Notes on attached memorandum

1. This Memorandum shall be read in conjunction with R.M. 66 'Imperial Conference 1926' 'Policy on Defence and Cognate Questions'.¹ R.M. 66 was approved of in this Department and circulated to the Executive Council.

2. Owing to the absence of a detailed policy on the major issues of which the subjects dealt with in this paper are only a feature, it was impossible to be as clear and definite as desired. Many of the suggestions made are accordingly tentative and provisional.

3. It may be suggested, an undue attention is paid to British views in this Memorandum. No consideration was given to British views except for the purpose of indicating that if we want a considerable measure of freedom in dealing with our Defence Problems we can only obtain this freedom by agreement with Great Britain (or attempt to obtain it by force). (The Union Government did not get the British Garrison withdrawn from South Africa by a policy of non-co-operation. Nevertheless the withdrawal of the garrison has increased the Union's international prestige).

4. Anote was attached to R.M. 66. This note referred to the lack of knowledge and misconceptions that then prevailed with regard to defence. There are no indications that a better knowledge as to defence questions now prevails. It is desired to amplify the note in one respect. Having referred to the lack of knowledge and misconceptions, it went on to indicate reasons why an attempt should be made to educate the public in these matters. Experience has since indicated that a very definite misconception exists (even in unexpected circles) on one point and it is essential this matter should be mentioned. When references are made to questions of Defence, more particularly ones connected with Coast Defence of the Ports at present occupied by British 'Care and Maintenance Parties', it is generally assumed that these questions arise solely because of our membership of the British Commonwealth, or because of the Defence Reservations in the Treaty or from a combination of both. The general assumption evidently is that were it not for the reasons mentioned the Saorstát would not be worried with the particular problems of defence mentioned. Attempts to have this matter considered or discussed are then discouraged because it is believed such a discussion would direct attention to serious disadvantages arising out of our membership of the British Commonwealth, or out of the Reservations in the Treaty. The facts are, if we were a Sovereign State, we would because of our geographical position have to undertake a far larger programme of defence and expend at least four if not eight times the present annual defence expenditure. Defence problems do arise from our membership of the British Commonwealth. Such problems are however quite small compared with the problems (and expenditure) that would arise if we were not members of the Commonwealth.

Misconceptions as to our Defence position are also being continually caused by the practice of making comparisons with the Dominions where in fact no real grounds for comparison exist. We also suffer from the disadvantage that compared with other countries, a large proportion of our diplomatic activities centre on the League of Nations, with the result that undue importance is attached in the Saorstát, to the activities of disarmament conferences, and other such bodies, which have in fact achieved no tangible results.

MEMORANDUM

EXPERT COMMITTEE ON OPERATION OF DOMINION LEGISLATION

I. General Issues affecting Saorstát

Before examining in detail the questions affecting Defence raised in the British Memorandum, attention is being directed to certain issues that must come under the notice of any committee considering the application of existing British Defence Legislation to the Commonwealth States. These issues are:-

These issues are all closely inter-related but an attempt will be made to examine them separately.

(a) Effect of Defence Status and Development on Constitutional Position

With the exception of the Saorstát the Commonwealth States can normally in the event of war undertake their own Local or Home Defence. The Saorstát in the present development of its defence organisation could not undertake to deal in any way effectively with its local defence problems, more particularly when these problems are considered in connection with the defence problem of Great Britain. This position will have a considerable influence on the work of the Committee in several ways. When considering the application of legislation it will be found in matters like Naval Defence and Prize Law that even if the Saorstát had full legal power to deal with these questions, it has no administrative or executive machinery or forces capable of enforcing and administering such powers. This consideration will be further considered in other paragraphs. Consideration must also be given to the enormous influence that the development of the Dominions defence organisation and their war efforts had in making the great changes in their post-war international and constitutional status.

