My dear Minister,

I telephoned to you to-day a message advising that the Council should insist on being given time to consider the situation created by my brother's resignation and your knowledge of the draft award. I am convinced that, while the Commission is in law entitled to make its award at its own time, neither the Commission nor the British Government would wish that it should be published under conditions which rendered any attempt to enforce it likely to lead to (1) active and prolonged resistance on the part of persons directly affected and those in sympathy with them, and (2) deep feeling in Ireland against the BritishGovernment and the Treaty position.

In my talk with Cope last night we discussed the whole matter at length. I agreed with him that it would be easiest to let the award go on if it were possible,but as that was impossible it was necessary to consider alternatives. The alternative of preserving the status quo would obviate immediate trouble but would retain a state of friction and unsettlement and would put the Six-Counties in a state of defensive anxiety which would render conferences as to unification either impossible or fruitless, while it would enable the Ulster Separatists to keep their ranks united and prevent internal dissatisfaction with their militant regime. The third possible course seemed to be to press the British Government to induce the Northern Government to come to an agreed compromise to be adopted as an award. I thought that the East Donegal portion must be retained in the Free State if trouble was to be avoided. Cope thought it might be worth proposing that a greater population elsewhere, otherwise likely to be included in the proposed transfer to the Free State, were to remain in the six counties,and some compensation paid on either side to people who left any jurisdiction because of the change. I agreed that it would probably be less troublesome to let some people stay in Northern Ireland than to eject any from the Free State.I explained that what was possible in any way depended on the effect on our people, which I could not estimate here.

Taking the position as it stands at the moment I think that it would be best to push the third proposal hard, and try to see Sir James Craig here as well as ministers of the British Government.

While Mr. Amery urged the need for proceeding with the award I simply do not believe that any Government here would determine to rush you into compliance and risk violent and continued resistance to the introduction of a new Government in East Donegal. The legal and constitutional position is with them but the political fact is that we have been treated with gross unfairness by their nominee. We may be unable to redress the greater part of the evil but we must I think put it up to them that no Irish Government could hope to secure the peaceful application of such an award or prevent the re-opening of the whole Treaty position. This Government could not, in my opinion, refuse to join with you in a request to the Commission to hold over the award for a few weeks and the arbitrators could not reject such a request.

I expect every moment to hear from Cope who was going to try to see Mr.Churchill and possibly either Mr. Baldwin or the latter's Private Secretary. Whatever he may learn I think we must demand time in everyone's interest. If Sir James Craig could be moved to assent to the omission of the East Donegal area, not impossible if his action was recognised and in some fitting way commended, it would be a way out of a bad business. I think that if the President and Vice-President saw the Prime Minister, Amery and Joynson-Hicks and frankly said it was that or a speedy change from growing national friendliness to a steady anti-British movement accompanied by prolonged resistance to the Northern Ireland Government in the portion transferred with the active sympathy of their neighbours and their kindred overseas. Against all arguments about the validity of the award you can urge its palpable unjustness.

If Ministers come over I think they should not meet the Boundary Commissioners.

The Secretary of the Boundary Commission sent me a copy of his letter to our Government¹ about Thursday's meeting and added in his letter that I might telephone its contents if I thought fit. I thought that I had better not assist in any expediting procedure. One advantage of delay is that the legal and constitutional technicalities of the case seem less important and the political meaning and consequences of the award as generally outlined will move public opinion here and everywhere towards us. Though analogies are dangerous I think we are at least as much entitled to political redress for a serious wrong under judicial forms as the Scottish Churchmen whose endowments were judicially taken away and legislatively restored. If we assail the award as grossly unjust and stick to the need for substantial compromise we must win.

As I finished this Cope rang me up and told me in language which couldnot be understood by listeners that he had seen people and that an invitation to come over would be sent to Ministers if it was likely to be accepted. I hope this will be done, avoiding of course all contact with the Commission. I feel sure that if the manifest wrong of the decision is sufficiently assailed at least some, perhaps much, improvement will be effected. Cope hoped a moderate reply was sent to the Commission's letter. He suggests that moderation of tone(not matter) be practised in all things. I am to let him know early to-morrow.

Can Thomas Johnson² say nothing which will strengthen the Council in bettering our position?

You will realise that in suggesting demands to be made as to compromise I am trying to estimate the minimum on the assumption that you could not escape refusal to take any responsibility if less is conceded. To get the minimum it may be desirable not to set forth or even hint what it is until you must. You may well get more than a minimum as estimated by me on slender knowledge.