Volume 5 1936~1939


Doc No.
Date
Subject

No. 294 NAI DFA Paris Embassy 19/34

Confidential report from Seán Murphy to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)1
(P. 19/34) (Copy)

Paris, 11 April 1939

The developments in Albania2 took French public opinion completely by surprise to the extent that it was not expected, especially after the Italian assurances referred to by M. Chamberlain in his statement on the 6th inst. in the Commons, that Italy would move either so quickly or so thoroughly. On the other hand, I think it probable that the Quai d'Orsay had decided beforehand that France would not move on the Albanian issue.

The first reaction of the Press here was one of indignation coupled, in many cases, (as matters developed and it was being reported from London that the British Government did not intend to move pending the receipt of more reliable information) with bitterness at British inaction; for the first judgement here of a large portion of the press was that the Italian action represented a definite menace to British interests in the Mediterranean and almost a direct challenge. This attitude has now entirely disappeared and many organs have given reasons why England should accept the Italian assurances as to the continued validity of the Mediterranean agreement of last year, one of the main reasons being so as to avoid at all costs seeming to provoke a conflict.

It is also pointed out in some quarters that for the Chamberlain Government to accept that the Agreement is at an end would be tantamount to admitting that the whole policy of the Government since Eden left has failed. The general opinion in France is that the motives of the Italian action were of two kinds, the one kind, concerned with prestige to enable the Government to show some 'return' to Italy from the axis policy and the second being to ensure Italian control of the Adriatic, neutralise Yugoslavia and provide the axis powers with a jumping-off ground in the Balkans from which the effort at 'encirclement' can be opposed and a further positive advance in penetration of Southern and South-Eastern Europe can be made. It is thought here that the neutralisation of Yugoslavia is now an accomplished fact and also that Bulgaria has been more or less finally, because of her grievance against both Greece and Rumania, won over to the axis side. The immediate advantages to Italy from the changed status of Albania are not regarded as great, the ordinary opinion being that she has not got any greater control over the resources of the country than she had previously. However, it is generally held that the situation in South-Eastern Europe has changed radically both because of the success of the Italian coup and because of the possibilities for threatening the other Balkans powers which are inherent in the new position.

On the other hand, it is thought that the whole Moslem world has been antagonised by the attack on Albania and that the attitude of Turkey in particular may now be definitely favourable to the democracies. As a proof of this result, the French press points to the absence, in spite of Italian provocation, of all demonstration in Tunis on the 9th inst., anniversary of some repressive measures taken by the French authorities in 1938.

It has been stated here that the Yugoslav Minister informed Mr. Bonnet on Friday that Yugoslavia would definitely refuse to move in regard to Albania. The Government is remaining in the closest touch with London. The Defence Council met on Sunday and there is to be a Cabinet meeting this evening followed by a Council of Ministers to-morrow.

Of the Pope's speech on Sunday, the section which received by far the most attention here was that relating to confidence in treaties and the given word being essential to stability. This passage is interpreted as directed against the practice of the totalitarian states.


[signed]SEÁN MURPHY


1 This document bears the typist's mark 'CCC/LM', indicating that it was dictated by Con Cremin.

2 Italian forces invaded Albania on 7 April 1939.