In the Saorstát it would seem to be largely assumed that a considerable increase in the 'constitutional and international status of the Dominions or States of the British Commonwealth is due to developments which took place at the Imperial Conference of 1926' and were embodied in the report of its committee on Inter-Imperial Relations. This Memorandum while fully recognising the importance of the principles enunciated in the report of the Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations is based on the conviction that the increased status of the Dominions is due to the development of their defence positions both prior to and during the war, and to the magnitude of their war efforts. This was recognised at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 when it was decided 'that the re-adjustment of the constitutional arrangements of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities'. About this time General Smuts stated 'whatever we may say, and whatever we may think, we are subject provinces of Great Britain. That is the actual theory of the constitution ... that theory still permeates practice to the same extent'. The present Committee will really consider how the legal theory or de jure position can be reconciled with the practical or de facto position and will really undertake an examination of many of the problems which it was intended the 'special Imperial Conference' mentioned in the 1917 Resolution should undertake. There is the very important difference, however, that in 1917 no one had even then realised or considered the far-reaching developments that were later to take place as a result of the independent participation of the Dominions in the peace and post-war resettlement negotiations. The Canadian Government and the Premier of Australia insisted that the Dominions should take part in the negotiations as independent units or states. The British Government, if not actually opposed to this proposal, has at least made other arrangements for the representation of the Dominions. They however controlled military forces and other resources absolutely essential to Great Britain and she had no alternative but to support their proposals. A case then had to be made to the other powers for the independent representation of the Dominions. This case was bluntly based on the consideration that they had made of their own initiative as great a war effort as many of the Small Powers, and that they should accordingly receive the same representation at the Peace Conference. As nothing could be urged against this case the Dominions (1) received independent representation at the Peace Conference (2) became members of the League of Nations (3) received mandates for the administration of ex-enemy territory direct from the League of Nations (4) Canada as a result of the first three developments asserted her right to exchange her own diplomatic representatives with other countries. The few developments mentioned are really those that make the great difference in the International position of the Commonwealth States. They have largely arisen from circumstances connected with a capacity to undertake defensive and offensive efforts of which the Saorstát is not at present capable and this consideration cannot fail to have influence when the present Committee proceeds to review the position as it will develop in application. It should of course be borne in mind when considering any question affecting Commonwealth status, that even in pre-war days one of the conditions on which 'Dominion Status' was based was capacity in ordinary circumstances to undertake local defence. The present Committee will consider questions of practice and application and it will be eventually found that if the practice and application differs in the Saorstát from the rest of the Commonwealth so will the constitutional and international status.

(b) Reservations in the Treaty

In the British Memorandum the following references to Reservations in the Treaty will be found. Under the heading 'Naval Forces' it is stated 'The Irish Free State has no naval forces at present. Certain Articles of the Articles of Agreement bear on the position of the Irish Free State in the matter of "Naval Defence".' When dealing with 'Military and Air Forces' under the subheading 'Dominion Forces' one of the few statements is as follows: 'In the case of the Irish Free State Article 8 of the Articles of Agreement bears on the question'. These references would indicate that the British will (as far as lies in their power) have questions arising out of these Reservations examined when defence legislation is under consideration. It also indicates that they propose treating the reservations as a problem of 'Dominion legislation'. The practical effect of the reservations and the policy that should be adopted by our representatives with regard to them will be considered in later paragraphs. It should however be remembered that the reservations can have a very considerable influence on both the practical development of our defence position and therefore of legislation designed to meet that position and also on our status.

Corbett and Smith in 'Canada and World Politics' ('A Study of the Constitutional and International Relations of the British Empire') state 'In the case of the Irish Free State the right of succession without the consent of Great Britain is presumably excluded by the terms of the Treaty of 1921'. Any contention that we have not the same status as Canada can presumably only be based on the Defence Reservations in the Treaty.

These reservations might also enable the British to argue that we could not obtain legal powers that might be given to the other Commonwealth States. In the case of Prize Law Great Britain might agree that the other States could have full legal powers to deal with this question. In the case of the Saorstát she might however insist that this matter was obviously very closely connected with the problem of Naval Defence. In time of war, which is the only time questions of Prize Law will arise, she is entitled to certain facilities in the Saorstát in connection with Naval Defence, and she must have similar facilities in connection with the administration of Prize Law.

(c) Saorstát's Geographical position

In examining any problem of defence this factor must be ever in the minds of the British. In the event of war if Canada or South Africa were remiss in taking measures to secure the position of, or co-operate with Great Britain the results would be from Britain's point of view serious but not beyond control.

