Volume 7 1941~1945


Doc No.
Date
Subject

No. 400  NAI DFA Secretary's Files A52/1

Extract from a letter from Con Cremin to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(48/2b)

BERLIN, 20 March 1944

[matter omitted]

It may have struck you as curious (as it did me to some extent) that the Secretary of State should have referred to the possibility of O'Reilly and Kenny having been landed by other than German aircraft. During the official conversation I replied to this point that such a theory was completely excluded in the present case and that in any event, such an argument or indeed any other in extenuation of what had happened (such as for instance the reference to the possibility of thousands of English agents having landed in Ireland in the course of the war) had no relevancy as the only question with which we were concerned was the fact that (1) we were presented with a formal demand from countries in a position to exercise pressure on us directed against the continued presence of the German Legation in Dublin; (2) that the parachute landings had furnished a pretext for the note and (3) that, according to the instructions I had received, further infringements of our neutrality would have the most serious consequences. As it happened I had an opportunity to revert to this point a few hours later at the 'Diplomates' Lunch' (in the Adlon) at which I was the guest of the Under Secretary of State. In the meantime I had met Mullally who is going to Vienna and wanted to see me before his departure. I asked him what he knew about the O'Reilly case (he had already mentioned to Mr. Warnock on the 26th February that there was a rumour he had landed in Ireland by parachute.) He said O'Reilly and himself had been lodging together and that the former had told him he was going to the Channel Islands. I asked him if he remembered when O'Reilly left and he replied that it was on the 15th December. As O'Reilly landed on the morning of the 16th, Mullally had therefore seen him in Berlin on the previous evening. (I have no doubt that this statement of Mullally's is correct as he is rather frightened that he may be drawn into the story in some way and would therefore have every interest in dissociating himself from O'Reilly). After the lunch I was talking to Hencke (U.S. of S.) when the Secretary of State came across to us and said to Hencke that I had been to see him about the U.S. note. He then again mentioned the possibility of Irishmen from Germany being dropped by British planes (just like, he said, English planes could let fall bombs on Irish ships and allege it was the Germans who did it) and about numerous British agents landing in Ireland etc. etc. etc. I then said that I had just had occasion to meet a fellow-lodger of O'Reilly's who had seen him here the day before he was landed so that any alternative explanation than that it was a German plane was excluded in this case. To the second point I again mentioned the geographical position etc. and said that a rough parallel would be if British planes were to drop parachutists in Switzerland.

As I have already reported the Secretary of State repeated on several occasions the assurance that neither the German Government, any official authority ('amtliche Stelle') nor the Legation had anything to do with the landings and that measures had been taken to guarantee that there would not be a recurrence. Quite clearly the parachute episode had been preoccupying the Foreign Office. Baron von Steengracht showed not the least surprise when I produced my aide-mémoire. My impression is that his declaration was quite sincere – in fact it seems to me that the assurance given is a minimum in the circumstances, as the answer to the 'cui bono' touchstone if applied to the parachute landings is certainly not 'Germaniae'. The question arises therefore as to how it happened that O'Reilly and Kenny got to Ireland. Steengracht's explanation may be the correct one. It must not be overlooked, however, that the Waffen S.S. is to a great extent independent of the Wehrmacht and they may have thought they would be doing something very clever in carrying out this feat. Mullally seems to think the S.S. had something to do with it, especially as he says, O'Reilly was working in an office under the control of the Gestapo (which can be taken to belong to the same general organisation as the S.S.)

Apropos of Herr von Steengracht's assurance that measures have been taken to ensure that such incidents do not recur I wonder if the fact that Mullally has been refused an exit-visa to go home may not be in some way connected therewith – in that he would be known to have been connected with some German service (translation and radio); but, of course, one can find other explanations.

I would summarise my interview with the Secretary of State by saying that (1) he felt that our views are well founded (2) he can have no doubt about the grave view we take of further occurrences compromising to us.

I might perhaps add one further point. While the German admiration of our stand in this matter is undoubtedly sincere I have the impression that they are perhaps writing down a little the real merits of our attitude. As I already indicated they tend to bring it into line with the pressure on Turkey etc. and a few members of the Foreign Office here cited the Turkish case to me as proving that a firm stand involves no positive risks. It seems to me, however, that the parallel between the two cases is far from complete.

Yours sincerely, [signed]
C. C. CREMIN