Volume 9 1948~1951


Doc No.
Date
Subject

No. 291 TNA DO 35/3974

Letter from Seán MacBride to Ernest Bevin (London)
(Copy)

Dublin, 9 March 1949

Dear Ernie,
I meant to have a talk with you in London in connection with the Atlantic Pact, but somehow there was no suitable opportunity. I am writing this personal letter to you to ask you not to dismiss our Aide-Mémoire on the Atlantic Pact casually as merely an irritating contretemps and in the hope that you will examine the considerations mentioned in this letter with an open mind.

Please do not consider our Aide-Mémoire merely as a tactical move. It set out the very real difficulty in our way, and, I think, represents the attitude which any Irish Government would be bound to take.

If the concept of Atlantic co-operation is to have any reality, we must try to secure co-operation in the real sense. In order to secure this co-operation, we must, in the first instance, seek to remove any misunderstandings and conflicts that exist among ourselves - or, at least, try to remove them.

Ireland is plump in the middle of the Atlantic and is one of the most obvious participants. Ireland agrees with the purpose of the Atlantic Pact and would wish to co-operate provided the one obstacle in the way can be overcome. In these circumstances, it would be a pity if at least an attempt were not made to examine the position.

Partition is a very real and serious problem which is not going to solve itself. Sooner or later, it will have to be faced and solved. So long as it remains unsolved, it is a constant source of danger to Ireland and of embarrassment to Britain.

From the point of view of Britain, to consider it necessary or advisable to continue Partition and thereby to alienate the natural sympathy of the Irish people, would be a short-sighted policy. Its continuance merely acts as a barrier to the good relationship which must otherwise exist between our two countries. Over the centuries, every conceivable method of dealing with Ireland has been tried, save the most obvious and natural one, namely, the acquisition of the friendship of Ireland on the basis of equality. A friendly and united Ireland on Britain's western approaches surely outweighs the possible advantage of maintaining a strategical bridgehead of doubtful value surrounded by a semi-hostile population. People never fight so well as when they are fighting in defence of their own country and their own rights.

Even in peace-time, I think that the friendship of the Irish people throughout the world would be of considerable value to Britain and would help to strengthen the democratic front.

On the merits, there can be no difficulty. The right to national self-determination is the basic democratic right upon which, in the final analysis, all other democratic rights depend. If that right is conceded, there can be little dispute as to its application to Ireland. We have more clearly defined boundaries than most countries; the seas that surround our island provide those. We have certainly a distinct national history. Our people are of the same colour and are homogeneous. They speak, by and large, the same language. I can conceive of no other test for the purpose of determining what constitutes a national entity for the purpose of the exercise of the right to national self-determination.

But, even if, for some special reason - for which I can see no justification, it were to be determined that, irrespective of boundaries and history, a minority, no matter how small, were to be given the right to set up its own State, there can be no justification for coercing the people of Counties Tyrone and Fermanagh, Derry City, Mid-Derry, South Down, Mourne and South Armagh. If, irrespective of boundaries and history, minorities are entitled to opt out of a State, why, then, are Nationalist areas in the Six Counties precluded from exercising the same right?

The right to national self-determination is the most clearly defined of the democratic rights by all standards laid down, and it should apply to Ireland. On the merits, I do not think that the British Government could ever take the stand that a political minority in an otherwise clearly defined national unit had a right to set up an independent State. If this were to apply in practise, none of the existing States could survive, for there are political, racial, religious and colour problems in most States. I feel, therefore, that the attitude of the British Government on Partition cannot be governed by the merits of the question. Because it is a troublesome, political question in Britain, and because you all have so much to do, there is a natural tendency to shelve it. This, I think, is a pity and a mistake.

The concept of Atlantic co-operation provides a new background in which a genuine attempt might be made to end the existing deadlock on Partition without raising many of the political difficulties. From the point of view of public opinion in Britain and in Ireland, as well as from the point of view of our Tory friends in the Six Counties, it provides an opportunity for a normal and rational approach. I fully appreciate the political difficulties of the Partition question in the field of British politics, but I feel that these could be largely avoided by examining the problem in the context of the proposed Atlantic Pact.

Our reply to the United States Aide-Mémoire on the Atlantic Pact will come up for consideration by the seven convening nations. The whole matter could then be allowed to arise for discussion. Britain herself could take the initiative and suggest that our difficulty be examined. Alternatively, Canada could bring the matter up for discussion; this might be more satisfactory, as it would relieve the British Government of any criticism from the Tories for having taken the initiative in the matter. Presumably the replies of the various countries who are being invited to participate will be discussed, and, wherever possible, every effort will be made to surmount any obstacles that may exist in the way of the fullest co-operation. In that context, it would seem but natural that some effort should be made to end the deadlock on Partition.

I realise, of course, that, should the British Government oppose a discussion of the Partition question, it could easily prevent it. But I think that this would be a great pity, as it does appear to provide an opportunity to have the matter examined against a fresh background and in a better atmosphere. Besides, the assistance of third parties is usually helpful in 'making peace'.

From the point of view of our own political situation in Ireland, I can conceive of no more favourable a situation to examine it than the present one. Britain and Ireland share a common cause; all irritants and other causes of conflict, with the exception of Partition, have now been removed; there is a real feeling of sympathy and friendship to the British people, which is only marred by what we consider to be a completely indefensible and undemocratic anomaly.

Liberal thought - in the non-party sense - in Britain realises that the present situation cannot last and that, sooner or later, there will be a united Ireland. Even the 'Daily Mail', which cannot be accused of Labour or pro-Irish sentiments, in dealing with the result of the recent Six County elections, declared:-

'But, when all this has been said, there remains something else, and it is this. The division of Ireland is unnatural. The split is a geographic and economic absurdity.'

Our Tory friends in the Six Counties do a good deal of blustering, but I think that a lot of it is superficial. Some of them, I know, look upon the ending of Partition as inevitable; a section of them, I believe, take the view that it might be more advisable, from their own standpoint, to effect a solution now rather than to await the possibility of a less favourable occasion.

That they were standing in the way of the accomplishment of the full degree of co-operation required would provide justification from the point of view of their supporters; they profess deep loyalty to Britain, and, accordingly, it would be but natural that they should assist in the fulfilment of a policy which is in the interest of Britain.

Of course, my assessment of their attitude may be entirely wrong, but I think that it would be worth while to, at least, make an attempt to explore the possibilities in this new context.

I have written to you at length on this matter because I know that the whole of this Atlantic co-operation plan is your child and the result of your own initiative. You will remember that, when you were good enough to take me into your confidence about this plan in Paris last April, I foreshadowed what our own difficulties would be. At that time, I told you that there would be two main obstacles as far as we were concerned: the External Relations Act and Partition.

We have removed one of these two obstacles - the External Relations Act; this, despite short-sighted criticism at the time, was, I believe, a constructive step in our relationship. After centuries of struggle, we have reached the stage where there is now only one point of friction left.

As the father of the Atlantic Plan, I decided to write to you fully, in the hope that you would examine the suggestions contained in this letter and help in the achievement of the co-operation we both desire.

I am writing this in the form of a personal letter so as to be able to discuss the position more freely and informally. I am, however, sending a copy of this letter to Philip Noel-Baker, because of his interest in the matter.

Please forgive the length of this letter and the absence of the diplomatic 'trappings'.

If, instead of writing, you would prefer to have a discussion, let me know, and I will arrange to go over any time that suits you - unless, of course, you would do us the honour of coming over yourself. It might be a pleasant change for you and we would be very glad to have you.

With every best wishes
Yours sincerely
[unsigned]