In the case of the Saorstát because of any of the four factors mentioned, i.e. (1) our position in Western Europe, (2) adjoining the Six Counties, (3) beside Great Britain and (4) on the trade routes, failure to take measures to secure her interests in the event of war would be from her point of view of paramount importance. Great Britain will regard the same measures essential in time of war in the Saorstát as in her own home territory and this will be the determining factor on the attitude of the British when considering our position in connection with Defence Legislation.

[matter omitted]

III. Actual Wartime position

A good portion of the Defence Legislation referred to in the previous paragraph will be only fully operative in time of war. The suitability of Defence Legislation can be determined only by making an estimate of its capacity to serve the purposes for which it is designed during war. Finally so far as the Saorstát is concerned, if consideration were given to conditions of peace only we could evidently (clearly?) carry on without paying any attention to the matters referred to in the British Memorandum. It is, however, recognised that complications can and will arise in time of war or emergency. In view of the Committee's terms of Reference and the British Memorandum it is probable, and in fact likely, that these problems (even those of particular application to the Saorstát) will be discussed by the Committee. It is therefore necessary that an attempt should be made to estimate the position as it will develop in wartime. In making this estimate certain factors must be borne in mind:

(a) Probable Military Situation

The military situation is complicated because of the following reasons. The Saorstát has a military force, but this force at present is not adequate to effectively maintain the necessary defences of the Saorstát even during a less important crisis. In the event of any crisis, the existing British establishments at Lough Swilly, Cobh and Berehaven would have to be very considerably increased. Under certain circumstances coast defences would have to be improved elsewhere. As we have no Garrison (or Coast) Artillery and corresponding engineers and other specialist troops, the British would presumably send such troops here. Again the British would not regard their Coast Artillery and other specialist troops effectively secured unless they were supported by greater or lesser detachments of other troops, depending on the circumstances. In the case of places like Cobh and Berehaven these forces might amount to a very large number.

At the beginning of the European War there were 26 Defended Ports and Harbours in Great Britain. Some were Naval Bases, others commercial waterways. The garrisons allotted varied between 1,000 and 20,000 men each, according to the [blank] of the area to be defended. Under strategic conditions by no means unlikely in the future certain Irish Harbours and Ports may be as important as any in Great Britain (Saorstát troops could discharge a considerable portion of the functions mentioned, in fact if sufficiently equipped, and suitably organised and armed, all of them). In the absence however firstly of a Defence policy on the matter, and secondly of an understanding or agreement with the British, it is not possible to estimate what duties would be undertaken respectively by British and Saorstát troops in the defence of the Saorstát. In the event of an agreement, the country could be divided into zones to which both forces would confine their activities. Any serious threat of attack would of course at once end such an agreement. Under the circumstances outlined, and in the absence of other arrangements, it is apparent that both British and Saorstát troops would be located at various points in the Saorstát. Questions of command and discipline would at once arise. Detachments of different troops in an area must be subjected to one Commander. Under existing circumstances a detachment of British Coast Artillery, and other specialists supported by Saorstát Infantry might guard the Shannon mouth. Men will be detached for other purposes, such as occasional specialists attached to other units. Detachments will be moved through the country from their own units. Small detachments of British Artillery or Specialists may be located far from their own troops amongst entirely Saorstát personnel. The reverse position may also arise.

(b) Aerial situation

The position of Aerial Forces is similar to that of military. The Saorstát possesses an Air unit which is obviously unable to discharge many of the duties in connection with Air Defence that will arise both in the Saorstát and surrounding waters in the event of war affecting Western Europe. Under such circumstances it seems fair to assume that units of the British Air Force will be located at various points in the Saorstát. It is quite probable that they will have to obtain facilities and be allowed to occupy portions of the Aerodromes in the possession of our Air Corps. In the absence of a policy or agreement as to the duties that might be undertaken by the British and Saorstát Forces respectively, they would probably become considerably mixed up. Under the circumstances the same question of Command, discipline, and control as were mentioned in connection with the Military forces would arise.

