rather not accept the optional clause at all if that course happened to become an alternative to accepting the agreement. In this connection, it would be helpful to send us a cable answering the question: What elements not referred to in your wires have been introduced into the discussions which make it possible to consider it favourably, having in view the political necessity of not renouncing our right to go to the Court?

As the Ministers are now somewhat au courant with the situation, it is better to keep them informed from day to day.

Would it be any help that I should send a cable to Skelton generally on the Geneva situation finding out whether he has really understood the full meaning of the agreement?