In his address to the National Assembly on the day of his investiture (17th June), Mr. Mendès-France undertook to bring forward definite proposals designed to end the uncertainty attaching to ratification by France of the Treaty on the European Defence Community. The date by which these proposals will be presented to Parliament he defined as ‘before the Parliamentary recess’. The proposals will be based on an agreement reached between the advocates and the adversaries of the Treaty or, failing such an agreement, will be elaborated by the Government.

2. Generally speaking Parliament recesses not later than the early part of August and hence the proposals about the EDC should in principle be worked out by then. There is however no imperative reason why Parliament should not remain in session, if necessary, throughout August. Mr. Mendès-France, in any event, has indicated that he wishes to terminate the long delay in this matter which, he considers, has adversely affected the French position in international affairs and has also been ‘harmful to the Atlantic Alliance’. The purpose of bringing about a ‘confrontation’ between those against and those in favour of the Treaty is to produce a scheme which will have a prospect of being adopted by a large majority and not simply by a few votes. He has not been specific (and in the circumstances could not be expected to be specific) as to the kind of scheme to be submitted to Parliament but he did indicate that the solution must take account of the facts of the situation and mentioned as one of these facts ‘the necessity of western rearmament imposed by the international situation and which has led to envisaging – a painful prospect for all Frenchmen – the conditions of German participation in a common defence organisation.’
3. As I mentioned in my report of 26th June,¹ the composition of the Mendès-France Cabinet is almost equally divided between partisans and opponents of the EDC Treaty. None of the staunchest supporters of the Treaty is in the Cabinet; Pleven, the author of the project, is out (although because of the military setbacks suffered in Indo-China rather than because of his being pro-EDC) and the two MRP² members in the Government have never been closely identified with this issue. The Government includes, on the other hand, some of the strongest adversaries of the Treaty and in particular General Koenig³ and Chaban-Delmas,⁴ both leaders of the major Gaullist Group: taking the Ministers only (to the exclusion of the Under-Secretaries), the anti-EDC element is the more vigorous.
4. The ‘confrontation’ between the two schools of opinion has already begun inasmuch as the Prime Minister enjoined on General Koenig, Minister for Defence and Mr. Bourgès-Maunoury,⁵ Minister for Industry and Commerce and one of the prominent Radicals who favours EDC, to study the opposing view-points. It is impossible to say what will emerge. The whole issue is extremely confused. One might roughly distinguish four different schools of thought, viz:-
   1. those who have no objection to German rearmament but object to EDC: these comprise the ex RPF⁶ and many other influential people both inside and outside Parliament, like Marshal Juin;⁷
   2. those who oppose the EDC because they are opposed to German rearmament: this group comprises the bulk of the opposition to the Treaty and in particular those Socialists who are against it;
   3. those who favour the EDC as a step in the direction of European integration: to this group belong the majority of the advocates of the Treaty and in particular the MRP and the Socialists who are prepared to accept it;
   4. those who consider the EDC as the least objectionable method of providing for German rearmament: to this section belong many of those classified under ‘c’ as well as most of those who, like, say Pinay⁸ and René Mayer,⁹ regard German rearmament as inevitable but would like to have it surrounded by as many safeguards as possible.

   An additional factor which naturally weighs with many of those in groups ‘c’ and ‘d’ is that failure on the part of France to ratify a Treaty of which she took the initiative and which was only acceptable in the first instance as a lame solution by some of her Allies and in particular the USA, is calculated to injure her internationally.

5. I have mentioned in earlier reports that a number of ‘solutions de réchange’ have been put forward to replace the EDC. At least two more have been advanced in the last couple of weeks – by Barrachin¹⁰ and the ARS (ex RPF) and by Bonnefous (of the Pleven Group). In essence, these proposals seem to lean towards the NATO solution. Among the proposals earlier in the field was one advanced several months ago in Le Monde by Guerin de Beaumont,¹¹ Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The essential features of his proposal were the postponement of the operation of the Supra-National principle for five years and the adoption of a clause enabling a participating country to leave the Community. It is not unreasonable to think that as Mendès-France chose de Beaumont (an Independent) for the post of Deputy to himself in the Foreign Ministry, he has some sympathy with his views. Guerin de Beaumont is himself an advocate of the Treaty. He is however a former member of the Quai d’Orsay where he held the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and all his top ranking friends in the Ministry, with one or two exceptions, are opposed to the EDC as an impracticable scheme.
6. There is little point in speculating on the reception in Parliament which the Mendès-France proposals will have until one knows what they are. It seems improbable that the MRP will accept any scheme which falls seriously short of the present Treaty. The Socialists may also be a difficulty. The Party is seriously divided on the whole issue. As indicated in my report of 2nd June¹² a special Convention decided in May that the Party should vote for the Treaty. Subsequently, a number of prominent Deputies voted against ratification in the Parliamentary Commissions. Disciplinary action of one kind or another was taken against these men but they do not so far seem to have entirely conformed. At the same time a motion was passed at the Socialist Congress last week, in which the Party declares that it will accept any ‘confrontation’ designed to secure wider agreement on the Treaty but that it cannot agree to any solution which envisages a separate German army or which does not provide for a Supra-National Institution and democratic (i.e. joint-parliamentary) control.
7. Those opposed to German rearmament and hence to the EDC, are inspired primarily by sentimental dislike and fear of a German army in any form. They have always however adduced one concrete reason for their stand, viz the danger of Germany, if admitted to share in Western defence, starting a war for the unification of the whole country. A further reason which they now adduce is drawn from the passage of time: they argue that whereas a strong western defence may have been necessary four years ago to counter an attack from the East, the threat of such an attack no longer exists and hence it is no longer necessary to have a German contingent. This is of course a fundamental issue which has affected the thinking in many countries not only on German rearmament but on national defence efforts.
8. The international situation has naturally evolved considerably during the four years since the EDC project was first thought up. From the French standpoint, in the context of the EDC, the major factor in this evolution has been the remarkable recovery of Western Germany and the progressively greater acceptance by other countries and in particular the USA and Britain of the Adenauer Government as an equal, accompanied by the conviction, on the part of Washington and London, that Western Germany cannot indefinitely be prevented from having the right to arm. These developments confront France with a delicate and serious problem. The stage has been reached at which failure on her part to ratify the EDC may no longer mean that German rearmament is prevented and upsets her relations with her friends. The contrast between the situation now and what it was in 1950 is illustrated on the one hand by the insistence of the Benelux countries, who were to say the least not enthusiastic about the EDC project in the first place, that the Treaty must come into force and, on the other, by the discussions which have been taking place in London between Britain and America, and without the participation of France, of the question of dissociating the EDC Treaty from the Bonn Agreements with the object of restoring German Sovereignty. It is clear that the growing stature of Germany is an irritant to the French: the decision of the Government, as a result of Dr. Adenauer’s declarations last week, to cancel the visit to Bonn of Guerin de Beaumont, reflects this frame of mind. De Beaumont was to have visited Dr. Adenauer to discuss the EDC Treaty with him but, although even critical observers here claim that Adenauer’s statements from Hamburg Radio contained nothing essentially new, the journey was cancelled as a mark of disapproval of the fact that the Chancellor should have spoken at all about the need to ratify the EDC.