(c) Naval and Marine situation

The position with regard to Naval, Marine and allied questions of Defence as they affect the Saorstát is at present (at least in ways) very simple. We have no organisation or force capable of dealing with any of these problems. Under existing circumstances the British Navy would presumably take over all these functions or duties. The discharge by the British Navy of these functions in the Saorstát, and surrounding territorial waters would involve the following.

Conditions arising out of the circumstances outlined in from 1 to 4, would involve; firstly, that British Naval Forces would have considerable contact with sections of the Saorstát population, and, secondly, it would become necessary to make various regulations for the control of Saorstát Shipping and allied questions.

As Departmental Staff plans are to provide for circumstances under which the Saorstát might assume a share in her Coastal Defence, it is essential that an estimate is made of the way in which this problem would then affect the Saorstát. Naval or Marine Personnel could be raised that would undertake the duties of Portal control and Coast Watching (1 and 2 above) or also mine-sweeping, anti-submarine work (3). Such forces would be raised, organised, disciplined, and in a general way controlled by the Saorstát Government. On the other hand, these forces would have to co-operate with and even act under the control of British Naval Units. Coastguards operating on the South West Coast, would in addition to co-operating under a central authority in the Saorstát have to co-operate with and assist British Naval Units in the surrounding waters. Urgent and indeed routine information would have to be exchanged between them without reference to their respective headquarters. An Irish Officer in control of shipping in a Saorstát port would probably often have to deal direct with British Naval officials, and have to act upon information received from them. Under these circumstances personnel could not be maintained in water-tight compartments. Men would have to be transferred about and at times Irish personnel would find themselves temporarily attached to British units and vice-versa. Personnel would probably also have to be exchanged for liaison purposes. As in the case of the Military and Aerial Forces questions of Discipline and Command would arise.

(d) Ireland a Defence Unit

It has been indicated that under certain circumstances British detachments might be located at various points. In the absence of prior arrangements the British would want a central point from which these troops could be controlled, and also central points at which reserves and depots would be maintained. They would then need communication facilities (rail, telegraph, 'phone, etc.) for the purpose of moving, supplying, co-ordinating and controlling these forces. Saorstát troops would for their purposes need similar rail, telegraph, telephone and other communication systems. Otherwise Saorstát troops and British troops would be needing the same facilities for the purpose of guarding against a common enemy. Under such circumstances questions would soon arise as to how their defensive activities were to be coordinated. Similar co-ordination would have to be arranged for in connection with administrative questions such as the use of Railways. It again must be borne in mind that for strategic purposes Ireland is one, and the present boundary from the military point of view is impossible. Donegal which for strategic purposes is the most important point on the North West Coast of Ireland, is, for all practical military purposes, cut off from the rest of the Saorstát. The entry to Lough Foyle and Londonderry can only be effectively protected from Saorstát Territory in Donegal. The position in practice might therefore be that both British and Saorstát troops would be defending the Saorstát against a common enemy. British troops would be defending the Six Counties against the same enemy. For defence purposes all these troops would be defending an absolute military unit against a common enemy. Under the circumstances questions such as that of unity of command would at once arise. In addition to the question of unity of command, it is probably fair to assume that under the circumstances outlined Saorstát troops might be employed in the defence of Ireland and not the Saorstát. The other Commonwealth States with land frontiers (Canada and South Africa) provide in their Defence legislation that their forces may be used for the defence of the State either within or without its territory.

Summarised, a war position at present would involve the presence of British Aerial and Military Forces in the Saorstát, Naval Forces in our ports and adjoining waters. The question of co-operation between British and Saorstát Forces would also arise and under circumstances the Border might have to be ignored.

(Other issues arising from the presence of British Forces in the Saorstát will be examined later.)

IV. Probable Development of Position during Conference

In examining this question it is desirable that the attitude likely to be adopted by the representatives of other Commonwealth States, when discussing Defence questions during the forthcoming meetings, should be considered. It is quite probable that some of the Dominions who wish to assert the full equality in legislative power of their Parliaments and who also wish to obtain extra-territorial powers for their legislation will not wish to have the present position with regard to defence legislation changed. The operation of certain sections of the Merchant Shipping and other Acts hamper their powers and interfere with them in administration. On the other hand their Defence legislation is based on British Acts, and on this legislation various administrative arrangements that suit practically all the States are based. Any change in the existing legislation would affect and possibly cut across the present legislative and administrative arrangements for co-operation in Defence based on the British Army and Navy Acts. The work of the Experts Committee in connection with Defence will consist largely in examining the effect legislative changes would have on the arrangements for co-operation as provided for in the present Acts. In the event of changes in legislation being proposed the question of making legislation uniform and reciprocal will certainly arise. Alternatives to any of the existing arrangements that are being terminated will certainly also be discussed. At the forthcoming meetings it is quite probable that most of the Commonwealth Defence representatives will not want the present position altered. They will probably be anxious to continue the present arrangements of working largely under the British Acts. Australia and New Zealand will certainly adopt this attitude. Canada also possibly may move particularly if the question is left to Military Representatives to handle. If it is insisted that the 'Dominions' must have their own Defence legislation, quite independent of the British Act and if the 'Dominions' are also given extra-territorial powers the question of continuing the present co-operation under the new legislative system will at once arise. Most of the Defence Representatives will probably suggest that the British Legislation be enacted (with modifications) in the Commonwealth States. It will be also suggested that this legislation should also contain clauses providing for the transfer and inter-change of personnel, ships, or units from any one Commonwealth State to any other.

[matter omitted]

V. Saorstát Position

Even if the other States do not desire to have the position with regard to Defence Legislation altered, the terms of reference of the Committee will almost certainly result in an examination of the question. Such an examination will result in the Saorstát's particular position with regard to Defence Legislation being discussed. In paragraph III it has been indicated that circumstances under which Saorstát and British Forces would have to cooperate may arise in wartime. The British recognise this and it would hardly be straining the Committee's terms of reference to raise questions as to the practicability of co-operation under existing British and Saorstát legislation. The extent to which questions of command and discipline may arise during co-operation would depend on circumstances. If British and Saorstát troops were kept in definite games and only associated in larger units and detachments, disciplinary questions cannot create much trouble. If the troops were considerably mixed up and small units transferred about complications would almost certainly arise. Owing to our present lack of technical and specialist personnel such transfers and mixing of forces would almost certainly occur. Again even if personnel were only transferred in definite disciplinary units, questions would arise in connection with such matters as subjection to unit or District Standing Orders and other problems of this kind. Certain sections of the British Army Act at present provide for such contingencies. In view of the importance the British attach to questions of uniformity in Defence the Saorstát representatives certainly will have to be prepared to face a discussion as to the Saorstát's position in this matter.

[matter omitted]

VI. Suggested Saorstát Policy

(a) Lack of Policy

The Saorstát policy at the forthcoming meetings will be based on a number of factors. One very important reason makes it impossible to adopt a very definite or positive policy. Apolicy with regard to questions affecting defence legislation between the Saorstát and Great Britain can only be based on the policy adopted for the major defence questions outstanding between the two countries. No attempt has been made to implement a detailed policy with regard to these questions. As there is no definite and detailed policy on the principal issue, it is impossible to have a clear cut policy on a number of questions that form only one feature of the principal or major issue. Owing to the lack of a definite and detailed policy on the principal issue, it is only possible to suggest that the Saorstát Representatives should adopt a policy of a kind not likely to lead to a discussion of the major questions. This is really equivalent to suggesting that they should await developments during the meetings. There is of course another reason why developments should be awaited. In the case of Merchant Shipping, the Privy Council, and various other questions, there is considerable information available as to the views that will be held by the various delegations. In the case of Defence, no information is available as to the views likely to be held by the various delegations, or the extent to which they may encourage discussion of these questions at all.

(b) Question of Co-operation

On the other hand there are a number of factors that must be very definitely taken into consideration when Saorstát Policy is being considered.

If we expect to co-operate with British Troops in the Defence of the Saorstát and expect them to co-operate with us such co-operation will be easier if Discipline and Regulations are somewhat similar. The extent to which co-operation will be necessary depends entirely on the measures taken by the Saorstát in connection with Defence. Consideration might therefore be given to proposals for keeping our Disciplinary Code and Regulations in [a] general way similar to those of the British. Uniformity and co-operation as really desired by the British could only at present be secured by the Saorstát adopting the British Act in a modified form. Under the constitutional and legal position of the future, it is hoped the Saorstát would secure uniformity by passing legislation similar to that of the British. Co-operation (interchangibility of personnel etc.), as desired by the British could only be secured by the Saorstát providing for an exchange of personnel with the British and by the British doing likewise. It is recognised that very considerable and peculiar difficulties would arise from any attempt to enact legislation of this kind in the Saorstát. On the other hand a war situation in the existing condition of our defence organisation would cause equal difficulties.

[matter omitted]

(c) Necessity for avoiding Disagreements

Certain reasons make it desirable, in fact almost essential, that the Saorstát Representatives should not adopt an attitude on Defence Questions that would antagonise the British. A number of questions affecting defence need adjustment between the Saorstát and Great Britain. If Government Policy is correctly understood, it is desired at some future date to settle these questions with the British Government. Again if Government Policy is correctly understood it is also desired to secure the Saorstát a pretty complete measure of freedom in handling her own Defence problem, while at the same time recognising that Great Britain must have guarantees as to the security of and even co-operation in protecting certain interests vital to her. The settlement of these issues can only be made in a way satisfactory to the Saorstát if a suitable atmosphere is cultivated. One essential to the cultivating of such an atmosphere is the development of a condition of affairs under which Great Britain would be prepared to trust us in dealing with defence questions. The position at present is that only on questions of Defence has co-operation attained a fair measure of success throughout the British Commonwealth. In the case of the Saorstát there has been no co-operation in connection with Defence and her co-operation on this matter is of vital importance to Great Britain. Attempts to oppose British Military policy or opposition to proposals designed to facilitate co-operation would be regarded by the British as further indications of a desire on our part to have no co-operation. If conditions that would justify the British in holding this opinion are allowed to develop, it will not be possible to cultivate an atmosphere in which the Saorstát could make a suitable Defence arrangement with Great Britain.

Coast Defence

Apart from the general military situation, the position with regard to the undefined problems described as Coast Defence needs special consideration. Independent of an agreement something could be done to develop our position and maintain our independence in matters of purely land defence, without agreement nothing can be done in connection with Coast Defence. No aspect of Defence in any Commonwealth State so vitally affects Great Britain as Irish Coast Defence. In a few years the Saorstát Government may decide that with a view to securing the State against undue interference by the British Admiralty in time of war, it would like to undertake certain portions of its Coast Defence. This can only be done under conditions more or less suitable to the British Government. If the Saorstát indicated to Great Britain that we wished to assume a share of our Coast Defence, Britain's attitude would largely depend on the extent to which she considered we would co-operate with her in wartime. If we have on previous occasions cut across her plans and opposed her policy, she would probably decide we might do so again, and would accordingly retain to the fullest extent her powers in connection with Coast Defence.

It is therefore suggested that the Saorstát Representatives should avoid adopting an attitude to any Defence Questions that would antagonise the British Defence Authorities. The adoption of such an attitude is likely to lead to the creation of an atmosphere in which it would be impossible for the Saorstát, at a later date, to arrive at a favourable Defence arrangement with Great Britain.

Finally it has been suggested at various points in this paper that at this Conference, and on other occasions when questions affecting the Saorstát and Great Britain are being considered, questions as to uniformity and similarity in Disciplinary Codes, Regulations and Procedure are likely to arise. These questions are likely to lead to awkward considerations of various kinds. On the other hand if Great Britain is satisfied that the Saorstát is determined to adopt an attitude of co-operation on the major issues, she will decide that under conditions in which a spirit of reasonable co-operation prevails, it will be easier to overcome difficulties with regard to issues like Discipline. Under such circumstances she would probably not insist on them and it would then be much easier to arrange an agreement suitable to the Saorstát on general issues.

Uniformity and Co-Operation in Defence

The Saorstát attitude to the work of the Expert Committee would seem to be somewhat as follows:- Any existing rights which the British Parliament may have (even in theory) to legislate for Commonwealth States must be destroyed. On the other hand the Commonwealth States are prepared as free and equal nations to co-operate on issues vital to the Commonwealth as a whole. In considering questions of Defence it would be possible for the British to suggest 'your policy is that as outlined, we are undertaking measures in many ways to implement that policy. Your representatives at the 1926 Imperial Conference admitted that the Defence of Great Britain and the Saorstát is a question which is to some extent common to and is definitely vital to both countries. We are implementing the general policy suggested by you. All the other States of the Commonwealth have arranged for not merely uniformity but have also made detailed arrangements for co-operation in certain eventualities. In view of the importance of the issue to both countries we think it is now time you gave some definite indication of what you propose doing in these matters.' In view of the wide ground that can be covered in considering the present position with regard to Defence legislation and in reviewing the application in practice of changes that may be made, it is quite likely that an opportunity would arise enabling the British to raise this issue, should they so desire. Consideration of the answer to be made to such a proposition is obviously outside the scope of this Memorandum. The Saorstát Representatives should however have instructions as to the attitude they would adopt if the question is raised.

Influence of Defence Considerations on Saorstát General Policy at Experts Conference

Throughout this Memorandum the policy adopted has largely been one of subordinating other considerations to the important one of creating an atmosphere and state of affairs that would make it easy for the Saorstát to complete a desirable arrangement with Britain on various Defence questions. The further question now arises as to the respective importance of this Defence problem, and the various problems that will be discussed in detail during the forthcoming meeting. If the Defence Problem is regarded as being of considerable or possibly paramount importance, it is obvious a policy should not be adopted to the other problems of a type that may eventually have a bad effect on the efforts that will be made to reach an agreement on the Defence Problem. Saorstát Representatives have on all occasions adopted a 'forward policy' toward the type of problem to be discussed by the Experts Committee. Numerous announcements have already been made as to the 'aggressive' policy the Saorstát will adopt during the meetings of the Experts Committee. Objections to our attitude have already been forthcoming from States like Australia and New Zealand who in matters of defence feel they must rely largely on Great Britain. It is not suggested that from the constitutional or legal point of view our attitude is in any way wrong. It has however been indicated that for defence purposes there are good reasons why we should not antagonise Great Britain. There are a number of reasons that make (or should make) official circles in Great Britain suspicious of our good faith.

These reasons are:-

[matter omitted]

Unless the Saorstát is to let its defence in time of war fall largely by default (with results that cannot be estimated) into the hands of Great Britain some arrangement must be made. If we, at this Experts Conference, continue our 'forward' policy and give no indications of co-operation on Defence or any other issue, the British will be justified in assuming that we do not propose to co-operate and that we desire to abolish all legal bonds designed with a view to ensuring co-operation. If the British reach such a conclusion a suitable agreement on defence will not be possible. This leads to the consideration that with a view to creating circumstances under which Defence Issues could be settled, it might be necessary to modify our attitude on other questions. A decision on this proposal could only be given when the respective importance of Defence and the other issues had been decided. There can be no doubt that at the moment the Privy Council and certain other questions are of very considerable importance. It will however be found that the arrangements made to safeguard the Saorstát's position in time of war will have at least as much eventual influence on her constitutional and international position as decisions on various legal and other problems. It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that the Saorstát's general policy at the forthcoming Conference should be influenced by the consideration that the Saorstát has yet to make an arrangement with Britain on major defence issues. If the Saorstát plays a leading part in a policy of considerable and consistent antagonism to Great Britain on most other questions, it will not be easy to reach a suitable agreement as to Defence.

[matter omitted]

Defence and the Six Counties

Government policy with regard to the Six County Question is not a matter for consideration in this paper. In it attention has been directed to the fact that Ireland for Defence purposes (as at present visualised) must be regarded as a unit and that this question will have to be considered when Defence plans are being made. Defence Questions had much to do with the creation of the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union of South Africa. Much more recently they are having influence on the relations of Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. An examination of this question is outside the scope of this memorandum, but it is felt that attention should be directed to this factor in any paper that touches on q uestions of Defence Policy and National Policy.